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Research article Special Issues

Prejudice, privilege, and power: Conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups

  • The problem of cooperation remains one of the fundamental questions in the fields of biology, sociology, and economics. The emergence and maintenance of cooperation are naturally affected by group dynamics, since individuals are likely to behave differently based on shared group membership. We here formulate a model of socio-economic power between two prejudiced groups, and explore the conditions for their cooperative coexistence under two social scenarios in a well-mixed environment. Each scenario corresponds to an asymmetrical increase in the payoffs for mutual cooperation in either cross-group or within-group interactions. In the 'inter-dependence' scenario payoffs of cross-group cooperation are enhanced, while in the 'group-cohesion' scenario payoffs of within-group cooperation are enhanced. We find that stable cooperative coexistence is possible only in the inter-dependence scenario. The conditions for such coexistence are highly sensitive to prejudice, defined as the reduction in probability for cross-group cooperation, and less sensitive to privilege, defined as the enhancements to payoffs of cross-group cooperation.

    Citation: Jeremy Bingham, Pietro Landi, Cang Hui. Prejudice, privilege, and power: Conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2019, 16(5): 4092-4106. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2019203

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  • The problem of cooperation remains one of the fundamental questions in the fields of biology, sociology, and economics. The emergence and maintenance of cooperation are naturally affected by group dynamics, since individuals are likely to behave differently based on shared group membership. We here formulate a model of socio-economic power between two prejudiced groups, and explore the conditions for their cooperative coexistence under two social scenarios in a well-mixed environment. Each scenario corresponds to an asymmetrical increase in the payoffs for mutual cooperation in either cross-group or within-group interactions. In the 'inter-dependence' scenario payoffs of cross-group cooperation are enhanced, while in the 'group-cohesion' scenario payoffs of within-group cooperation are enhanced. We find that stable cooperative coexistence is possible only in the inter-dependence scenario. The conditions for such coexistence are highly sensitive to prejudice, defined as the reduction in probability for cross-group cooperation, and less sensitive to privilege, defined as the enhancements to payoffs of cross-group cooperation.


    In mathematical modelling, the term diffusion is used to describe the motion of species from one region to another. Influenced by various natural factors, such as geographic, hydrological or climatic conditions and human activities, migrations occur between patches, which affects the population dynamics, for example the persistence and extinction of species [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8]. The growth of species population is also affected by competition caused by disputing food, resources, territories and spouses, including intraspecific and interspecific competitions among populations. To see the effects of the diffusion and competition on population dynamics, we propose the following mathematical model with n species, for i,j=1,2,,n,

    dxi(t)=xi(t)[riaiixi(t)nj=1,jiaijxj(t)+nj=1,jiDijxj(t)nj=1,jiDijαijxi(t)]dt, (1)

    where xi(t) is the population size at time t of the ith species, positive constants ri, aii are the growth rate and the interspecific competition rate of the ith species respectively, aij>0(ji) is the competition rate between species i and j, Dij0 is the diffusion coefficient from species j to species i, αij0 indicates the diffusion boundary condition.

    Recently, time delays have been widely used in biological and ecological models in order to get more realistic mathematical models, for example [9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16]. In this paper, we also consider the time delay, which is accounted for the diffusion. For example, birds cannot migrate immediately after they were born, so the time delay here is the time it takes for them to learn to fly before they can migrate, and death can also occur in the process. Then, from (1) we have the model with time delays as follows

    dxi(t)=xi(t)[riaiixi(t)nj=1,jiaijxj(t)+nj=1,jiDijedjτijxj(tτij)nj=1,jiDijαijxi(t)]dt,i,j=1,2,,n, (2)

    where τij0 is the time delay and dj is the death rate of the jth species. Let τ=maxi,j=1,,n{τij} and C([τ,0];Rn+) denote the family of all bounded and continuous functions from [τ,0] to Rn+. We assume model (2) is subject to the following initial condition

    x(θ)=(x1(θ),,xn(θ))T=(ϕ1(θ),,ϕn(θ))T=ϕ(θ)C([τ,0];Rn+). (3)

    Reference [17] suggests that the growth rate of organisms is generally affected by environmental fluctuations accounted for the disturbance of ecological environment in nature, consequently parameters in biologic models will exhibit random perturbations [18]. Thus, the deterministic models, like (2) are not applicable to capture the essential characters. In the past years, researchers have suggested the use of white noises to capture the main characters of these stochastic fluctuations, see [18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27] for example. Denote by {Bi(t)}t0,(i=1,2,,n) the independent standard Brownian motions defined on a complete probability space (Ω,{Ft}tR+,P) with σ2i represents the intensity of the environment noises. Then, the growth rate subject to random perturbation can be described by

    riri+σidBi(t),

    with which the model (2) reads

    dxi(t)=xi(t)[riaiixi(t)nj=1,jiaijxj(t)+nj=1,jiDijedjτijxj(tτij)nj=1,jiDijαijxi(t)]dt+σixi(t)dBi(t),i,j=1,2,,n. (4)

    We further consider the optimal harvesting problem of model (4). The research on the optimal harvesting of the population is of great significance to the utilization and development of resources, and can also help mankind to get the optimal strategy of harvesting in order to obtain the most long-term benefits [28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35]. Then, we reach the following model accounted for harvesting:

    dxi(t)=xi(t)[riaiixi(t)nj=1,jiaijxj(t)+nj=1,jiDijedjτijxj(tτij)nj=1,jiDijαijxi(t)]dthixi(t)dt+σixi(t)dBi(t),i,j=1,2,,n, (5)

    where hi0 denotes the harvesting effort of the species i.

    In the rest of the paper, we will devote ourselves to explore the dynamics and the optimal harvesting strategy of model (5). More precisely, in Section 2, we establish necessary conditions for persistence of species in mean and extinction of the species. In Section 3, we investigate conditions of stability, and prove asymptotic stability in distribution of the model, namely, there is a unique probability measure ρ() such that for each ϕC([τ,0];Rn+), the transition probability p(t,ϕ,) of x(t) converges weekly to ρ() when t. In Section 4, by the use of the Hessian matrix and theorems of optimal harvesting due to [36], we investigate the optimal harvesting effort and gain the maximum of expectation of sustainable yield (ESY). In Section 5, we numerically illustrate our theoretical results obtained in previous sections, and then conclude our study in Section 6.

    For the convenience of the following discussion, we define some notations as follows

    bi=rihi0.5σ2i,qij=aii+nj=1,jiDijαij,ci=binj=1,jiaijqjibj,i,j=1,,n,

    and assume that nj=1,jiaijnj=1,jiDijedjτij holds in the rest of the paper.

    Following the same argument as in [37], we can prove the existence of the positive solution.

    Lemma 2.1. Given initial value (3), model (5) admits a unique global positive solution x(t)=(x1(t),,xn(t))T almost surely. Furthermore, for each p>1, there exists a positive constant K=K(p) such that

    lim supt+E|x(t)|pK. (6)

    To show our main result of this section, we consider the following auxiliary equations

    dΦi(t)=Φi(t)(rihiaiiΦi(t)nj=1,jiDijαijΦi(t))dt+σiΦi(t)dBi(t), (7)
    dΨi(t)=Ψi(t)(rihiaiiΨi(t)nj=1,jiaijΦj(t)+nj=1,jiDijedjτijΦj(tτij)nj=1,jiDijαijΨi(t))dt+σiΨi(t)dBi(t), (8)

    with initial value

    Φi(θ)=Ψi(θ)=xi(θ),θ[τ,0],i=1,2,,n.

    By [38,Stochastic Comparison Theorem], we know that for tτ,

    Ψi(θ)xi(θ)Φi(θ)a.s.,i=1,2,,n. (9)

    Remark 1. It is easy to see from [39] that the explicit solution of (7) is

    Φi(t)=exp{bit+σiBi(t)}Φ1i(0)+(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)t0exp{bis+σiBi(s)}ds,i=1,2,,n. (10)

    Similar calculation gives

    Ψi(t)=exp{bitnj=1,jiaijt0Φj(s)ds+nj=1,jiDijedjτijt0Φj(sτij)ds+σidBi(t)}×{Ψ1i(0)+(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)t0exp{bisnj=1,jiaijs0Φj(u)du+nj=1,jiDijedjτijs0Φj(uτij)du+σiBi(s)}ds}1,i=1,2,,n. (11)

    Then, by using [40], we obtain the following.

    Lemma 2.2. Let bi>0. Then, from (7) we have

    limt+t1lnΦi(t)=0,limt+t1t0Φi(s)ds=biqij,a.s.,i=1,2,,n. (12)

    Based on Lemma 2, we assume:

    Assumption 2.1. bi>0,ci>0,i=1,2,,n.

    Remark 2. A result due to Golpalsamy [10] and Assumption 2.1 imply that there exists a unique positive solution (det(A1)/det(A),,det(An)/det(A))T for the following system

    {(a11+nj=2D1jα1j)x1+(a12D12ed2τ12)x2++(a1nD1nednτ1n)xn=b1r1h112σ21,(a21D21ed1τ21)x1+(a22+nj=1,j2D2jα2j)x2++(a2nD2nednτ2n)xn=b2r2h212σ22,,(an1Dn1ed1τn1)x1+(an2Dn2ed2τn2)x2++(ann+n1j=1Dnjαnj)xn=bnrnhn12σ2n, (13)

    in which

    A=(a11+nj=2D1jα1ja12D12ed2τ12a1nD1nednτ1na21D21ed1τ21a22+nj=1,j2D2jα2ja2nD2nednτ2nan1Dn1ed1τn1an2Dn2ed2τn2ann+n1j=1Dnjαnj)

    and Ai is the matrix given by using the (b1,b2,,bn)T to replace the ith column of matrix A.

    Now we are in the position to show our main results.

    Theorem 2.1. All species in system (5) are persistent in mean a.s., i.e.,

    limt+t1t0xi(s)ds=det(Ai)/det(A)>0a.s.,i=1,2,,n. (14)

    when Assumption 2.1 is satisfied.

    Proof. Let bi>0, according to (12) that for i,j=1,2,,n,ji, one has

    limt+t1ttτijΦj(s)ds=limt+(t1t0Φj(s)dst1tτij0Φj(s)ds)=0, (15)

    which together with (9) yields

    limt+t1ttτijxj(s)ds=0,i,j=1,2,,n,ji. (16)

    By using Itô's formula to (5), one can see that

    t1lnxi(t)t1lnxi(0)=biaiit1t0xi(s)dsnj=1,jiaijt1t0xj(s)ds+nj=1,jiDijedjτijt1t0xj(sτij)dsnj=1,jiDijαijt1t0xj(s)ds+σit1Bi(t)=bi[aiit1t0xi(s)ds+nj=1,jiaijt1t0xj(s)dsnj=1,jiDijedjτijt1t0xj(s)ds+nj=1,jiDijαijt1t0xi(s)ds]+nj=1,jiDijedjτijt1[0τijxj(s)ds ttτijxj(s)ds]+σit1Bi(t),i,j=1,2,n,ij. (17)

    According to (16) together with the property of Brownian motion, we obtain

    limt+t1[0τijxj(s)dsttτijxj(s)ds]=0,
    limt+t1Bi(t)=0,limt+t1lnxi(0)=0,a.s.

    We next to show that

    limt+t1lnxi(t)=0,i=1,2,,n.

    In view of (9) and (12), we have

    lim inft+t1lnΨi(t)lim inft+t1lnxi(t)lim supt+t1lnxi(t)lim supt+t1lnΦi(t)=0.

    Therefore we obtain

    lim inft+t1lnΨi(t)0a.s.,i=1,2,,n. (18)

    From (15) and (12), we get

    limt+t1t0Φj(sτij)ds=limt+t1(t0Φj(s)dsttτijΦj(s)ds+0τijΦj(s)ds)=bjqji,a.s.,i,j=1,2,n,ij.

    By using limt+t1Bi(t)=0 together with what we have just obtained, yields that for any given ε>0, there exists a T=T(ω) thus for tT,i,j=1,2,n,ij,

    bj/qjiεt1t0Φj(sτij)dsbj/qji+ε,εt1σiBi(t)ε.

    Applying these inequalities to (11), we have

    1Ψi(t)=exp{bit+nj=1,jiaijt0Φj(s)dsnj=1,jiDijedjτijt0Φj(sτij)dsσiBi(t)}×{Ψ1i(0)+(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)t0exp{bisnj=1,jiaijs0Φj(u)du+nj=1,jiDijedjτijs0Φj(uτij)du+σiBi(s)}ds}=exp{bit+nj=1,jiaijt0Φj(s)dsnj=1,jiDijedjτijt0Φj(sτij)dsσiBi(t)}×{Ψ1i(0)+(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)T0exp{bisnj=1,jiaijs0Φj(u)du+nj=1,jiDijedjτijs0Φj(uτij)du+σiBi(s)}ds+(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)tTexp{bisnj=1,jiaijs0Φj(u)du+nj=1,jiDijedjτijs0Φj(uτij)du+σiBi(s)}ds}exp{t[bi+nj=1,jiaij(bjqji+ε)nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqjiε)+ε]}×{Ψ1i(0)+Mij+(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)tTexp{s[binj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]}ds},i,j=1,,n,

    in which Mij>0 is a constant. Note that ci=binj=1,jiaijqjibj>0, thereby for large enough t, one has that

    Ψ1i(0)+Mij(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)tTexp{s[binj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]}ds.

    Hence for sufficiently large t, we obtain

    1Ψi(t)exp{t[bi+nj=1,jiaij(bjqji+ε)nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqjiε)+ε]}×2(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)tTexp{s[binj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]}ds=2(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)binj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε×exp{t[bi+nj=1,jiaij(bjqji+ε)nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqjiε)+ε]}×exp{[binj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε](tT)}.

    Rearranging this inequality shows that

    t1lnΨi(t)t1lnbinj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε2(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)2ε(nj=1,jiaij+nj=1,jiDijedjτij+1)+[binj=1,jiaij(bjqjiε)+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(bjqji+ε)+ε]Tt.

    Since t is large enough and ε is arbitrary, we get (14). This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.

    Corollary 2.1. If there is a bi<0, then according to (17), one has lim supt+t1lnxi(t)bi<0,a.s. It is to say limt+xi(t)=0,a.s., which means that the ith species in system (5) will die out.

    In this section, we study the stability of the model. To this end, we suppose the following holds:

    Assumption 3.1. aii+nj=1,jiDijαijnj=1,jiaji+nj=1,jiDjiediτji,i=1,2,,n.

    Then, we can prove the following.

    Theorem 3.1. The system (5) is asymptotically stable in distribution if Assumption 3.1 holds.

    Proof. Given two initial values ϕ(θ),ψ(θ)C([τ,0];Rn+) of model (5), the corresponding solutions are xϕ(t)=(xϕ11(t),,xϕnn(t))T and xψ(t)=(xψ11(t),,xψnn(t))T respectively. Let

    V(t)=ni=1|lnxϕii(t)lnxψii(t)|+ni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτijttτij|xϕjj(s)xψjj(s)|ds.

    Applying Itô's formula yields

    d+V(t)=ni=1sgn(xϕii(t)xψii(t))d(lnxϕii(t)lnxψii(t))+ni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(t)xψjj(t)|dtni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(tτij)xψjj(tτij)|dt=ni=1sgn(xϕii(t)xψii(t))[aii(xϕii(t)xψii(t))nj=1,jiaij(xϕjj(t)xψjj(t))+nj=1,jiDijedjτij(xϕjj(tτij)xψjj(tτij))nj=1,jiDijαij(xϕii(t)xψii(t))]dt+ni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(t)xψjj(t)|dtni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(tτij)xψjj(tτij)|dtni=1aii|xϕii(t)xψii(t)|dt+ni=1nj=1,jiaij|xϕjj(t)xψjj(t)|dt+ni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(tτij)xψjj(tτij)|dt+ni=1nj=1,jiDijαij|xϕii(t)xψii(t)|dt+ni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(t)xψjj(t)|dtni=1nj=1,jiDijedjτij|xϕjj(tτij)xψjj(tτij)|dt=ni=1(aiinj=1,jiaji+nj=1,jiDijαijnj=1,jiDjiediτji)|xϕii(t)xψii(t)|dt.

    Therefore

    E(V(t))V(0)ni=1(aiinj=1,jiaji+nj=1,jiDijαijnj=1,jiDjiediτji)t0E|xϕii(s)xψii(s)|ds.

    Together with E(V(t))0, one has

    ni=1(aiinj=1,jiaji+nj=1,jiDijαijnj=1,jiDjiediτji)t0E|xϕii(s)xψii(s)|dsV(0)<.

    Hence we have E|xϕii(s)xψii(s)|L1[0,),i=1,2,,n. At the same time, by using (5) we obtain that

    E(xi(t))=xi(0)+t0[E(xi(s))(rihi)aiiE(xi(s))2nj=1,jiaijE(xi(s)xj(s))+nj=1,jiDijedjτijE(xi(s)xj(sτij))nj=1,jiDijαijE(xi(s))2]ds=xi(0)+t0[E(xi(s))(rihi)aiiE(xi(s))2nj=1,jiaijE(xi(s)xj(s))nj=1,jiDijαijE(xi(s))2]ds+nj=1,jiDijedjτij[0τijE(xi(s)xj(s))ds+t0E(xi(s)xj(s))dsttτijE(xi(s)xj(s))ds]xi(0)+t0[Exi(s)(rihi)aiiE(xi(s))2nj=1,jiaijE(xi(s)xj(s))nj=1,jiDijαijE(xi(s))2]ds+nj=1,jiDijedjτij[0τijE(xi(s)xj(s))ds+t0E(xi(s)xj(s))ds].

    That is to say E(xi(t)) is continuously differentiable with respect of t. Computing by (5) leads to

    dE(xi(t))dtE(xi(t))(rihi)(aii+nj=1,jiDijαij)E(xi(t))2nj=1,jiaijE(xi(t)xj(t))+nj=1,jiDijedjτijE(xi(t)xj(t))E(xi(t))ririK,

    in which K>0 is a constant. It implies that E(xi(t)) is uniformly continuous. Using [41], we get

    limt+E|xϕii(t)xψii(t)|=0,a.s.,i=1,2,,n. (19)

    Denote p(t,ϕ,dy) as the transition probability density of the process x(t) and P(t,ϕ,A) represents the probability of event x(t)A. By (6) and [42,Chebyshev's inequality], we can obtain that the family of p(t,ϕ,dy) is tight. Now define Γ(C([τ,0];Rn+)) as the probability measures on C([τ,0];Rn+). For arbitrary two measures P1,P2Γ, we define the metric

    dL(P1,P2)=supvL|Rn+v(x)P1(dx)Rn+v(x)P2(dx)|,

    where

    L={v:C([τ,0];R3+)R:||v(x)v(y)||≤∥xy,|v()|1}.

    Since {p(t,ϕ,dy)} is tight, then according to (19) we know that for any ε>0, there is a T>0 satisfies that for tT,s>0,

    supvL|Ev(x(t+s))Ev(x(t))|ε.

    Therefore {p(t,ξ,)} is Cauchy in Γ with metric dL, in which ξC([τ,0];Rn+) is arbitrary given. Hence there exists a unique κ()Γ(C([τ,0];Rn+)) such that limtdL(p(t,ξ,),κ())=0. At the same time, it follows from (19) that

    limtdL(p(t,ϕ,),p(t,ξ,))=0.

    Consequently,

    limtdL(p(t,ϕ,),κ())limtdL(p(t,ϕ,),p(t,ξ,))+limtdL(p(t,ξ,),κ())=0.

    This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.

    In this section, we consider the optimal harvesting problem of system (5). Our purpose is to find the optimal harvesting effort H=(h1,,hn) such that:

    (ⅰ) Y(H)=limt+ni=1E(hixi(t)) is maximum;

    (ⅱ) Every xi(i=1,2,,n) is persistent in the mean.

    Before we give our main results, we define

    Θ=(θ1,θ2,,θn)T=[A(A1)T+I]1G, (20)

    in which G=(r10.5σ21,r20.5σ22,,rn0.5σ2n)T and I is the unit matrix, and make an assumption:

    Assumption 4.1. A1+(A1)T is positive definite,

    Theorem 4.1. Suppose Assumptions 3.1 and 4.1 hold, and If these following inequalities

    θi0,bihi=θi>0,cihm=θm,m=1,2,,n>0,i=1,,n (21)

    are satisfied. Then, for system (5) the optimal harvesting effort is

    H=Θ=[A(A1)T+I]1G

    and the maximum of ESY is

    Y=ΘTA1(GΘ). (22)

    Proof. Denote W={H=(h1,,hn)TRnbi>0,ci>0,hi>0,i=1,,n}. Easily we can see that for any HW, (14) is satisfied. Note that ΘW, then W is not empty. According to (14), we have that for every HW,

    limt+t1t0HTx(s)ds=ni=1hilimt+t1t0xi(s)ds=HTA1(GH). (23)

    Applying Theorem 4.1, there is a unique invariant measure ρ() for model (5). By [43,Corollary 3.4.3], we obtain that ρ() is strong mixing. Meanwhile, it is ergodic according to [43,Theorem 3.2.6]. It means

    limt+t1t0HTx(s)ds=Rn+HTxρ(dx). (24)

    Let μ(x) represent the stationary probability density of system (5), then we have

    Y(H)=limt+ni=1E(hixi(t))=limt+E(HTx(t))=Rn+HTxμ(x)dx. (25)

    Since the invariant measure of model (9) is unique, one has

    Rn+HTxμ(x)dx=Rn+HTxρ(dx). (26)

    In other words,

    Y(H)=HTA1(GH). (27)

    Assume that Θ=(θ1,θ2,,θn)T is the solution of the following equation

    dY(H)dH=dHTdHA1(GH)+ddH[(GH)T(A1)T]H=A1G[A1+(A1)T]H=0. (28)

    Thus, Θ=[A(A1)T+I]1G. By using of the Hessian matrix (see [44,45]),

    ddHT[dY(H)dH]=(ddH[(dY(H)dH)T])T=(ddH[GT(A1)THT[A1+(A1)T]])T=A1(A1)T

    is negative defined, then Θ is the unique extreme point of Y(H). That is to say, if ΘW and under the condition of (21), the optimal harvesting effort is H=Θ and Y is the maximum value of ESY. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.

    To see our analytical results more clearly, we shall give some numerical simulations in this section. Without loss of generality, we consider the following system

    {dx1(t)=x1(t)[r1h1a11x1(t)a12x2(t)+D12ed2τ12x2(tτ12)D12α12x1(t)]dt+σ1x1(t)dB1(t),dx2(t)=x2(t)[r2h2a22x2(t)a21x1(t)+D21ed1τ21x1(tτ21)D21α21x2(t)]dt+σ2x2(t)dB2(t), (29)

    which is the case when n=2 in (5), with initial value

    x(θ)=ϕ(θ)C([τ,0];R2+),τ=max{τ1,τ2},

    where ri>0,aij>0,τi0,i,j=1,2.

    Firstly, we discuss the persistence in mean of x1 and x2. For that, we take the parameter values as follows:

    Table 1.  Parameter Values for Figure 13.
    Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
    r1 0.9 h1 0.1 α12 0.6
    r2 0.8 h2 0.05 α21 0.3
    a11 0.6 a12 0.2 a21 0.35
    a22 0.23 σ1 0.05 σ2 0.05
    d1 1 d2 1 D12 4
    D21 3 τ12 8 τ21 5

     | Show Table
    DownLoad: CSV

    The initial values are x1(θ)=0.5+0.01sinθ, x2(θ)=0.5+0.02sinθ, θ[τ,0]. Simple calculations show that b1=0.7988>0,b2=0.7488>0,c1=0.6662>0,c2=0.6556>0 implying Assumption 2.1 is satisfied. Then by Theorem 2.1, we can obtain that in (29)

    Figure 1.  Time series of species x1 and x2 of system (29) with initial values x1(θ)=0.5+0.01sinθ, x2(θ)=0.5+0.02sinθ, θ[τ,0] and parameter values in Table 1.
    limt+t1t0x1(s)ds=det(A1)/det(A)=0.2268>0a.s.,
    limt+t1t0x2(s)ds=det(A2)/det(A)=0.5964>0a.s..

    Applying the Milstein numerical method in [47], we then obtained the numerical solution of system (29), see Figure 1. It shows that x1 and x2 respectively asymptotical approach to 0.2268 and 0.5964 time averagely. And this agrees well with our results in Theorem 2.1. Then we research the distributions of x1 and x2 under the same conditions. Obviously, we have a11+D12α12a21+D21ed1τ21,a22+D21α21a12+D12ed2τ12, it is to say Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Thus by Theorem 3.1, system (29) is asymptotically stable in distribution as suggested by Figure 2.

    Figure 2.  Distributions of species x1 and x2 of system (29) with initial values x1(θ)=0.5+0.01sinθ, x2(θ)=0.5+0.02sinθ, θ[τ,0] and parameter values in Table 1.

    Lastly, we consider the optimal harvesting strategy of system (29). It is easy to see that the Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 3.1 are satisfied. Furthermore, we have

    Θ=(θ1,θ2)T=[A(A1)T+I]1(r10.5σ21,r20.5σ22)T=(0.4817,0.3820)T,

    in which I=(1001). Since condition (21) is satisfied, by Theorem 4.1, the optimal harvesting effort is

    H=Θ=(θ1,θ2)T=[A(A1)T+I]1(r10.5σ21,r20.5σ22)T=(0.4817,0.3820)T,

    on the other hand, the maximum of ESY is

    Y=ΘTA1(r10.5σ21θ1,r20.5σ22θ2)T=0.1789.

    By using the Monte Carlo method (see [48]) and the parameters in Table 1, we can obtain Figure 3, showing our results in Theorem 4.1.

    Figure 3.  The harvesting policies E[h1x1(t)+h2x2(t)] of system (29) with initial values x1(θ)=0.5+0.01sinθ, x2(θ)=0.5+0.02sinθ, θ[τ,0] and parameter values in Table 1. The red line is with h1=h1=0.4817,h2=h2=0.3820, the green line is with h1=0.53,h2=0.2, the blue line is with h1=0.1,h2=0.2.
    Table 2.  Parameter Values for Figure 4-6.
    ParameterValueParameterValueParameterValue
    r12 h10.4452 α120.8
    r21.12 h20.3307 α130.67
    r30.6 h30.3307 α210.56
    α230.8 α310.6 α320.77
    a110.18 a120.35 a130.3
    a210.45 a220.22 a230.6
    a310.4 a320.3 a330.2
    σ10.05 σ20.05 σ30.05
    d10.39 d20.57 d30.37
    τ123 τ133 τ215
    τ225 τ314 τ325.5
    D124 D135 D212.4
    D234 D312 D322.5

     | Show Table
    DownLoad: CSV

    Next, we consider a case of three species.

    {dx1(t)=x1(t)[r1h1a11x1(t)(a12x2(t)+a13x3(t))+(D12ed2τ12x2(tτ12)+D13ed3τ13x3(tτ13))(D12α12x1(t)+D13α13x1(t))]dt+σ1x1(t)dB1(t),dx2(t)=x2(t)[r2h2a22x2(t)(a21x1(t)+a23x3(t))+(D21ed1τ21x1(tτ21)+D23ed3τ23x3(tτ23))(D21α21x2(t)+D23α23x2(t))]dt+σ2x2(t)dB2(t),dx3(t)=x3(t)[r3h3a33x3(t)(a31x1(t)+a32x2(t))+(D31ed1τ31x1(tτ31)+D32ed2τ32x2(tτ32))(D31α31x3(t)+D32α32x3(t))]dt+σ3x3(t)dB3(t). (30)

    We use the following parameter values:

    The initial values are x_{1}(\theta) = 0.5+0.01\sin\theta , x_{2}(\theta) = 0.5+0.02\sin\theta , x_{3}(\theta) = 0.5+0.001\sin\theta , \theta\in[-\tau, 0] . Easily we get that b_{1} = 0.1.5536>0, \;b_{2} = 0.7881>0, \;b_{3} = 0.2681>0, \;c_{1} = 1.4502>0, \;c_{2} = 0.0552>0, \;c_{3} = 0.0229>0. Thus Assumption 2.1 is hold. By Theorem 2.1, we have for (30)

    \lim\limits_{t\rightarrow+\infty}t^{-1}\int_{0}^{t}x_{1}(s) {\rm d}s = \det(A_{1})/\det(A) = 0.2543 \gt 0\;\;a.s.,
    \lim\limits_{t\rightarrow+\infty}t^{-1}\int_{0}^{t}x_{2}(s) {\rm d}s = \det(A_{2})/\det(A) = 0.1601 \gt 0\;\;a.s.,
    \lim\limits_{t\rightarrow+\infty}t^{-1}\int_{0}^{t}x_{3}(s) {\rm d}s = \det(A_{3})/\det(A) = 0.0730 \gt 0\;\;a.s..

    The numerical results of Theorem 2.1 when n = 3 are shown in Figure 4.

    Figure 4.  Time series of species x_{1} , x_{2} and x_{3} of system (30) with initial values x_{1}(\theta) = 0.5+0.01\sin\theta , x_{2}(\theta) = 0.5+0.02\sin\theta , x_{3}(\theta) = 0.5+0.001\sin\theta , \theta\in[-\tau, 0] and parameter values in Table 2.

    The stable distribution for n = 3 are shown in Figure 5.

    Figure 5.  Distributions of species x_{1}, \;x_{2} and x_{3} of system (30) with initial values x_{1}(\theta) = 0.5+0.01\sin\theta , x_{2}(\theta) = 0.5+0.02\sin\theta , x_{3}(\theta) = 0.5+0.001\sin\theta and parameter values in Table 2.

    To numerical illustrate the optimal harvesting effort of (30), we set

    \Theta = (\theta_{1}, \theta_{2}, \theta_{3})^{T} = [A(A^{-1})^{T}+I]^{-1}(r_{1}-0.5\sigma_{1}^{2}, r_{2} -0.5\sigma_{2}^{2}, r_{3}-0.5\sigma_{3}^{2})^{T} = (1.1052, 0.5537, 0.1663)^{T},

    which yield H^{*} = \Theta = (1.1052, 0.5537, 0.1663)^{T} , and the maximum of ESY is Y^{*} = 0.2263 , see Figure-6.

    Figure 6.  The harvesting policies E[h_{1}x_{1}(t)+h_{2}x_{2}(t)+h_{3}x_{3}(t)] of system (29) with initial values x_{1}(\theta) = 0.5+0.01\sin\theta, x_{2}(\theta) = 0.5+0.02\sin\theta, x_{3}(\theta) = 0.5+0.001\sin\theta and parameter values in Table 2. The red line is with h_{1} = h_{1}^{*} = 1.1052, \;h_{2} = h_{2}^{*} = 0.5537, \;h_{3} = h_{3}^{*} = 0.1663, the green line is with h_{1} = 0.1, \;h_{2} = 0.6, \;h_{3} = 0.6, the blue line is with h_{1} = 0.35, \;h_{2} = 0.4, \;h_{3} = 0.1.

    In this paper, a stochastic n-species competitive model with delayed diffusions and harvesting has been considered. We studied the persistence in mean of every population, which is biologically significant because it shows that all populations can coexist in the community. Since the model (5) does not have a positive equilibrium point and its solution can not approach a positive value, we considered its asymptotically stable distribution. By using ergodic method, we obtained the optimal harvesting policy and the maximum harvesting yield of system (5). We have also done some numerical simulations of the situations for n = 2 and n = 3 in model (5) to illustrate our theoretical results as it is very useful whether in terms of mathematics or biology to visualize our conclusions.

    Our studies showed some interesting results

    (a) Both environmental disturbance and diffused time delay can effect the persistence and optimal harvesting effort of system (5)..

    (b) Environmental noises have no effect on asymptotic stability in distribution of system (5), but the time delays have.

    There are other meaningful aspects that can be studied further since our paper only consider the effects of white noises on population growth rate. In future, for example, we can consider the situation when white noises also have influences over harvesting (see [45]) and non-autonomous system (see [46]); the time delay will also be reflected in competition (see [49]). Furthermore, we can consider something more complex models such as the ones with regime-switching (see [50,51]) or Lévy jumps (see [14,42]).

    This work was supported by the Research Fund for the Taishan Scholar Project of Shandong Province of China, and the SDUST Research Fund (2014TDJH102).

    The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.



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