Research article Special Issues

Security protocols analysis including various time parameters

  • Communication is a key element of everyone's life. Nowadays, we most often use internet connections for communication. We use the network to communicate with our family, make purchases, we operate home appliances, and handle various matters related to public administration. Moreover, the Internet enables us to participate virtually in various official meetings or conferences. There is a risk of losing our sensitive data, as well as their use for malicious purposes. In this situation, each connection should be secured with an appropriate security protocol. These protocols also need to be regularly checked for vulnerability to attacks. In this article, we consider a tool that allows to analyze different executions of security protocols as well as simulate their operation. This research enables the gathering of knowledge about the behaviour of the security protocol, taking into account various time parameters (time of sending the message, time of generation confidential information, encryption and decryption times, delay in the network, lifetime) and various aspects of computer networks. The conducted research and analysis of the obtained results enable the evaluation of the protocol security and its vulnerability to attacks. Our approach also assumes the possibility of setting time limits that should be met during communication and operation of the security protocol. We show obtained results on Andrew and Needham Schroeder Public Key protocols examples.

    Citation: Sabina Szymoniak. Security protocols analysis including various time parameters[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2021, 18(2): 1136-1153. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2021061

    Related Papers:

    [1] Junlong Chen, Yanbin Tang . Homogenization of nonlinear nonlocal diffusion equation with periodic and stationary structure. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2023, 18(3): 1118-1177. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2023049
    [2] Iryna Pankratova, Andrey Piatnitski . Homogenization of convection-diffusion equation in infinite cylinder. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2011, 6(1): 111-126. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2011.6.111
    [3] L.L. Sun, M.L. Chang . Galerkin spectral method for a multi-term time-fractional diffusion equation and an application to inverse source problem. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2023, 18(1): 212-243. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2023008
    [4] Markus Gahn, Maria Neuss-Radu, Peter Knabner . Effective interface conditions for processes through thin heterogeneous layers with nonlinear transmission at the microscopic bulk-layer interface. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2018, 13(4): 609-640. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2018028
    [5] Yinlin Ye, Hongtao Fan, Yajing Li, Ao Huang, Weiheng He . An artificial neural network approach for a class of time-fractional diffusion and diffusion-wave equations. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2023, 18(3): 1083-1104. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2023047
    [6] Tom Freudenberg, Michael Eden . Homogenization and simulation of heat transfer through a thin grain layer. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2024, 19(2): 569-596. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2024025
    [7] Kexin Li, Hu Chen, Shusen Xie . Error estimate of L1-ADI scheme for two-dimensional multi-term time fractional diffusion equation. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2023, 18(4): 1454-1470. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2023064
    [8] Farman Ali Shah, Kamran, Dania Santina, Nabil Mlaiki, Salma Aljawi . Application of a hybrid pseudospectral method to a new two-dimensional multi-term mixed sub-diffusion and wave-diffusion equation of fractional order. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2024, 19(1): 44-85. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2024003
    [9] Tasnim Fatima, Ekeoma Ijioma, Toshiyuki Ogawa, Adrian Muntean . Homogenization and dimension reduction of filtration combustion in heterogeneous thin layers. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2014, 9(4): 709-737. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2014.9.709
    [10] Thomas Geert de Jong, Georg Prokert, Alef Edou Sterk . Reaction–diffusion transport into core-shell geometry: Well-posedness and stability of stationary solutions. Networks and Heterogeneous Media, 2025, 20(1): 1-14. doi: 10.3934/nhm.2025001
  • Communication is a key element of everyone's life. Nowadays, we most often use internet connections for communication. We use the network to communicate with our family, make purchases, we operate home appliances, and handle various matters related to public administration. Moreover, the Internet enables us to participate virtually in various official meetings or conferences. There is a risk of losing our sensitive data, as well as their use for malicious purposes. In this situation, each connection should be secured with an appropriate security protocol. These protocols also need to be regularly checked for vulnerability to attacks. In this article, we consider a tool that allows to analyze different executions of security protocols as well as simulate their operation. This research enables the gathering of knowledge about the behaviour of the security protocol, taking into account various time parameters (time of sending the message, time of generation confidential information, encryption and decryption times, delay in the network, lifetime) and various aspects of computer networks. The conducted research and analysis of the obtained results enable the evaluation of the protocol security and its vulnerability to attacks. Our approach also assumes the possibility of setting time limits that should be met during communication and operation of the security protocol. We show obtained results on Andrew and Needham Schroeder Public Key protocols examples.


    We will derive integrals as indicated in the abstract in terms of special functions. Some special cases of these integrals have been reported in Gradshteyn and Ryzhik [5]. In 1867 David Bierens de Haan derived hyperbolic integrals of the form

    0((log(a)ix)k+(log(a)+ix)k)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)dx (1.1)

    In our case the constants in the formulas are general complex numbers subject to the restrictions given below. The derivations follow the method used by us in [6]. The generalized Cauchy's integral formula is given by

    ykk!=12πiCewywk+1dw. (1.2)

    We use the method in [6]. Here the contour is in the upper left quadrant with (w)<0 and going round the origin with zero radius. Using a generalization of Cauchy's integral formula we first replace y by ix+log(a) for the first equation and then y by ix+log(a) to get the second equation. Then we add these two equations, followed by multiplying both sides by 12log(cos(α)sech(x)+1) to get

    ((log(a)ix)k+(log(a)+ix)k)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)2k!=12πiCawwk1cos(wx)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)dw (2.1)

    where the logarithmic function is defined in Eq (4.1.2) in [2]. We then take the definite integral over x[0,) of both sides to get

    0((log(a)ix)k+(log(a)+ix)k)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)2k!dx=12πi0Cawwk1cos(wx)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)dwdx=12πiC0awwk1cos(wx)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)dxdw=12πiCπawwk2cosh(πw2)csch(πw)dw12πiCπawwk2csch(πw)cosh(αw)dw (2.2)

    from Eq (1.7.7.120) in [1] and the integral is valid for α, a, and k complex and |(α)|<π.

    In this section we will again use the generalized Cauchy's integral formula to derive equivalent contour integrals. First we replace y by yπ/2 for the first equation and y by y+π/2 for second then add these two equations to get

    (yπ2)k+(y+π2)kk!=12πiC2wk1ewycosh(πw2)dw (3.1)

    Next we replace y by log(a)+π(2p+1) then we take the infinite sum over p[0,) to get

    p=02π((log(a)+π(2p+1)π2)k+(log(a)+π(2p+1)+π2)k)k!=12πip=0C4πwk1cosh(πw2)ew(log(a)+π(2p+1))dw=12πiCp=04πwk1cosh(πw2)ew(log(a)+π(2p+1))dw (3.2)

    where (w)<0 according to (1.232.3) in [5]. Then we simplify the left-hand side to get the Hurwitz zeta function

    2k+1πk+2(k+1)!(ζ(k1,2log(a)+π4π)+ζ(k1,2log(a)+3π4π))=12πiCπawwk2cosh(πw2)csch(πw)dw (3.3)

    Then following the procedure of (3.1) and (3.2) we replace y by y+α and yα to get the second equation for the contour integral given by

    (yα)k+(α+y)kk!=12πiC2wk1ewycosh(αw)dw (3.4)

    next we replace y by log(a)+π(2p+1) and take the infinite sum over p[0,) to get

    p=0(α+log(a)+π(2p+1))k+(α+log(a)+π(2p+1))kk!=12πip=0C2wk1cosh(αw)ew(log(a)+π(2p+1))dw=12πiCp=02wk1cosh(αw)ew(log(a)+π(2p+1))dw (3.5)

    Then we simplify to get

    2k+1πk+2(k+1)!(ζ(k1,α+log(a)+π2π)+ζ(k1,α+log(a)+π2π))=12πiCπ(aw)wk2csch(πw)cosh(αw)dw (3.6)

    Since the right-hand sides of Eqs (2.2), (3.3) and (3.5) are equivalent we can equate the left-hand sides to get

    0((log(a)ix)k+(log(a)+ix)k)log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)dx=2(2k+1πk+2(ζ(k1,α+log(a)+π2π)+ζ(k1,α+log(a)+π2π))k+1)2(2k+1πk+2(ζ(k1,2log(a)+π4π)+ζ(k1,2log(a)+3π4π))k+1) (4.1)

    from (9.521) in [5] where ζ(z,q) is the Hurwitz zeta function. Note the left-hand side of Eq (4.1) converges for all finite k. The integral in Eq (4.1) can be used as an alternative method to evaluating the Hurwitz zeta function. The Hurwitz zeta function has a series representation given by

    ζ(z,q)=n=01(q+n)z (4.2)

    where (z)>1,q0,1,.. and is continued analytically by (9.541.1) in [5] where z=1 is the only singular point.

    In this section we have evaluated integrals and extended the range of the parameters over which the integrals are valid. The aim of this section is to derive a few integrals in [5] in terms of the Lerch function. We also present errata for one of the integrals and faster converging closed form solutions.

    Using Eq (4.1) and taking the first partial derivative with respect to α and setting a=1 and simplifying the left-hand side we get

    0xkcos(α)+cosh(x)dx=2kπk+1csc(α)sec(πk2)(ζ(k,πα2π)ζ(k,α+π2π)) (5.1)

    from Eq (7.102) in [3].

    Using Eq (5.1) and taking the first partial derivative with respect to k and setting k=0 and simplifying the left-hand side we get

    0log(x)cos(α)+cosh(x)dx=csc(α)(αlog(2π)πlog(απ)+πlog(απ)πlogΓ(α+π2π)+πlogΓ(πα2π)))=csc(α)(αlog(2π)+πlog(Γ(α+π2π)Γ(πα2π))) (5.2)

    from (7.105) in [3].

    Using Eq (5.2) and setting α=π/2 and simplifying we get

    0log(x)sech(x)dx=πlog(2πΓ(34)Γ(14)) (5.3)

    Using Eq (5.2) and taking the first derivative with respect to α and setting α=π/2 and simplifying we get

    0log(x)sech2(x)dx=log(π4)γ (5.4)

    where γ is Euler's constant.

    Using Eq (5.1) and taking the first partial derivative with respect to k then setting k=1/2 and α=π/2 and simplifying we get

    0log(x)sech(x)xdx=12π(2ζ(12,14)+2ζ(12,34)+(ζ(12,34)ζ(12,14))(π+log(14π2))) (5.5)

    The expression in [4] is correct but converges much slower than Eq (5.5).

    Using Eq (5.1) and taking the first partial derivative with respect to α we get

    0xk(cos(α)+cosh(x))2dx=2k1πkcsc2(α)sec(πk2)(k(ζ(1k,πα2π)+ζ(1k,α+π2π)))2k1πkcsc2(α)sec(πk2)(2πcot(α)(ζ(k,πα2π)ζ(k,α+π2π))) (5.6)

    from (7.102) in [3]. Next we use L'Hopital's rule and take the limit as α0 to get

    0xk(cosh(x)+1)2dx=1321k((2k8)ζ(k2)(2k2)ζ(k))Γ(k+1) (5.7)

    Then we take the first partial derivative with respect to k to get

    0xklog(x)(cosh(x)+1)2dx=1324kkΓ(k)ζ(k2)23kΓ(k)ζ(k2)1322kkΓ(k)ζ(k)+23kΓ(k)ζ(k)1321kklog(256)ζ(k2)Γ(k)+1321kklog(4)ζ(k)Γ(k)+1324kkζ(k2)Γ(k)ψ(0)(k+1)23kζ(k2)Γ(k)ψ(0)(k+1)1322kkζ(k)Γ(k)ψ(0)(k+1)+23kζ(k)Γ(k)ψ(0)(k+1) (5.8)

    Finally we set k=0 to get

    0log(x)(cosh(x)+1)2dx=13(14ζ(2)γ+log(π2)) (5.9)

    The integral listed in [4] appears with an error in the integrand.

    Using Eq (4.1) we first take the limit as k1 by applying L'Hopital's rule and using (7.105) in [3] and simplifying the right-hand side we get

    0log(cos(α)sech(x)+1)a2+x2dx=πalog(π212aπΓ(aπ+12)Γ(aα+π2π)Γ(a+α+π2π)) (5.10)

    Next we take the first partial derivative with respect to α and set α=0 to get

    0sech(x)a2+x2dx=ψ(0)(2a+π4π)ψ(0)(2a+3π4π)2a (5.11)

    from Eq (8.360.1) in [5] where (a)>0, next we replace x with bx to get

    0sech(bx)a2+b2x2dx=ψ(0)(2a+π4π)ψ(0)(2a+3π4π)2ab (5.12)

    Next we set a=b=π to get

    0sech(πx)x2+1dx=12(ψ(0)(54)ψ(0)(34))=2π2 (5.13)

    from Eq (8.363.8) in [5].

    Using Eq (5.12) and setting a=b=π/2 we get

    0sech(πx2)x2+1dx=12(γψ(0)(12))=log(2) (5.14)

    from Eq (8.363.8) in [5].

    Using Eq (5.12) and setting a=b=π/4 we get

    0sech(πx4)x2+1dx=12(ψ(0)(78)ψ(0)(38))=π2coth1(2)2 (5.15)

    from Eq (8.363.8) in [5].

    Using Eq (5.10) and taking the second partial derivative with respect to α we get

    0sech2(x)a2+x2dx=ψ(1)(aπ+12)πa (5.16)

    from Eq (8.363.8) in [5] where (a)>0.

    In this paper we were able to present errata and express our closed form solutions in terms of special functions and fundamental constants such π, Euler's constant and log(2). The use of the trigamma function is quite often necessary in statistical problems involving beta or gamma distributions. This work provides both an accurate and extended range for the solutions of the integrals derived.

    We have presented a novel method for deriving some interesting definite integrals by Bierens de Haan using contour integration. The results presented were numerically verified for both real and imaginary and complex values of the parameters in the integrals using Mathematica by Wolfram.

    This research is supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada NSERC Canada under Grant 504070.

    The authors declare there are no conflicts of interest.



    [1] R. M. Needham, M. D. Schroeder, Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers, Commun. ACM, 21 (1978), 993–999. doi: 10.1145/359657.359659
    [2] D. Dolev, A. C. Yao, On the security of public key protocols, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 29 (1983), 198–208.
    [3] G. Lowe, An attack on the needham-schroeder public-key authentication protocol, Inf. Process. Lett., 56 (1995), 131–133. doi: 10.1016/0020-0190(95)00144-2
    [4] G. Lowe, Breaking and fixing the needham-schroeder public-key protocol using FDR, in Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems, TACAs '96, Springer-Verlag, London, UK, 1996.
    [5] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, R. Needham, A logic of authentication, ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 8 (1990), 18–36. doi: 10.1145/77648.77649
    [6] L. C. Paulson, Inductive analysis of the internet protocol TLS, ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., 2 (1999), 332–351. doi: 10.1145/322510.322530
    [7] M. Kurkowski, W. Penczek, Verifying security protocols modelled by networks of automata, Fundam. Inf., 79 (2007), 453–471.
    [8] B. Nguyen, C. Sprenger, C. Cremers, Abstractions for security protocol verification, J. Comput. Secur., 26 (2018), 459–508. doi: 10.3233/JCS-15769
    [9] W. Steingartner, V. Novitzka, Coalgebras for modelling observable behaviour of programs, J. Appl. Math. Comput. Mech., 16 (2017), 145–157. doi: 10.17512/jamcm.2017.2.12
    [10] J. Perh, Z. Bilanov, W. Steingartner, J. Piatko, Benchmark of software developed in different component models, in 2019 IEEE 13th International Symposium on Applied Computational Intelligence and Informatics (SACI), 2019.
    [11] D. Galinec, W. Steingartner, V. Zebic, Cyber rapid response team: An option within hybrid threats, IEEE 15th International Scientific Conference on Informatics, 2019.
    [12] A. Armando, D. Basin, Y. Boichut, Y. Chevalier, L. Compagna, J. Cuellar, et al., The AVISPA Tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005.
    [13] M. Kacprzak, W. NabiaÅek, A. Niewiadomski, W. Penczek, A. PÅrola, M. Szreter, et al., Verics 2007-a model checker for knowledge and real-time, Fundam. Inf., 85 (2008), 313–328.
    [14] C. Cremers, The Scyther Tool: Verification, Falsification, and Analysis of Security Protocols, International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, 2008.
    [15] A. Casimiro, R. d Lemos, C. Gacek, Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols, Information Security and Cryptography, Springer, 2012.
    [16] A. David, K. G. Larsen, A. Legay, M. Mikuionis, D. B. Poulsen, Uppaal smc tutorial, Int. J. Software Tools Technol. Trans, 17 (2015), 397–415. doi: 10.1007/s10009-014-0361-y
    [17] B. Blanchet, Modeling and verifying security protocols with the applied pi calculus and proverif, Found. Trends Priv. Secur., 1 (2016), 1–135. doi: 10.1561/3300000004
    [18] V. Cortier, S. Delaune, J. Dreier, Automatic generation of sources lemmas in tamarin: Towards automatic proofs of security protocols, European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2020.
    [19] M. Kurkowski, Formalne metody weryfikacji własności protokołów zabezpieczajacych w sieciach komputerowych, Informatyka-Akademicka Oficyna Wydawnicza EXIT, Akademicka Oficyna Wydawnicza Exit, 2013.
    [20] M. Kurkowski, O. Siedlecka-Lamch, P. Dudek, Using backward induction techniques in (timed) security protocols verification, in Proceedings of 12th International Conference CISIM 2013, Krakow, Poland, 2013.
    [21] O. Siedlecka-Lamch, M. Kurkowski, J. Piatkowski, Probabilistic model checking of security protocols without perfect cryptography assumption, International Conference on Computer Networks, 2016.
    [22] S. Szymoniak, M. Kurkowski, J. Piatkowski, Timed models of security protocols including delays in the network, J. Appl. Math. Comput. Mech., 14 (2015), 127–139.
    [23] R. Corin, S. Etalle, P. H. Hartel, A. Mader, Timed Analysis of Security Protocols, J. Comput. Secur. 15 (2017), 619–645.
    [24] O. Siedlecka-Lamch, I. El Fray, M. Kurkowski, J. Pejas, Verification of mutual authentication protocol for mobinfosec system, IFIP International Conference on Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management, 2015.
    [25] O. Siedlecka-Lamch, S. Szymoniak, M. Kurkowski, A fast method for security protocols verification, IFIP International Conference on Computer Information Systems and Industrial Management, 2019,
    [26] S. Szymoniak, The impact of time parameters on the security protocols correctness, International Conference on Computer Networks, 2018.
    [27] S. Szymoniak, O. Siedlecka-Lamch, M. Kurkowski, On some time aspects in security protocols analysis, International Conference on Computer Networks, 2018.
    [28] A. Kassem, P. Lafourcade, Y. Lakhnech, S. Mödersheim, Multiple independent lazy intruders, in 1st Workshop on Hot Issues in Security Principles and Trust (HotSpot 2013), 2013.
    [29] D. Basin, S. Mdersheim L. Vigan, OFMC: A symbolic model-checker for security protocols, Int. J. Inf. Secur., 4 (2005), 181–208. doi: 10.1007/s10207-004-0055-7
    [30] S. Mdersheim, F. Nielson, H. R. Nielson, Lazy mobile intruders, International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust Springer, 2013.
    [31] A. Grosser, M. Kurkowski, J. Piatkowski, S. Szymoniak, ProToc–An Universal Language for Security Protocols Specifications, Soft Computing in Computer and Information Science, 2015.
    [32] M. Satyanarayanan, Integrating security in a large distributed system, ACM Trans. Comput. Syst., 7 (1989), 247–280. doi: 10.1145/65000.65002
  • Reader Comments
  • © 2021 the Author(s), licensee AIMS Press. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0)
通讯作者: 陈斌, bchen63@163.com
  • 1. 

    沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

  1. 本站搜索
  2. 百度学术搜索
  3. 万方数据库搜索
  4. CNKI搜索

Metrics

Article views(3538) PDF downloads(203) Cited by(14)

Figures and Tables

Figures(1)  /  Tables(5)

Other Articles By Authors

/

DownLoad:  Full-Size Img  PowerPoint
Return
Return

Catalog