In this paper, we examined how carbon pricing and retailer inequity aversion interact through profit allocation in a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain. The analysis distinguished behavioral responses from material-profit outcomes. A finite-horizon open-loop model combined a forward-looking manufacturer, a myopic retailer, low-carbon goodwill, and product-specific low-carbon awareness under cap-and-trade regulation; control parameterization and constrained retailer responses yield selected numerical candidates with Softplus smoothing. Carbon-price transmission depended on the emission-effort regime: Effort remained at its upper bound in the tested low-cost setting, whereas mean effort declined modestly with carbon price in the higher-cost interior regimes. Across these regimes, higher carbon prices raise mean wholesale and retail prices, reduce mean demand, and increase the retailer's mean disadvantageous profit gap. Stronger inequity aversion under high profit-comparison pressure induces preemptive wholesale-price concessions. An exact positive-part benchmark preserves this direction while revealing smoothing sensitivity in near-kink activation and response magnitudes. A composite contract combined marginal-cost wholesale pricing, promotion sharing, direct emission-incentive support, and fixed redistribution. Under the tested discretization and contract conditions, independently selected contract paths approached the discrete integrated reference and satisfied material-profit and post-fee behavioral-utility participation. These findings revealed a price-coordination/emission-incentive conflict and supported numerical contract implementation within the specified model and finite checks; they do not establish general continuous-time coordination.
Citation: Bo Xu, Yunlong Tian. A dynamic low-carbon supply chain coordination model under cap-and-trade regulation and the retailer's disadvantageous inequity aversion[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(12): 6399-6441. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026215
In this paper, we examined how carbon pricing and retailer inequity aversion interact through profit allocation in a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain. The analysis distinguished behavioral responses from material-profit outcomes. A finite-horizon open-loop model combined a forward-looking manufacturer, a myopic retailer, low-carbon goodwill, and product-specific low-carbon awareness under cap-and-trade regulation; control parameterization and constrained retailer responses yield selected numerical candidates with Softplus smoothing. Carbon-price transmission depended on the emission-effort regime: Effort remained at its upper bound in the tested low-cost setting, whereas mean effort declined modestly with carbon price in the higher-cost interior regimes. Across these regimes, higher carbon prices raise mean wholesale and retail prices, reduce mean demand, and increase the retailer's mean disadvantageous profit gap. Stronger inequity aversion under high profit-comparison pressure induces preemptive wholesale-price concessions. An exact positive-part benchmark preserves this direction while revealing smoothing sensitivity in near-kink activation and response magnitudes. A composite contract combined marginal-cost wholesale pricing, promotion sharing, direct emission-incentive support, and fixed redistribution. Under the tested discretization and contract conditions, independently selected contract paths approached the discrete integrated reference and satisfied material-profit and post-fee behavioral-utility participation. These findings revealed a price-coordination/emission-incentive conflict and supported numerical contract implementation within the specified model and finite checks; they do not establish general continuous-time coordination.
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Dynamic paths under carbon-price sensitivity in the standard channel profit-comparison setting. Panels report $ W(t) $, $ P(t) $, $ Q(t) $, and $ \Delta\Pi(t) $ for $ p_c = 0.50 $, $ 1.10 $, and $ 2.00 $. Since emission-reduction effort remains saturated at its upper bound across the sampled carbon prices, carbon-price shocks mainly affect price transmission, demand, and profit allocation rather than additional marginal emission-reduction effort
Dynamic paths under inequity-aversion intensity sensitivity in the high channel profit-comparison setting. Panels report $ W(t) $, $ P(t) $, $ A(t) $, and $ Q(t) $ for $ \lambda_L = 1.00 $, $ 1.20 $, and $ 1.50 $. A higher $ \lambda_L $ induces stronger preemptive wholesale-price concessions, as shown in panel (a). Between $ \lambda_L = 1.00 $ and $ \lambda_L = 1.20 $, the downstream paths of $ P(t) $, $ A(t) $, and $ Q(t) $ remain nearly unchanged, indicating that the concession mainly reallocates channel profit through $ W(t) $, consistent with the exact-hinge mechanism illustrated by Proposition 2. When $ \lambda_L = 1.50 $, the system approaches the inequity-aversion kink, leading to a marked reduction in retail price and a substantial expansion of promotion and demand
New integrated reference and independently selected C3 paths from complete saved arrays. Black lines show I; open circles and triangles show Standard and High-pressure C3 at every tenth node for legibility. All 101 nodes are used in the reported distances. Panels show $ P, A, E, Q, G, R $ without artificial offsets or amplified residuals; near-overlap is the actual result. Effort reaches its original upper bound as an outcome. Maximum mean-normalized node deviations over the six variables are $ 2.84093\times10^{-8} $ and $ 4.10514\times10^{-8} $, respectively.