Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
0.9 | 0.1 | 0.6 | |||
0.8 | 0.05 | 0.3 | |||
0.6 | 0.2 | 0.35 | |||
0.23 | 0.05 | 0.05 | |||
1 | 1 | 4 | |||
3 | 8 | 5 |
Citation: Jeremy Bingham, Pietro Landi, Cang Hui. Prejudice, privilege, and power: Conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2019, 16(5): 4092-4106. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2019203
[1] | Ekaterina Kldiashvili, Archil Burduli, Gocha Ghortlishvili . Application of Digital Imaging for Cytopathology under Conditions of Georgia. AIMS Medical Science, 2015, 2(3): 186-199. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2015.3.186 |
[2] | Anuj A. Shukla, Shreya Podder, Sana R. Chaudry, Bryan S. Benn, Jonathan S. Kurman . Non-small cell lung cancer: epidemiology, screening, diagnosis, and treatment. AIMS Medical Science, 2022, 9(2): 348-361. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2022016 |
[3] | Nicole Lavender, David W. Hein, Guy Brock, La Creis R. Kidd . Evaluation of Oxidative Stress Response Related Genetic Variants, Pro-oxidants, Antioxidants and Prostate Cancer. AIMS Medical Science, 2015, 2(4): 271-294. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2015.4.271 |
[4] | Masahiro Yasunaga, Shino Manabe, Masaru Furuta, Koretsugu Ogata, Yoshikatsu Koga, Hiroki Takashima, Toshirou Nishida, Yasuhiro Matsumura . Mass spectrometry imaging for early discovery and development of cancer drugs. AIMS Medical Science, 2018, 5(2): 162-180. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2018.2.162 |
[5] | Sherven Sharma, Pournima Kadam, Ram P Singh, Michael Davoodi, Maie St John, Jay M Lee . CCL21-DC tumor antigen vaccine augments anti-PD-1 therapy in lung cancer. AIMS Medical Science, 2021, 8(4): 269-275. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2021022 |
[6] | Ayomide Abe, Mpumelelo Nyathi, Akintunde Okunade . Lung cancer diagnosis from computed tomography scans using convolutional neural network architecture with Mavage pooling technique. AIMS Medical Science, 2025, 12(1): 13-27. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2025002 |
[7] | Timothy Hamerly, Margaret H. Butler, Steve T. Fisher, Jonathan K. Hilmer, Garth A. James, Brian Bothner . Mass Spectrometry Imaging of Chlorhexidine and Bacteria in a Model Wound. AIMS Medical Science, 2015, 2(3): 150-161. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2015.3.150 |
[8] | Prarthana Shrestha, Rik Kneepkens, Gijs van Elswijk, Jeroen Vrijnsen, Roxana Ion, Dirk Verhagen, Esther Abels, Dirk Vossen, and Bas Hulsken . Objective and Subjective Assessment of Digital Pathology Image Quality. AIMS Medical Science, 2015, 2(1): 65-78. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2015.1.65 |
[9] | Anne A. Adeyanju, Wonderful B. Adebagbo, Olorunfemi R. Molehin, Omolola R. Oyenihi . Exploring the multi-drug resistance (MDR) inhibition property of Sildenafil: phosphodiesterase 5 as a therapeutic target and a potential player in reversing MDR for a successful breast cancer treatment. AIMS Medical Science, 2025, 12(2): 145-170. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2025010 |
[10] | Salma M. AlDallal . Quick glance at Fanconi anemia and BRCA2/FANCD1. AIMS Medical Science, 2019, 6(4): 326-336. doi: 10.3934/medsci.2019.4.326 |
In mathematical modelling, the term diffusion is used to describe the motion of species from one region to another. Influenced by various natural factors, such as geographic, hydrological or climatic conditions and human activities, migrations occur between patches, which affects the population dynamics, for example the persistence and extinction of species [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8]. The growth of species population is also affected by competition caused by disputing food, resources, territories and spouses, including intraspecific and interspecific competitions among populations. To see the effects of the diffusion and competition on population dynamics, we propose the following mathematical model with
dxi(t)=xi(t)[ri−aiixi(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iaijxj(t)+n∑j=1,j≠iDijxj(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijxi(t)]dt, | (1) |
where
Recently, time delays have been widely used in biological and ecological models in order to get more realistic mathematical models, for example [9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16]. In this paper, we also consider the time delay, which is accounted for the diffusion. For example, birds cannot migrate immediately after they were born, so the time delay here is the time it takes for them to learn to fly before they can migrate, and death can also occur in the process. Then, from (1) we have the model with time delays as follows
dxi(t)=xi(t)[ri−aiixi(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iaijxj(t)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijxj(t−τij)−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijxi(t)]dt,i,j=1,2,…,n, | (2) |
where
x(θ)=(x1(θ),…,xn(θ))T=(ϕ1(θ),…,ϕn(θ))T=ϕ(θ)∈C([−τ,0];Rn+). | (3) |
Reference [17] suggests that the growth rate of organisms is generally affected by environmental fluctuations accounted for the disturbance of ecological environment in nature, consequently parameters in biologic models will exhibit random perturbations [18]. Thus, the deterministic models, like (2) are not applicable to capture the essential characters. In the past years, researchers have suggested the use of white noises to capture the main characters of these stochastic fluctuations, see [18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27] for example. Denote by
ri→ri+σidBi(t), |
with which the model (2) reads
dxi(t)=xi(t)[ri−aiixi(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iaijxj(t)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijxj(t−τij)−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijxi(t)]dt+σixi(t)dBi(t),i,j=1,2,…,n. | (4) |
We further consider the optimal harvesting problem of model (4). The research on the optimal harvesting of the population is of great significance to the utilization and development of resources, and can also help mankind to get the optimal strategy of harvesting in order to obtain the most long-term benefits [28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35]. Then, we reach the following model accounted for harvesting:
dxi(t)=xi(t)[ri−aiixi(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iaijxj(t)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijxj(t−τij)−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijxi(t)]dt−hixi(t)dt+σixi(t)dBi(t),i,j=1,2,…,n, | (5) |
where
In the rest of the paper, we will devote ourselves to explore the dynamics and the optimal harvesting strategy of model (5). More precisely, in Section 2, we establish necessary conditions for persistence of species in mean and extinction of the species. In Section 3, we investigate conditions of stability, and prove asymptotic stability in distribution of the model, namely, there is a unique probability measure
For the convenience of the following discussion, we define some notations as follows
bi=ri−hi−0.5σ2i,qij=aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij,ci=bi−n∑j=1,j≠iaijqjibj,i,j=1,…,n, |
and assume that
Following the same argument as in [37], we can prove the existence of the positive solution.
Lemma 2.1. Given initial value (3), model (5) admits a unique global positive solution
lim supt→+∞E|x(t)|p≤K. | (6) |
To show our main result of this section, we consider the following auxiliary equations
dΦi(t)=Φi(t)(ri−hi−aiiΦi(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijΦi(t))dt+σiΦi(t)dBi(t), | (7) |
dΨi(t)=Ψi(t)(ri−hi−aiiΨi(t)−n∑j=1,j≠iaijΦj(t)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijΦj(t−τij)−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijΨi(t))dt+σiΨi(t)dBi(t), | (8) |
with initial value
Φi(θ)=Ψi(θ)=xi(θ),θ∈[−τ,0],i=1,2,…,n. |
By [38,Stochastic Comparison Theorem], we know that for
Ψi(θ)≤xi(θ)≤Φi(θ)a.s.,i=1,2,…,n. | (9) |
Remark 1. It is easy to see from [39] that the explicit solution of (7) is
Φi(t)=exp{bit+σiBi(t)}Φ−1i(0)+(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫t0exp{bis+σiBi(s)}ds,i=1,2,…,n. | (10) |
Similar calculation gives
Ψi(t)=exp{bit−n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫t0Φj(s)ds+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫t0Φj(s−τij)ds+σidBi(t)}×{Ψ−1i(0)+(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫t0exp{bis−n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫s0Φj(u)du+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫s0Φj(u−τij)du+σiBi(s)}ds}−1,i=1,2,…,n. | (11) |
Then, by using [40], we obtain the following.
Lemma 2.2. Let
limt→+∞t−1lnΦi(t)=0,limt→+∞t−1∫t0Φi(s)ds=biqij,a.s.,i=1,2,…,n. | (12) |
Based on Lemma 2, we assume:
Assumption 2.1.
Remark 2. A result due to Golpalsamy [10] and Assumption 2.1 imply that there exists a unique positive solution
{(a11+n∑j=2D1jα1j)x1+(a12−D12e−d2τ12)x2+…+(a1n−D1ne−dnτ1n)xn=b1≜r1−h1−12σ21,(a21−D21e−d1τ21)x1+(a22+n∑j=1,j≠2D2jα2j)x2+…+(a2n−D2ne−dnτ2n)xn=b2≜r2−h2−12σ22,…………………………………………………………………………,(an1−Dn1e−d1τn1)x1+(an2−Dn2e−d2τn2)x2+…+(ann+n−1∑j=1Dnjαnj)xn=bn≜rn−hn−12σ2n, | (13) |
in which
A=(a11+∑nj=2D1jα1ja12−D12e−d2τ12⋯a1n−D1ne−dnτ1na21−D21e−d1τ21a22+n∑j=1,j≠2D2jα2j⋯a2n−D2ne−dnτ2n⋮⋮⋱⋮an1−Dn1e−d1τn1an2−Dn2e−d2τn2⋯ann+∑n−1j=1Dnjαnj) |
and
Now we are in the position to show our main results.
Theorem 2.1. All species in system (5) are persistent in mean
limt→+∞t−1∫t0xi(s)ds=det(Ai)/det(A)>0a.s.,i=1,2,…,n. | (14) |
when Assumption 2.1 is satisfied.
Proof. Let
limt→+∞t−1∫tt−τijΦj(s)ds=limt→+∞(t−1∫t0Φj(s)ds−t−1∫t−τij0Φj(s)ds)=0, | (15) |
which together with (9) yields
limt→+∞t−1∫tt−τijxj(s)ds=0,i,j=1,2,…,n,j≠i. | (16) |
By using Itô's formula to (5), one can see that
t−1lnxi(t)−t−1lnxi(0)=bi−aiit−1∫t0xi(s)ds−n∑j=1,j≠iaijt−1∫t0xj(s)ds+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijt−1∫t0xj(s−τij)ds−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijt−1∫t0xj(s)ds+σit−1Bi(t)=bi−[aiit−1∫t0xi(s)ds+n∑j=1,j≠iaijt−1∫t0xj(s)ds−n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijt−1∫t0xj(s)ds+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijt−1∫t0xi(s)ds]+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijt−1[∫0−τijxj(s)ds −∫tt−τijxj(s)ds]+σit−1Bi(t),i,j=1,2…,n,i≠j. | (17) |
According to (16) together with the property of Brownian motion, we obtain
limt→+∞t−1[∫0−τijxj(s)ds−∫tt−τijxj(s)ds]=0, |
limt→+∞t−1Bi(t)=0,limt→+∞t−1lnxi(0)=0,a.s. |
We next to show that
limt→+∞t−1lnxi(t)=0,i=1,2,…,n. |
In view of (9) and (12), we have
lim inft→+∞t−1lnΨi(t)≤lim inft→+∞t−1lnxi(t)≤lim supt→+∞t−1lnxi(t)≤lim supt→+∞t−1lnΦi(t)=0. |
Therefore we obtain
lim inft→+∞t−1lnΨi(t)≥0a.s.,i=1,2,…,n. | (18) |
From (15) and (12), we get
limt→+∞t−1∫t0Φj(s−τij)ds=limt→+∞t−1(∫t0Φj(s)ds−∫tt−τijΦj(s)ds+∫0τijΦj(s)ds)=bjqji,a.s.,i,j=1,2…,n,i≠j. |
By using
bj/qji−ε≤t−1∫t0Φj(s−τij)ds≤bj/qji+ε,−ε≤t−1σiBi(t)≤ε. |
Applying these inequalities to (11), we have
1Ψi(t)=exp{−bit+n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫t0Φj(s)ds−n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫t0Φj(s−τij)ds−σiBi(t)}×{Ψ−1i(0)+(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫t0exp{bis−n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫s0Φj(u)du+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫s0Φj(u−τij)du+σiBi(s)}ds}=exp{−bit+n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫t0Φj(s)ds−n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫t0Φj(s−τij)ds−σiBi(t)}×{Ψ−1i(0)+(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫T0exp{bis−n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫s0Φj(u)du+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫s0Φj(u−τij)du+σiBi(s)}ds+(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫tTexp{bis−n∑j=1,j≠iaij∫s0Φj(u)du+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫s0Φj(u−τij)du+σiBi(s)}ds}≤exp{t[−bi+n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji+ε)−n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji−ε)+ε]}×{Ψ−1i(0)+Mij+(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫tTexp{s[bi−n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]}ds},i,j=1,…,n, |
in which
Ψ−1i(0)+Mij≤(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫tTexp{s[bi−n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]}ds. |
Hence for sufficiently large
1Ψi(t)≤exp{t[−bi+n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji+ε)−n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji−ε)+ε]}×2(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)∫tTexp{s[bi−n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]}ds=2(aii+∑nj=1,j≠iDijαij)bi−∑nj=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+∑nj=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε×exp{t[−bi+n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji+ε)−n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji−ε)+ε]}×exp{[bi−n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε](t−T)}. |
Rearranging this inequality shows that
t−1lnΨi(t)≥t−1lnbi−∑nj=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+∑nj=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε2(aii+∑nj=1,j≠iDijαij)−2ε(n∑j=1,j≠iaij+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij+1)+[bi−n∑j=1,j≠iaij(bjqji−ε)+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]Tt. |
Since
Corollary 2.1. If there is a
In this section, we study the stability of the model. To this end, we suppose the following holds:
Assumption 3.1.
Then, we can prove the following.
Theorem 3.1. The system (5) is asymptotically stable in distribution if Assumption 3.1 holds.
Proof. Given two initial values
V(t)=n∑i=1|lnxϕii(t)−lnxψii(t)|+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij∫tt−τij|xϕjj(s)−xψjj(s)|ds. |
Applying Itô's formula yields
d+V(t)=n∑i=1sgn(xϕii(t)−xψii(t))d(lnxϕii(t)−lnxψii(t))+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t)−xψjj(t)|dt−n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t−τij)−xψjj(t−τij)|dt=n∑i=1sgn(xϕii(t)−xψii(t))[−aii(xϕii(t)−xψii(t))−n∑j=1,j≠iaij(xϕjj(t)−xψjj(t))+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij(xϕjj(t−τij)−xψjj(t−τij))−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij(xϕii(t)−xψii(t))]dt+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t)−xψjj(t)|dt−n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t−τij)−xψjj(t−τij)|dt≤−n∑i=1aii|xϕii(t)−xψii(t)|dt+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iaij|xϕjj(t)−xψjj(t)|dt+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t−τij)−xψjj(t−τij)|dt+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij|xϕii(t)−xψii(t)|dt+n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t)−xψjj(t)|dt−n∑i=1n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij|xϕjj(t−τij)−xψjj(t−τij)|dt=−n∑i=1(aii−n∑j=1,j≠iaji+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij−n∑j=1,j≠iDjie−diτji)|xϕii(t)−xψii(t)|dt. |
Therefore
E(V(t))≤V(0)−n∑i=1(aii−n∑j=1,j≠iaji+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij−n∑j=1,j≠iDjie−diτji)∫t0E|xϕii(s)−xψii(s)|ds. |
Together with
n∑i=1(aii−n∑j=1,j≠iaji+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij−n∑j=1,j≠iDjie−diτji)∫t0E|xϕii(s)−xψii(s)|ds≤V(0)<∞. |
Hence we have
E(xi(t))=xi(0)+∫t0[E(xi(s))(ri−hi)−aiiE(xi(s))2−n∑j=1,j≠iaijE(xi(s)xj(s))+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijE(xi(s)xj(s−τij))−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijE(xi(s))2]ds=xi(0)+∫t0[E(xi(s))(ri−hi)−aiiE(xi(s))2−n∑j=1,j≠iaijE(xi(s)xj(s))−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijE(xi(s))2]ds+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij[∫0−τijE(xi(s)xj(s))ds+∫t0E(xi(s)xj(s))ds−∫tt−τijE(xi(s)xj(s))ds]≤xi(0)+∫t0[Exi(s)(ri−hi)−aiiE(xi(s))2−n∑j=1,j≠iaijE(xi(s)xj(s))−n∑j=1,j≠iDijαijE(xi(s))2]ds+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτij[∫0−τijE(xi(s)xj(s))ds+∫t0E(xi(s)xj(s))ds]. |
That is to say
dE(xi(t))dt≤E(xi(t))(ri−hi)−(aii+n∑j=1,j≠iDijαij)E(xi(t))2−n∑j=1,j≠iaijE(xi(t)xj(t))+n∑j=1,j≠iDije−djτijE(xi(t)xj(t))≤E(xi(t))ri≤riK, |
in which
limt→+∞E|xϕii(t)−xψii(t)|=0,a.s.,i=1,2,…,n. | (19) |
Denote
dL(P1,P2)=supv∈L|∫Rn+v(x)P1(dx)−∫Rn+v(x)P2(dx)|, |
where
L={v:C([−τ,0];R3+)→R:||v(x)−v(y)||≤∥x−y∥,|v(⋅)|≤1}. |
Since
supv∈L|Ev(x(t+s))−Ev(x(t))|≤ε. |
Therefore
limt→∞dL(p(t,ϕ,⋅),p(t,ξ,⋅))=0. |
Consequently,
limt→∞dL(p(t,ϕ,⋅),κ(⋅))≤limt→∞dL(p(t,ϕ,⋅),p(t,ξ,⋅))+limt→∞dL(p(t,ξ,⋅),κ(⋅))=0. |
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
In this section, we consider the optimal harvesting problem of system (5). Our purpose is to find the optimal harvesting effort
(ⅰ)
(ⅱ) Every
Before we give our main results, we define
Θ=(θ1,θ2,…,θn)T=[A(A−1)T+I]−1G, | (20) |
in which
Assumption 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold, and If these following inequalities
θi≥0,bi∣hi=θi>0,ci∣hm=θm,m=1,2,…,n>0,i=1,⋯,n | (21) |
are satisfied. Then, for system (5) the optimal harvesting effort is
H∗=Θ=[A(A−1)T+I]−1G |
and the maximum of ESY is
Y∗=ΘTA−1(G−Θ). | (22) |
Proof. Denote
limt→+∞t−1∫t0HTx(s)ds=n∑i=1hilimt→+∞t−1∫t0xi(s)ds=HTA−1(G−H). | (23) |
Applying Theorem 4.1, there is a unique invariant measure
limt→+∞t−1∫t0HTx(s)ds=∫Rn+HTxρ(dx). | (24) |
Let
Y(H)=limt→+∞n∑i=1E(hixi(t))=limt→+∞E(HTx(t))=∫Rn+HTxμ(x)dx. | (25) |
Since the invariant measure of model (9) is unique, one has
∫Rn+HTxμ(x)dx=∫Rn+HTxρ(dx). | (26) |
In other words,
Y(H)=HTA−1(G−H). | (27) |
Assume that
dY(H)dH=dHTdHA−1(G−H)+ddH[(G−H)T(A−1)T]H=A−1G−[A−1+(A−1)T]H=0. | (28) |
Thus,
ddHT[dY(H)dH]=(ddH[(dY(H)dH)T])T=(ddH[GT(A−1)T−HT[A−1+(A−1)T]])T=−A−1−(A−1)T |
is negative defined, then
To see our analytical results more clearly, we shall give some numerical simulations in this section. Without loss of generality, we consider the following system
{dx1(t)=x1(t)[r1−h1−a11x1(t)−a12x2(t)+D12e−d2τ12x2(t−τ12)−D12α12x1(t)]dt+σ1x1(t)dB1(t),dx2(t)=x2(t)[r2−h2−a22x2(t)−a21x1(t)+D21e−d1τ21x1(t−τ21)−D21α21x2(t)]dt+σ2x2(t)dB2(t), | (29) |
which is the case when
x(θ)=ϕ(θ)∈C([−τ,0];R2+),τ=max{τ1,τ2}, |
where
Firstly, we discuss the persistence in mean of
Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
0.9 | 0.1 | 0.6 | |||
0.8 | 0.05 | 0.3 | |||
0.6 | 0.2 | 0.35 | |||
0.23 | 0.05 | 0.05 | |||
1 | 1 | 4 | |||
3 | 8 | 5 |
The initial values are
limt→+∞t−1∫t0x1(s)ds=det(A1)/det(A)=0.2268>0a.s., |
limt→+∞t−1∫t0x2(s)ds=det(A2)/det(A)=0.5964>0a.s.. |
Applying the Milstein numerical method in [47], we then obtained the numerical solution of system (29), see Figure 1. It shows that
Lastly, we consider the optimal harvesting strategy of system (29). It is easy to see that the Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 3.1 are satisfied. Furthermore, we have
Θ=(θ1,θ2)T=[A(A−1)T+I]−1(r1−0.5σ21,r2−0.5σ22)T=(0.4817,0.3820)T, |
in which
H∗=Θ=(θ1,θ2)T=[A(A−1)T+I]−1(r1−0.5σ21,r2−0.5σ22)T=(0.4817,0.3820)T, |
on the other hand, the maximum of ESY is
Y∗=ΘTA−1(r1−0.5σ21−θ1,r2−0.5σ22−θ2)T=0.1789. |
By using the Monte Carlo method (see [48]) and the parameters in Table 1, we can obtain Figure 3, showing our results in Theorem 4.1.
Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
| 2 | | 0.4452 | | 0.8 |
| 1.12 | | 0.3307 | | 0.67 |
| 0.6 | | 0.3307 | | 0.56 |
| 0.8 | | 0.6 | | 0.77 |
| 0.18 | | 0.35 | | 0.3 |
| 0.45 | | 0.22 | | 0.6 |
| 0.4 | | 0.3 | | 0.2 |
| 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 |
| 0.39 | | 0.57 | | 0.37 |
| 3 | | 3 | | 5 |
| 5 | | 4 | | 5.5 |
| 4 | | 5 | | 2.4 |
| 4 | | 2 | | 2.5 |
Next, we consider a case of three species.
{dx1(t)=x1(t)[r1−h1−a11x1(t)−(a12x2(t)+a13x3(t))+(D12e−d2τ12x2(t−τ12)+D13e−d3τ13x3(t−τ13))−(D12α12x1(t)+D13α13x1(t))]dt+σ1x1(t)dB1(t),dx2(t)=x2(t)[r2−h2−a22x2(t)−(a21x1(t)+a23x3(t))+(D21e−d1τ21x1(t−τ21)+D23e−d3τ23x3(t−τ23))−(D21α21x2(t)+D23α23x2(t))]dt+σ2x2(t)dB2(t),dx3(t)=x3(t)[r3−h3−a33x3(t)−(a31x1(t)+a32x2(t))+(D31e−d1τ31x1(t−τ31)+D32e−d2τ32x2(t−τ32))−(D31α31x3(t)+D32α32x3(t))]dt+σ3x3(t)dB3(t). | (30) |
We use the following parameter values:
The initial values are
\lim\limits_{t\rightarrow+\infty}t^{-1}\int_{0}^{t}x_{1}(s) {\rm d}s = \det(A_{1})/\det(A) = 0.2543 \gt 0\;\;a.s., |
\lim\limits_{t\rightarrow+\infty}t^{-1}\int_{0}^{t}x_{2}(s) {\rm d}s = \det(A_{2})/\det(A) = 0.1601 \gt 0\;\;a.s., |
\lim\limits_{t\rightarrow+\infty}t^{-1}\int_{0}^{t}x_{3}(s) {\rm d}s = \det(A_{3})/\det(A) = 0.0730 \gt 0\;\;a.s.. |
The numerical results of Theorem 2.1 when
The stable distribution for
To numerical illustrate the optimal harvesting effort of (30), we set
\Theta = (\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3})^{T} = [A(A^{-1})^{T}+I]^{-1}(r_{1}-0.5\sigma_{1}^{2}, r_{2} -0.5\sigma_{2}^{2}, r_{3}-0.5\sigma_{3}^{2})^{T} = (1.1052, 0.5537, 0.1663)^{T}, |
which yield
In this paper, a stochastic n-species competitive model with delayed diffusions and harvesting has been considered. We studied the persistence in mean of every population, which is biologically significant because it shows that all populations can coexist in the community. Since the model (5) does not have a positive equilibrium point and its solution can not approach a positive value, we considered its asymptotically stable distribution. By using ergodic method, we obtained the optimal harvesting policy and the maximum harvesting yield of system (5). We have also done some numerical simulations of the situations for
Our studies showed some interesting results
(a) Both environmental disturbance and diffused time delay can effect the persistence and optimal harvesting effort of system (5)..
(b) Environmental noises have no effect on asymptotic stability in distribution of system (5), but the time delays have.
There are other meaningful aspects that can be studied further since our paper only consider the effects of white noises on population growth rate. In future, for example, we can consider the situation when white noises also have influences over harvesting (see [45]) and non-autonomous system (see [46]); the time delay will also be reflected in competition (see [49]). Furthermore, we can consider something more complex models such as the ones with regime-switching (see [50,51]) or Lévy jumps (see [14,42]).
This work was supported by the Research Fund for the Taishan Scholar Project of Shandong Province of China, and the SDUST Research Fund (2014TDJH102).
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.
[1] | T. Clutton-Brock, Cooperation between non-kin in animal societies, Nature, 462 (2009), 51–57. |
[2] | R. L. Trivers, The evolution of reciprocal altruism, Q. Rev. Biol., 46 (1971), 35–57. |
[3] | C. Darwin, On the origin of species by means of natural selection, or preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life. John Murray, London, 1859. |
[4] | C. Hauert, M. Holmes and M. Doebeli, Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games, Proc. R. Soc. B, 273 (2006), 2565–2570. |
[5] | W. D. Hamilton, The genetical ecolution of social behavior I and II, J. Theor. Biol., 7 (1964), 1–52. |
[6] | R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1981. |
[7] | R. Boyd and P. J. Richerson, The evolution of indirect reciprocity, Social Networks, 11 (1989), 213 – 236. |
[8] | M. A. Nowak and K. Sigmund, Evolution of indirect reciprocity, Nature, 437 (2005), 1291–1298. |
[9] | A. Gardner and S. A. West, Greenbeards, Evolution, 64 (2009), 25–38. |
[10] | S. D. Carroll, Evolutionary games and population dynamics, Q. Rev. Biol., 74 (1999), 347–347. |
[11] | R. Boyd and P. J. Richerson, Culture and the evolution of human cooperation, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B, 364 (2009), 3281–3288. |
[12] | L. Liu, S. Wang, X. Chen, et al., Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion, Chaos, 28 (2018), 103105. |
[13] | X. Chen, T. Sasaki and M. Perc, Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement, Sci. Rep., 5 (2011). |
[14] | M. Perc, J. Gomez-Gardenes, A. Szolnoki, et al., Evolutionary dymanics of group interactions on structured populations: a review, J. R. Soc. Interface, 10 (2013), 20120997. |
[15] | A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, Second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment, Phys. Rev. X, 7 (2017), 198192. |
[16] | K. Mahmoodi, B. J. West and P. Grigolini, Self-organizing Complex Networks: individual versus global rules, Front. Physiol., 8 (2017), 478. |
[17] | M. Perc, J. J. Jordan, D. G. Rand, et al., Statistical physics of human cooperation Phys. Rep., 687 (2017), 1–51. |
[18] | Z. Wang, L. Wang, A. Szolnoki, et al., Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: a colloquium,Eur. Phys. J. B, 88 (2015), 124. |
[19] | M. A. Nowak, Five rules for the evolution of cooperation., Science, 314 (2006), 1560–1563. |
[20] | K. M. Page and M. A. Nowak, Unifying evolutionary dynamics, J. Theor. Biol., 219 (2002), 93–98. |
[21] | M. van Baalend and D. A. Rand The unit of selection in viscous populations and the evolution of altruism, J. Theor. Biol., 193 (1998), 631–648. |
[22] | F. Zhang and C. Hui, Eco-evolutionary feedback and the invasion of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games, PLoS One, 6 (2011), e27523. |
[23] | F. Zhang, Y. Tao, Z. Li, et al., The evolution of cooperation on fragmented landscapes: the spatial hamilton rule, Evol. Ecol. Res., 12 (2010), 23–33. |
[24] | P. Richerson, A .V. Bell, and R. Baldini et al., Cultural group selection plays an essential role in explaining human cooperation: A sketch of the evidence, Behav. Brain Sci., 29 (2016), 30. |
[25] | B. C. Eaton, M. Eswaran and R. J. Oxoby, 'Us' and 'Them': The origin of identity, and its economic implications, Can. J. Econ., 44 (2011), 719–748. |
[26] | R. M. Kramer and M. B. Brewer, Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma, J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 46 (1984), 1044–1057. |
[27] | M. B. Brewer and R. M. Kramer, Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing, J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., 50 (1986), 543–549. |
[28] | G. Hardin, The trajedy of the commons, Science, 162 (1968), 1243–1248. |
[29] | D. H. Cole and P. Z. Grossman, Institutions matter! why the herder problem is not a prisoner's dilemma, Theo. Dec., 69 (2008), 219–231. |
[30] | R. H. McAdams, Beyond the prisoners' dilemma: Coordination, game theory, and law, South. Calif. Law Rev., 82 (2009), 209. |
[31] | B. Skyrms, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge University Press, 2003. |
[32] | J.-J. Rousseau, R. D. Masters and C. Kelly, Discourse on the origins of inequality; polemics; and, political economy. Hanover, NH, Published for Dartmouth College by University Press of New England, 1992. |
[33] | T. Antal, H. Ohtsuki, J. Wakeley, et al., Evolution of cooperation by phenotypic similarity, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 106 (2009), 8597–8600. |
[34] | F. Fu, C. E. Tarnita, N. A. Christakis, et al., Evolution of in-group favoritism, Sci. Rep., 2 (2012), 460. |
[35] | F. Jansson, What games support the evolution of an ingroup bias?, J. Theor. Biol., 373 (2015), 100–110. |
[36] | W. A. Darity Jr, P. L. Mason and J. B. Stewart, The economics of identity: The origin and persistence of racial identity norms, J. Econ. Behav. Organ., 60 (2006), 283–305. |
[37] | F. M. Kai and A. Konrad, Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict, J. Theor. Biol., 306 (2012), 61–67. |
[38] | N. Masuda, Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation, J. Theor. Biol., 311 (2012), 8–18. |
[39] | K. Pattni, M. Broom and J. Rychtář, Evolutionary dynamics and the evolution of multiplayer cooperation in a subdivided population, J. Theor. Biol., 429 (2017), 105–115. |
[40] | R. L. Riolo, M. D. Cohen and R. Axelrod, Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity, Nature,414 (2001), 441–443. |
[41] | J. P. Bruner, Diversity and cooperation, Ph.D thesis, UC Irvine, 2014. |
[42] | S. T. Powers, D. J. Taylor and J. J. Bryson, Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations, J. Theor. Biol., 311 (2012), 107–116. |
[43] | C. Hui, P. Landi, H. O. Minoarivelo, et al., Ecological and Evolutionary Modelling, Springer International Publishing, 2018. |
[44] | N. Alexander, Affirmative action and the perpetuation of racial identities in post-apartheid South Africa, Edited version of a Lecture originally delivered at the East London Campus, University of Fort Hare, 2006. |
[45] | K. Durrheim, M. Xoliswa and L. Brown, Race trouble: race, identity and inequality in post- apartheid South Africa, Lexington Books, 2011. |
[46] | R. A. Wilson, The politics of truth and reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimizing the post- apartheid state, Cambridge University Press, 2001. |
[47] | N. Alexander, Language policy and national unity in South Africa/Azania, Buchu Books, Cape Town, 1989. |
[48] | N. W. Thiong'o, Decolonizing the mind: the politics of language in African literature, James Currey, London, 1986. |
[49] | P. Landi and F. Dercole, The social diversification of fashion, J. Math. Soc., 40 (2016), 185–205. |
[50] | M. Hartshorn, A. Kaznatcheev and T. Schultz, The evolutionary dominance of ethnocentric cooperation, J. Artif. Soc. S., 16 (2013), 7. |
[51] | R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1976. |
[52] | V. A. A. Jansen and M. van Baalen, Altruism through beard chromodynamics, Nature, 440 (2006), 663. |
[53] | A. Traulsen and M. A. Nowak, Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations, PLoS One,2 (2007), e270. |
[54] | C. Hui, H. O. Minoarivelo and P. Landi, Modelling coevolution in ecological networks with adaptive dynamics, Math. Method. Appl. Sci., 41 (2018), 8407–8422. |
[55] | M. Perc and A. Szolnoki Coevolutionary games - a mini review, BioSystems, 99 (2010), 109–125. |
[56] | V. Capraro and M. Perc, Grand challenges in social physics: in pursuit of moral behavior, Front. Phys., 6 (2018), 107. |
[57] | K. Mahmoodi, P. Grigolini and B. J. West, On social sensitivity to either zealot or independent minorities, Chaos, Soliton. Fract., 110 (2018), 185–190. |
[58] | P. Landi and C. Piccardi, Community analysis in directed networks: in-, out- and pseudocommunities, Phys. Rev. E, 89 (2014), 012814. |
[59] | K. Mahmoodi and P. Grigolini Evolutionary game theory and criticality J. Phys. A- Math. Theor., 50 (2017), 015101. |
[60] | M.A.NowakandR.M.May, Evolutionarygamesandspatialchaos, Nature, 359(1992), 826–829.v 61. J. J. Horton, D. G. Rand and R. J. Zeckhauser, The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market. Exp. Econ., 14 (2011), 399–425. |
[61] | 62. A. Ofra and D. G. Rand, Economic games on the internet: the effect of $1 stakes, PloS One, 7 (2012), e314 |
[62] | 63. D. G. Rand, The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioural experiments, J. Theor. Biol., 299 (2012), 172–179. |
Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
| 2 | | 0.4452 | | 0.8 |
| 1.12 | | 0.3307 | | 0.67 |
| 0.6 | | 0.3307 | | 0.56 |
| 0.8 | | 0.6 | | 0.77 |
| 0.18 | | 0.35 | | 0.3 |
| 0.45 | | 0.22 | | 0.6 |
| 0.4 | | 0.3 | | 0.2 |
| 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 |
| 0.39 | | 0.57 | | 0.37 |
| 3 | | 3 | | 5 |
| 5 | | 4 | | 5.5 |
| 4 | | 5 | | 2.4 |
| 4 | | 2 | | 2.5 |
Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
0.9 | 0.1 | 0.6 | |||
0.8 | 0.05 | 0.3 | |||
0.6 | 0.2 | 0.35 | |||
0.23 | 0.05 | 0.05 | |||
1 | 1 | 4 | |||
3 | 8 | 5 |
Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value | Parameter | Value |
| 2 | | 0.4452 | | 0.8 |
| 1.12 | | 0.3307 | | 0.67 |
| 0.6 | | 0.3307 | | 0.56 |
| 0.8 | | 0.6 | | 0.77 |
| 0.18 | | 0.35 | | 0.3 |
| 0.45 | | 0.22 | | 0.6 |
| 0.4 | | 0.3 | | 0.2 |
| 0.05 | | 0.05 | | 0.05 |
| 0.39 | | 0.57 | | 0.37 |
| 3 | | 3 | | 5 |
| 5 | | 4 | | 5.5 |
| 4 | | 5 | | 2.4 |
| 4 | | 2 | | 2.5 |