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Research article Special Issues

Analyzing the impact of quantum computing on IoT security using computational based data analytics techniques

  • Received: 05 December 2023 Revised: 15 January 2024 Accepted: 23 January 2024 Published: 19 February 2024
  • MSC : 03B52, 94D05, 94D10

  • The Internet of Things (IoT) market is experiencing exponential growth, with projections increasing from 15 billion dollars to an estimated 75 billion dollars by 2025. Quantum computing has emerged as a key enabler for managing the rapid expansion of IoT technology, serving as the foundation for quantum computing support. However, the adoption of quantum computing also introduces numerous privacy and security challenges. We delve into the critical realm of quantum-level security within a typical quantum IoT. To achieve this objective, we identified and precisely analyzed security attributes at various levels integral to quantum computing. A hierarchical tree of quantum computing security attributes was envisioned, providing a structured approach for systematic and efficient security considerations. To assess the impact of security on the quantum-IoT landscape, we employed a unified computational model based on Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM), incorporating the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the Technique for Ordering Preferences by Similarity to Ideal Solutions (TOPSIS) within a fuzzy environment. Fuzzy sets were used to provide practical solutions that can accommodate the nuances of diverse and ambiguous opinions, ultimately yielding precise alternatives and factors. The projected undertaking was poised to empower practitioners in the quantum-IoT realm by aiding in the identification, selection, and prioritization of optimal security factors through the lens of quantum computing.

    Citation: Wael Alosaimi, Abdullah Alharbi, Hashem Alyami, Bader Alouffi, Ahmed Almulihi, Mohd Nadeem, Rajeev Kumar, Alka Agrawal. Analyzing the impact of quantum computing on IoT security using computational based data analytics techniques[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2024, 9(3): 7017-7039. doi: 10.3934/math.2024342

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  • The Internet of Things (IoT) market is experiencing exponential growth, with projections increasing from 15 billion dollars to an estimated 75 billion dollars by 2025. Quantum computing has emerged as a key enabler for managing the rapid expansion of IoT technology, serving as the foundation for quantum computing support. However, the adoption of quantum computing also introduces numerous privacy and security challenges. We delve into the critical realm of quantum-level security within a typical quantum IoT. To achieve this objective, we identified and precisely analyzed security attributes at various levels integral to quantum computing. A hierarchical tree of quantum computing security attributes was envisioned, providing a structured approach for systematic and efficient security considerations. To assess the impact of security on the quantum-IoT landscape, we employed a unified computational model based on Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM), incorporating the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and the Technique for Ordering Preferences by Similarity to Ideal Solutions (TOPSIS) within a fuzzy environment. Fuzzy sets were used to provide practical solutions that can accommodate the nuances of diverse and ambiguous opinions, ultimately yielding precise alternatives and factors. The projected undertaking was poised to empower practitioners in the quantum-IoT realm by aiding in the identification, selection, and prioritization of optimal security factors through the lens of quantum computing.



    In mathematics, integral inequalities are a useful tool in solving various problems. Some of the best known are Chebyshev, Jensen, Hölder, Minkowski, Cauchy-Schwartz and Liapounoff inequalities. Many generalizations of these types of inequalities (and many others) for different classes of integrals have been investigated. In paper [6], are given for fuzzy integral and in [2,7,11] for Sugeno integral, in [1,3,8] for pseudo-integral.

    The main topic of this paper is Liapounoff type inequality. One of its forms is

    (10f(x)sdx)rt(10f(x)tdx)rs(10f(x)rdx)st,

    where 0<t<s<r and f:[0,1][0,) is an integrable function (see [5]).

    Pseudo-analysis is a part of mathematical analysis where the field of real numbers is replaced with a closed or semi-closed interval [a,b][,], and operations of addition and multiplication of real numbers are replaced with two new operations, pseudo-addition and pseudo-multiplication, defined on the considered interval [a,b]. The structure ([a,b],,), where and are pseudo-addition and pseudo-multiplications, respectively, is called semiring. There are three classes of semirings [20,21]. In this paper, the focus is on two classes of semirings on the interval [0,]. In the first part of the investigation the focus is on so-called g-semirings where pseudo-operations are given by a continuous function g:[0.][0,]. The second part of the investigation is dedicated to idempotent semiring ([0,],sup,) with generated pseudo-multiplication. Tools from pseudo-analysis have applications in various fields, such as game theory, nonlinear partial differential equations, probability theory, interval probability theory, etc. (see [13,21,27,28]).

    Two generalizations of the Liapounoff type inequality for pseudo-integral are given in [15]. The first generalization is given for the semiring ([0,1],,) when both pseudo-operations are given by the generator g:[0,1][0,1] and the second generalization refers to the semiring ([0,1],sup,) from the first class when the pseudo-multiplication is given by an increasing generator g:[0,1][0,1].

    Based on results from [15] it holds that

    ([0,1]f(s)dμ)(rt)([0,1]f(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]f(r)dμ)(st), (1.1)

    where 0<t<s<r,f:[0,1][0,1] is a measurable function, and are pseudo-operations given by generator g:[0,1][0,1], is the total order on the considered semiring from the second class and μ is an -measure.

    In the case when the semiring belongs to the first class, pseudo-addition is sup and pseudo-multiplication is given by an increasing generator g:[0,1][0,1] the Liapounoff type inequality has the form

    (sup[0,1]f(s)dμ)(rt)(sup[0,1]f(t)dμ)(rs)(sup[0,1]f(r)dμ)(st), (1.2)

    where 0<t<s<r,f:[0,1][0,1] is a measurable function and μ is a complete sup-measure.

    One generalization of ordinary functions (single-valued functions) are set-valued functions. The theory of set-valued functions has application in the mathematical economy and optimal control [12]. The well-known terms for single-valued function, such as continuity, differentiation and integration are investigated in the field of set-valued functions. The first results of the integration of set-valued functions are given in [4]. Set-valued functions and their pseudo-integration has been investigated in [10]. The investigation of pseudo-integral of set-valued function is focused on a special case of the set-valued function, interval-valued function since the interval-valued function is suitable for applications. Different integral inequalities for interval-valued functions with respect to pseudo-integral are proven in [14,29]. Jensen type and Hölder type inequality for interval-valued Choquet integrals are given in [14] and inequalities of Liapounoff and Stolarsky type for Choquet-like integrals with respect to nonmonotonic fuzzy measures are given in [29]. Interval Minkowski's inequality, interval Radon's inequality, and interval Beckenbach's inequality for Aumann integral are proven in [24].

    The paper is organized in the following way. The second section contains preliminary notions needed for the investigation. It contains the definition of semiring and some illustrative examples. Definition of -measure and pseudo-integral are also the part of this section as well as definitions of operations on intervals and interval-valued function and its integration. The third section contains the main result of the paper, the Liapounoff type inequality for the pseudo-integral of an interval-valued function and some illustrative examples. The fourth section contains the definition of the interval-valued central moment of order n and an example where the Liapounoff inequality for pseudo-integral of interval-valued function is used for estimation of the interval-valued central moment of order n.

    Some basic notions and definitions from pseudo-analysis are presented in this section.

    Let [a,b] be a closed (or semi-closed) subinterval of [,] and let be the total order on the interval [a,b]. On the interval [a,b] two operations are considered:

    i) commutative and associative binary operation called pseudo-addition which is non-decreasing with respect to and has a neutral element denoted by 0,

    ii) commutative and associative binary operation called pseudo-multiplication which is positively non-decreasing with respect to , i.e. xy implies xzyz for all z[a,b]+ where [a,b]+={z[a,b]:0z}. It has a neutral element denoted by 1.

    The structure ([a,b],,) is called a semiring if the following conditions are satisfied:

    i) :[a,b]2[a,b] and :[a,b]2[a,b] are pseudo-addition and pseudo-multiplication, respectively,

    ii) pseudo-multiplication is distributive over pseudo-addition , i.e. x(yz)=xyxz for all x,y,z[a,b],

    iii) for all x[a,b] it holds 0x=0.

    More about pseudo-operations and semirings can be found in [20,21,22].

    Depending on other properties that pseudo-operations possess, there are three classes of semirings (see [21,22]).

    The first class consists of semirings where pseudo-addition is an idempotent operation, and pseudo-multiplication is a non-idempotent operation. The semiring investigated in this paper is ([a,b],sup,), where pseudo-addition is xy=sup(x,y) and pseudo-multiplication is given by xy=g1(g(x)g(y)) and g:[a,b][0,] is a continuous increasing function. The function g is called generator of pseudo-multiplication. An example of this type of semiring is ([,],sup,+), where the generator for pseudo-multiplication is g(x)=ex.

    The second class consists semirings where both pseudo-operations are strict and defined by a monotone and continuous function g:[a,b][0,], by

    xy=g1(g(x)+g(y))andxy=g1(g(x)g(y)).

    The function g is called generator of pseudo-operations and the semiring is called g-semiring. In this case, the pseudo-operations are called g-operations.

    The third class of semirings are semirings with both idempotent pseudo-operations.

    In this investigation the pseudo-multiplication is always defined by a generator g, and in this case the pseudo-power x(n) is defined by

    x(n)=xxxn=g1(gn(x)),

    for x[a,b] and nN. It can be shown (see [3]) that the pseudo-power x(p) is well defined for all p(0,)Q in the same way, i.e.

    x(p)=g1(gp(x)),p(0,)Q.

    Due to the continuity of , it holds that (see [3])

    x(p)=sup{x(r)|r(0,p),rQ},pRQ,p>0. (2.1)

    On the class of g-semirings, the total order on the interval [a,b] is given by xy if and only if g(x)g(y). If g is an increasing generator, the total order is the usual order on the real line and if g is a decreasing generator, the total order is opposite to the usual order on the real line. If pseudo-addition is xy=sup(x,y), then the total order is defined by xy if and only if sup(x,y)=y, and the total order is the usual order on the real line. Similarly, if =min the total order is the order opposite to the usual order on the real line.

    One generalization of additive measure from the classical measure theory is so-called -measure.

    Let X be a non-empty set, and let A be the σ-algebra of the subsets of X. A set function μ:A[a,b]+ is an -measure, or a pseudo-additive measure if

    i) μ()=0,

    ii) μ(i=1Ai)=i=1μ(Ai)=limnni=1μ(Ai), where {Ai} is a sequence of pairwise disjoint sets from A.

    If is an idempotent operation, the first condition and disjointness of sets from the second condition can be omitted.

    For the g-semiring, the second condition has the form

    μ(i=1Ai)=limng1(ni=1gμ(Ai)).

    The focus of this paper is on two cases of pseudo-integral (see [20]).

    Let ([a,b],,) be a g-semiring. g-integral of a measurable function f:X[a,b] is of the form

    Xfdμ=g1(X(gf)d(gμ)),

    where the integral on the right-hand side is the Lebesgue integral. In the special case, when X=[c,d],A=B([c,d]) is a Borel σ-algebra on [c,d] and gμ is a Lebesgue measure on [c,d], then

    [c,d]fdμ=g1(dcg(f(x))dx).

    Let ([a,b],sup,) be a semiring where pseudo-multiplication is given by an increasing function g:[a,b][0,]. Pseudo-integral of a measurable function f:X[a,b] is

    supXfdμ=supxX(g1(g(f(x))g(Ψ(x)))),

    where Ψ:[c,d][a,b] is a continuous density which determines sup-decomposable measure μ.

    Due to the fact that every semiring ([a,b],sup,) of the first class can be obtained as a limit of a family of g-semirings of the second class generated by gλ, i.e.,

    limλxλy=limλ(gλ)1(gλ(x)+gλ(y))=sup(x,y)

    and

    xλy=(gλ)1(gλ(x)gλ(y))=g1(g(x)g(y))=xy,

    where g is an increasing generator of pseudo-multiplication (see [19]), this research is focused on the class of g-semirings.

    Also, in [19] it is shown that for the semiring ([0,],sup,) with generated pseudo-multiplication it holds that

    supXfdμ=limλ+(gλ)1(X(gλf)d(gμ)), (2.2)

    where μ is a sup-decomposable measure on [0,] and f:[0,][0,] is a continuous function.

    As this paper deals with interval-valued functions, for further work it is necessary to define pseudo-multiplication on the class

    I={[x,y]:xyand[x,y][a,b]+}

    of closed sub-intervals of [a,b]+.

    The pseudo-product of two intervals A=[l1,r1] and B=[l2,r2] is defined in [16]. Since this paper only deals with generated pseudo-multiplication, AB when xy=g1(g(x)g(y)) is given below.

    If the pseudo-multiplication is given by an increasing generator g, then

    AB=[g1(g(l1)g(l2)),g1(g(r1)g(r2))], (2.3)

    and when the generator g is a decreasing function, it holds that

    AB=[g1(g(r1)g(r2)),g1(g(l1)g(l2))]. (2.4)

    For every family {[li,ri]:[li,ri]I,iI} of closed sub-intervals of [a,b]+, where the index set I is a countable set, based on results from [9] and [25] it holds that

    supiI[li,ri]=[supiIli,supiIri]. (2.5)

    Also,

    limn[ln,rn]=[limnln,limnrn], (2.6)

    if limnln and limnrn exist.

    The pseudo-power x(p),p(0,),x[0,] is extended to the pseudo-power A(p) of a set A[0,] (see [16]) as

    A(p)={x(p):xA}.

    In the special case, when A=[c,d], the next lemma is shown in [16].

    Lemma 1. Let n,mN,pR+Q and pseudo-multiplication is given by a generator g. Then it holds that

    i) [c,d](n)=[c(n),d(n)],

    ii) [c,d](1n)=[c(1n),d(1n)],

    iii) [c,d](mn)=[c(mn),d(mn)].

    iv) [c,d](p)=sup{[c(r),d(r)]:r(0,p)Q}.

    Based on (2.1), (2.5) and iv) from Lemma 1 it holds that

    [c,d](p)=[c(p),d(p)],pRQ. (2.7)

    The relation "less or equal" for the intervals from I is denoted by S.

    Definition 1. Let A,BI.ASB if and only if for all xA there exists yB such that xy and for all yB there exists xA such that xy.

    In paper [17], the relation S was defined in a more general manner, on the set of all non-empty subsets of the interval [a,b].

    The necessity of introducing the relation S was illustrated in [17] by an example - if the usual subset is used instead of S, for x,y[a,b]+ such that xy and xy, for elements A=[x,x] and B=[y,y] neither AB nor BA holds, but it holds that ASB.

    Let X be a non-empty set, ([a,b],,) a semiring, I a class of closed sub-intervals of [a,b]+ and F:XI an interval-valued function.

    An interval-valued function F is pseudo-integrably bounded if there exists a function hL1(μ) such that

    i) αF(x)αh(x), for the non-idempotent pseudo-addition,

    ii) supαF(x)αh(x), for the pseudo-addition given by an increasing generator g,

    iii) infαF(x)αh(x), for the pseudo-addition given by a decreasing generator g

    holds, where L1(μ) is the family of functions which are integrable with respect to the pseudo-integral in the sense of the considered semiring.

    Based on results from [10], the pseudo-integral of a pseudo-integrably bounded interval-valued function F:XI represented by its border functions Fl,Fr:X[a,b]+ by F(x)=[Fl(x),Fr(x)] is defined by

    XFdμ=[XFldμ,XFrdμ]. (2.8)

    If F is a pseudo-integrably bounded function, then F is a pseudo-integrable function. More about the pseudo-integral of an interval-valued function, its basic properties and application can be found in [10].

    The main result of this paper, the Liapounoff type inequality for pseudo-integral of an interval-valued function is presented in this section.

    Obviously, the Liapounoff type inequalities from [15] hold for a g-semiring ([0,],,) with an increasing generating function g:[0,][0,] and a semiring ([0,],sup,) and pseudo-multiplication given by an increasing generator g:[0,][0,]. In those cases, Liapounoff type inequalities deal with a measurable function f:[0,1][0,) and then gf:[0,1][0,], i.e. (1.1) and (1.2) hold. Based on this fact, in this investigation the interval [0,] is considered, instead of the interval [0,1] observed in [15].

    Let us consider a g-semiring ([0,],,) with generator g:[0,][0,] or a semiring ([0,],sup,) where is given by an increasing generator g:[0,][0,] and an interval-valued function F:[0,1]I represented by its border functions Fl,Fr:[0,1][0,) as F(x)=[Fl(x),Fr(x)].

    Lemma 2. Let αRQ or βRQ. Then it holds that

    ([0,1]F(α)dμ)(β)=[([0,1]F(α)ldμ)(β),([0,1]F(α)rdμ)(β)].

    Proof. If αRQ or βRQ, based on (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8) it holds that

    ([0,1]F(α)dμ)(β)=([0,1][Fl,Fr](α)dμ)(β)=([0,1][F(α)l,F(α)r]dμ)(β)=[[0,1]F(α)ldμ,[0,1]F(α)rdμ](β)=[([0,1]F(α)ldμ)(β),([0,1]F(α)rdμ)(β)].

    Theorem 1. Let ([0,],,) be a g-semiring with generator g:[0,][0,]. For a pseudo-integrably bounded interval-valued function F(x)=[Fl(x),Fr(x)], where the border functions Fl,Fr:[0,1][0,) are measurable, t,s,rR and 0<t<s<r, holds

    ([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt)S([0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)dμ)(st). (3.1)

    Proof. Let all pseudo-powers in (3.1) be rational numbers.

    From (2.8) and Lemma 1 for the left-hand side of inequality (3.1) it holds that

    ([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt)=([0,1][Fl,Fr](s)dμ)(rt)=([0,1][F(s)l,F(s)r]dμ)(rt)=[[0,1]F(s)ldμ,[0,1]F(s)rdμ](rt)=[([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt),([0,1]F(s)rdμ)(rt)].

    Similarly, for the right-hand side of inequality (3.1) from Lemma 1, definition of pseudo-multiplication on [0,] and definition of pseudo-multiplication on I it follows that

    ([0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)dμ)(st)=[[0,1]F(t)ldμ,[0,1]F(t)rdμ](rs)[[0,1]F(r)ldμ,[0,1]F(r)rdμ](st)=[([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs),([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)][([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st),([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st)].

    Let the generator g be an increasing function. Based on (2.3) it holds that

    ([0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)dμ)(st)=[([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st),([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st)].

    Since the generator g is an increasing function the total order is the usual order on the real line.

    For every x([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt) it holds that x([0,1]F(s)rdμ)(rt). From inequality (1.1) applied to the function Fr:[0,1][0,) it follows that

    ([0,1]F(s)rdμ)(rt)([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st).

    Let

    y=([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st).

    It holds that

    y[([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st),([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st)].

    Therefore, for every x([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt) holds xy.

    For every

    y[([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st),([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st)]

    holds

    ([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)y.

    From (1.1) applied to the function Fl:[0,1][0,) it follows that

    ([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt)([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st),

    so that for x=([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt) holds x([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt) and xy.

    Now the inequality (3.1) holds by Definition 1.

    Let the generator g be a decreasing function. Based on (2.4) it holds that

    ([0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)dμ)(st)=[([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st),([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)].

    Since the generator g is a decreasing function the total order is the order opposite to the usual order on the real line.

    For every x([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt) it holds that ([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt)x. Based on inequality (1.1) applied to the function Fl:[0,1][0,) it follows that

    ([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt).

    Let

    y=([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st).

    Then it holds that

    y[([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st),([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)]

    and for every x([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt) it holds that yx.

    For every

    y[([0,1]F(t)rdμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)rdμ)(st),([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)]

    holds

    y([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st).

    From inequality (1.1) applied to the function Fl:[0,1][0,) it holds that

    ([0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt),

    so for x=([0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt) holds x([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt) and yx.

    Now, inequality (3.1) holds by Definition 1.

    If at least one of the pseudo-powers in (3.1) is not a rational number, the proof of the inequality (3.1) is similar, using Lemma 2 and iv) from Lemma 1.

    Remark 1. For g(x)=x Theorem 1 is Liapounoff type inequality for Aumann integral.

    Since the proof of Theorem 1 is based on pseudo-multiplication of sub-intervals from I and pseudo-power of elements from I, based on results from [15] and [19] it is obvious that the next theorem holds.

    Theorem 2. Let ([0,],sup,) be a semiring from the first class where pseudo-multiplication is given by an increasing generator g:[0,][0,] and μ is a sup-decomposable measure on B([0,1]), given by μ(A)=esssup(Ψ(x):xA), where Ψ:[0,1][0,] is a continuous density. For a pseudo-integrably bounded interval-valued function F=[Fl,Fr], where the border functions Fl,Fr:[0,1][0,) are measurable, t,s,rR and 0<t<s<r holds

    (sup[0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt)S(sup[0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)(sup[0,1]F(r)dμ)(st). (3.2)

    Remark 2. Theorem 1 holds if any g-semiring ([a,b],,) is considered, where [a,b][0,], for F(x)=[Fl(x),Fr(x)] holds Range(Fl)[a,b] and Range(Fr)[a,b]. The similar holds for Theorem 2, for the semirings of the third class with generated pseudo-multipplication.

    Examples

    For the interval-valued function F(x)=[Fl(x),Fr(x)], from (2.8), the definition of g-integral and properties of interval-valued pseudo-integral (see [10]), for any generator g follows

    [0,1]Fdμ=[g1([0,1](gFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](gFr)d(gμ))]. (3.3)

    Now, the left-hand side of inequality (3.1) has the form

    ([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt)=g1grt[g1([0,1](gsFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](gsFr)d(gμ))].

    Similarly, for the right-hand side of inequality (3.1) it holds that

    ([0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)dμ)(st)=g1(grs([g1([0,1](gtFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](gtFr)d(gμ))])gst([g1([0,1](grFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](grFr)d(gμ))])).

    Therefore, the inequality (3.1) has the form

    g1grt[g1([0,1](gsFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](gsFr)d(gμ))]Sg1(grs([g1([0,1](gtFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](gtFr)d(gμ))])gst([g1([0,1](grFl)d(gμ)),g1([0,1](grFr)d(gμ))])).

    Example 1. Since indefinite integral sinx2dx cannot be expressed in terms of elementary functions, 10sinx2dx will be estimated using the Liapounoff type inequality for the pseudo-integral of an interval-valued function.

    Let ([0,],,) be the g-semiring with generator g(x)=x2. The interval-valued function F(x)=[sinx2,x] will be used for estimation of integral 10sinx2dx. In this case the left-hand side of the inequality (3.1) has the form

    [([0,1](sinx2)(s)d(gμ))(rt),([0,1]x(s)d(gμ))(rt)]

    and the right-hand side of the inequality (3.1) has the form

    [([0,1](sinx2)(t)d(gμ))(rs)([0,1](sinx2)(r)d(gμ))(st),([0,1]x(t)d(gμ))(rs)([0,1]x(r)d(gμ))(st)].

    From Definition 1 and Theorem 1 follows

    ([0,1](sinx2)(s)d(gμ))(rt)(10x(t)dx)(rs)(10x(r)dx)(st).

    Now, for the chosen parameters t=12,s=1 and r=32 from the fact that g is an increasing function it follows that

    10sinx2dx24.

    Example 2. Let ([0,],,) be the g-semiring with generator g(x)=ln(1+x). For the interval-valued function F(x)=[Fl(x),Fr(x)], the left side of inequality (3) has the form

    [e(10(lns(1+Fl(x))dx)rt1,e(10(lns(1+Fr(x))dx)rt1],

    and the right side of inequality (3) has the form

    [e(10lnt(1+Fl(x))dx)rs(10(lnr(1+Fl(x))dx)st1,e(10lnt(1+Fr(x))dx)rs(10(lnr(1+Fr(x))dx)st1].

    Therefore,

    α1e(10(lns(1+Fl(x))dx)rt+β1e(10(lns(1+Fr(x))dx)rtα2e(10lnt(1+Fl(x))dx)rs(10(lnr(1+Fl(x))dx)st+β2e(10lnt(1+Fr(x))dx)rs(10(lnr(1+Fr(x))dx)st,

    for every α1,β1,α2,β2[0,1] such that α1+β1=1 and α2+β2=1.

    The following example is based on an example from [26].

    Example 3. Let ([0,],sup,) be the semiring from the first class where pseudo-multiplication is generated by g(x)=x. Let μ be a sup-measure on ([0,],B([0,])) with density function Ψ(x)=x.

    Let us consider the interval-valued function F(x)=[Fl(x),2x], where Fl(x)2x,x[0,1].

    (sup[0,1](2x)(s)dμ)(rt)=(limnn[0,1](2x)(s)dμn)(rt)=(limn10(2x)sxdx)rt=(2slimn(1sn+n+1)1n)rt=2s(rt).

    Similarly,

    (sup[0,1]F(s)ldμ)(rt)=limn(10Fsnlxndx)rtn,

    and

    (sup[0,1]F(t)ldμ)(rs)(sup[0,1]F(r)ldμ)(st)=limn(10Ftnlxndx)rsn(10Frnlxndx)stn,

    and

    (sup[0,1](2x)(t)dμ)(rs)(sup[0,1](2x)(r)dμ)(st)=2s(rt).

    For the interval-valued function F(x)=[Fl(x),2x], where Fl(x)2x,x[0,1], based on (3.2) and (2.6) it holds that

    limn[(10Fsnlxndx)rtn,2s(rt)]Slimn[(10Ftnlxndx)rsn(10Frnlxndx)stn,2s(rt)].

    In this part, the interval Liapounoff inequality is applied for estimation of interval-valued central g-moment of order n for interval-valued functions in a g-semiring.

    Let ([a,b],,) be a g-semiring such that μ([a,b])=1, where 1 is neutral element for the given pseudo-multiplication and μ is an -measure. It is known that in the case when μ([a,b])=1, pseudo-additive measure μ is called pseudo-probability measure and it is given by μ=g1P, where g is a generator of pseudo-operations and P is a probability measure (see [18]).

    Based on the result from [18] the central g-moment of order n>0 for a measurable function f:[0,1][a,b] is given by

    Eg,n[f]=g1(10gnf(x)dx). (4.1)

    One representation of the Liapounoff inequality for pseudo-integral (1.1) in terms of the central g-moment of order n is given in the following Lemma.

    Lemma 3. Let ([a,b],,) be a g-semiring such that μ([a,b])=1. For a measurable function f:[0,1][0,) and central g-moment of order n it holds that

    g1grt(Eg,s[f])g1(grs(Eg,t[f])gst(Eg,r[f])). (4.2)

    Proof. For a measurable function f, the left-hand side of the Liapounoff inequality for pseudo-integral given in (1.1) is

    ([0,1]f(s)dμ)(rt)=g1grt(g1(10(gsf)d(gμ)))=g1grt(Eg,s[f]).

    The right-hand side of the same inequality is

    ([0,1]f(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]f(r)dμ)(st)=g1(grsg1(10(gtf)d(gμ))gstg1(10(grf)d(gμ)))=g1(grs(Eg,t[f])gst(Eg,r[f])),

    so that the inequality (4.2) holds.

    The following definition is one new generalization of the central g-moment of order n in the sense of the interval-valued functions.

    Definition 2. Let ([0,],,) be a g-semiring and F=[Fl,Fr] be an interval-valued function where the border functions Fl,Fr:[0,1][0,) are measurable. The interval-valued central g-moment of order n>0 for the interval-valued function F=[Fl,Fr], is

    Eg,nI[F]=[Eg,n[Fl],Eg,n[Fr]].

    Theorem 3. Let ([0,],,) be a g-semiring and let F=[Fl,Fr] be an interval-valued function where the border functions Fl,Fr:[0,1][0,) are measurable. For interval-valued central g-moment of order n it holds that

    g1(grt(Eg,sI[F]))Sg1(grs(Eg,tI[F])gst(Eg,rI[F])). (4.3)

    Proof. From (4.1) 0<t<s<r, for the left-hand side of inequality (3.1) holds

    ([0,1]F(s)dμ)(rt)=g1grt([g1(10(gsFl)d(gμ)),g1(10(gsFr)d(gμ))])=g1(grt([Eg,s[Fl],Eg,s[Fr]]))=g1(grt(Eg,sI[F])),

    and for the right-hand side of the same inequality holds

    ([0,1]F(t)dμ)(rs)([0,1]F(r)dμ)(st)=g1(grs ([g1(10(gtFl)d(gμ)),g1(10(gtFr)d(gμ))])gst([g1(10(grFl)d(gμ)),g1(10(grFr)d(gμ))]))=g1(grs([Eg,t[Fl],Eg,t[Fr]])gst([Eg,r[Fl],Eg,r[Fr]]))=g1(grs(Eg,tI[F])gst(Eg,rI[F])).

    Now, from (3) follows the inequality (4.3).

    Example 4. Let ([0,),,) be a g-semiring with generator g(x)=x1n,n>1. The inverse function is g1(x)=xn, and the pseudo operation are given by xy=(nx+ny)n and xy=xy.

    Let F=[Fl,Fr] be an interval-valued function with measurable border functions, t=n1,s=n and r=n+1,n>1.

    Since g is an increasing generator from (4.2) for function Fl holds

    g2(Eg,n[Fl])g(Eg,n1[Fl])g(Eg,n+1[Fl])
    (nEg,n[Fl])2nEg,n1[Fl]nEg,n+1[Fl]
    Eg,n[Fl]Eg,n1[Fl]Eg,n+1[Fl]. (4.4)

    Analogously, for function Fr it follows that

    Eg,n[Fr]Eg,n1[Fr]Eg,n+1[Fr]. (4.5)

    For all x[Eg,n[Fl],Eg,n[Fr]] holds xEg,n[Fr]. From (4.5) holds

    xEg,n1[Fr]Eg,n+1[Fr].

    Also, for all y[Eg,n1[Fl]Eg,n+1[Fl],Eg,n1[Fr]Eg,n+1[Fr]] holds the inequality Eg,n1[Fl]Eg,n+1[Fl]y, and from (4.4) it follows that

    Eg,n[Fl]y.

    From Definition 1 it follows that

    [Eg,n[Fl],Eg,n[Fr]]S[Eg,n1[Fl]Eg,n+1[Fl],Eg,n1[Fr]Eg,n+1[Fr]],

    so one estimation of interval-valued central g-moment of order n is

    Eg,nI[F]S[Eg,n1[Fl]Eg,n+1[Fl],Eg,n1[Fr]Eg,n+1[Fr]]. (4.6)

    Note that in inequality (4.6), the estimation of interval-valued central g-moment of order n is obtained using interval-valued central g-moment of order n1 and interval-valued central g-moment of order n+1.

    In this paper, we have proven two generalizations of the Liapounoff inequality for pseudo-integral of interval-valued function. Also, the Liapounoff inequality for central g-moment of order n for a function f and the Liapounoff inequality for interval-valued central g-moment of order n for an interval-valued function F are proven.

    The first step in the future investigation will be the generalization of theorems about the convergence of a sequence of random variables using the inequality (4.2) for the central g-moment of order n in the pseudo-probability space. The second step will be the generalization of theorems about the convergence of a sequence of interval-valued random sets using the inequality (4.3) for interval-valued central g-moment of order n, in the pseudo-probability space.

    This work was supported by the Department of Fundamental Sciences, Faculty of Technical Sciences, University of Novi Sad, through the project "Teorijska i primenjena matematika u tehničkim i informatičkim naukama".

    The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.



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