Research article Special Issues

The role of self-loops and link removal in evolutionary games on networks

  • Received: 28 December 2018 Accepted: 09 April 2019 Published: 11 June 2019
  • Recently, a new mathematical formulation of evolutionary game dynamics [1] has been introduced accounting for a finite number of players organized over a network, where the players are located at the nodes of a graph and edges represent connections between them. Internal steady states are particularly interesting in control and consensus problems, especially in a networked context where they are related to the coexistence of different strategies. In this paper we consider this model including self-loops. Existence of internal steady states is studied for different graph topologies in two-strategy games. Results on the effect of removing links from central players are also presented.

    Citation: Dario Madeo, Chiara Mocenni, Jean Carlo Moraes, Jorge P. Zubelli. The role of self-loops and link removal in evolutionary games on networks[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2019, 16(5): 5287-5306. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2019264

    Related Papers:

  • Recently, a new mathematical formulation of evolutionary game dynamics [1] has been introduced accounting for a finite number of players organized over a network, where the players are located at the nodes of a graph and edges represent connections between them. Internal steady states are particularly interesting in control and consensus problems, especially in a networked context where they are related to the coexistence of different strategies. In this paper we consider this model including self-loops. Existence of internal steady states is studied for different graph topologies in two-strategy games. Results on the effect of removing links from central players are also presented.


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