Research article

Should multinational firms participate in blockchain to provide quality verification under different market structures?

  • Published: 09 October 2026
  • 91B24, 91A80

  • The e-tailers selling global brands' products on cross-border e-commerce platforms have been suffering from low-quality image. To solve this problem, some platforms (e.g., JD.com, eBay and Tmall Global) have utilized blockchain for quality verification. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on blockchain adoption of the multinational firms on cross-border e-commerce platforms and its impact on the firms' production decisions. To address this gap, we developed a game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain parties' intention to participate in blockchain in a setting with one multinational firm (MNF) owning retail divisions, which competes with the e-tailers who sell the MNF's brand products in a low tax country. Considering the number of the e-tailers on the cross-border e-commerce platforms selling global brands' products is in a monopoly or in a duopoly, we investigated the blockchain adoption by multinational firms under different market structures. We found that, first, different blockchain adoption patterns will shape distinct channel competition structures, thereby directly affecting the MNF's pricing strategy and responsiveness to tax disparity by altering the degree of competitive equilibrium and channel symmetry. Second, blockchain is a double-edged sword for the MNF, which increases the MNF's wholesaling profit, but reduces the MNF's retailing and tax-planning profits. Consequently, when the e-tailer monopolizes the cross-border e-commerce market, the MNF tends to refuse to participate in blockchain. However, under a duopoly cross-border e-commerce market, the MNF prefers joint blockchain participation with both e-tailers when the stronger e-tailer has a high-quality image, particularly when the fixed cost of blockchain adoption and tax disparity are low. Third, the MNF's blockchain adoption incentive increases with e-tailers' quality image but decreases with cross-border tax disparity. In this study, we clarify that the MNF and regulators should take downstream market structure and international tax disparity into consideration when promoting blockchain-enabled product quality-verification infrastructure.

    Citation: Fei Yan, Xiao-ping Wang, Zhi-chao Zhang. Should multinational firms participate in blockchain to provide quality verification under different market structures?[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(11): 5588-5624. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026190

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  • The e-tailers selling global brands' products on cross-border e-commerce platforms have been suffering from low-quality image. To solve this problem, some platforms (e.g., JD.com, eBay and Tmall Global) have utilized blockchain for quality verification. However, there is scant literature investigating the decision on blockchain adoption of the multinational firms on cross-border e-commerce platforms and its impact on the firms' production decisions. To address this gap, we developed a game-theoretic model to examine the supply chain parties' intention to participate in blockchain in a setting with one multinational firm (MNF) owning retail divisions, which competes with the e-tailers who sell the MNF's brand products in a low tax country. Considering the number of the e-tailers on the cross-border e-commerce platforms selling global brands' products is in a monopoly or in a duopoly, we investigated the blockchain adoption by multinational firms under different market structures. We found that, first, different blockchain adoption patterns will shape distinct channel competition structures, thereby directly affecting the MNF's pricing strategy and responsiveness to tax disparity by altering the degree of competitive equilibrium and channel symmetry. Second, blockchain is a double-edged sword for the MNF, which increases the MNF's wholesaling profit, but reduces the MNF's retailing and tax-planning profits. Consequently, when the e-tailer monopolizes the cross-border e-commerce market, the MNF tends to refuse to participate in blockchain. However, under a duopoly cross-border e-commerce market, the MNF prefers joint blockchain participation with both e-tailers when the stronger e-tailer has a high-quality image, particularly when the fixed cost of blockchain adoption and tax disparity are low. Third, the MNF's blockchain adoption incentive increases with e-tailers' quality image but decreases with cross-border tax disparity. In this study, we clarify that the MNF and regulators should take downstream market structure and international tax disparity into consideration when promoting blockchain-enabled product quality-verification infrastructure.



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