Research article

A dynamic low-carbon supply chain coordination model under cap-and-trade regulation and the retailer's disadvantageous inequity aversion

  • Published: 11 November 2026
  • 91A65, 91B76, 49N90, 90B50

  • In this paper, we examined how carbon pricing and retailer inequity aversion interact through profit allocation in a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain. The analysis distinguished behavioral responses from material-profit outcomes. A finite-horizon open-loop model combined a forward-looking manufacturer, a myopic retailer, low-carbon goodwill, and product-specific low-carbon awareness under cap-and-trade regulation; control parameterization and constrained retailer responses yield selected numerical candidates with Softplus smoothing. Carbon-price transmission depended on the emission-effort regime: Effort remained at its upper bound in the tested low-cost setting, whereas mean effort declined modestly with carbon price in the higher-cost interior regimes. Across these regimes, higher carbon prices raise mean wholesale and retail prices, reduce mean demand, and increase the retailer's mean disadvantageous profit gap. Stronger inequity aversion under high profit-comparison pressure induces preemptive wholesale-price concessions. An exact positive-part benchmark preserves this direction while revealing smoothing sensitivity in near-kink activation and response magnitudes. A composite contract combined marginal-cost wholesale pricing, promotion sharing, direct emission-incentive support, and fixed redistribution. Under the tested discretization and contract conditions, independently selected contract paths approached the discrete integrated reference and satisfied material-profit and post-fee behavioral-utility participation. These findings revealed a price-coordination/emission-incentive conflict and supported numerical contract implementation within the specified model and finite checks; they do not establish general continuous-time coordination.

    Citation: Bo Xu, Yunlong Tian. A dynamic low-carbon supply chain coordination model under cap-and-trade regulation and the retailer's disadvantageous inequity aversion[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(12): 6399-6441. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026215

    Related Papers:

  • In this paper, we examined how carbon pricing and retailer inequity aversion interact through profit allocation in a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain. The analysis distinguished behavioral responses from material-profit outcomes. A finite-horizon open-loop model combined a forward-looking manufacturer, a myopic retailer, low-carbon goodwill, and product-specific low-carbon awareness under cap-and-trade regulation; control parameterization and constrained retailer responses yield selected numerical candidates with Softplus smoothing. Carbon-price transmission depended on the emission-effort regime: Effort remained at its upper bound in the tested low-cost setting, whereas mean effort declined modestly with carbon price in the higher-cost interior regimes. Across these regimes, higher carbon prices raise mean wholesale and retail prices, reduce mean demand, and increase the retailer's mean disadvantageous profit gap. Stronger inequity aversion under high profit-comparison pressure induces preemptive wholesale-price concessions. An exact positive-part benchmark preserves this direction while revealing smoothing sensitivity in near-kink activation and response magnitudes. A composite contract combined marginal-cost wholesale pricing, promotion sharing, direct emission-incentive support, and fixed redistribution. Under the tested discretization and contract conditions, independently selected contract paths approached the discrete integrated reference and satisfied material-profit and post-fee behavioral-utility participation. These findings revealed a price-coordination/emission-incentive conflict and supported numerical contract implementation within the specified model and finite checks; they do not establish general continuous-time coordination.



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