In response to growing concerns over agricultural carbon emissions, carbon reduction label standards (CES) have emerged as a market-oriented policy tool to promote low-carbon transitions in supply chains. This study investigates the effects of consumers' low-carbon preference (CLP) and consumers' recognition of carbon reduction labels (CLR) on the effectiveness of CES within agricultural supply chains, considering two emission reduction strategies that are independent reduction by processors (i.e. Non-cooperative Strategy, NS model) and two-tier reduction by suppliers and processors (i.e. Tandem Strategy, TS model). Using Stackelberg game theory, we derive optimal pricing, emission reduction levels, profits, and environmental and social benefits under each model. Our analytical and numerical results reveal that stringent CESs enhance carbon reduction, profitability, and social benefits when CLR is high, particularly under two-tier emission reduction. Moreover, the comparative advantage of two-tier over independent reduction widens with increasing CLR. While higher CLP incentivizes greater emission reductions, its effects on profits and social benefits depend on its interaction with CES's stringency and the choice of reduction strategy. Notably, under high CLP, relaxed CES can yield higher firm profits and social benefits than strict standards. This study provides theoretical and practical insights for policymakers, firms, and consumers in designing and responding to carbon labeling policies.
Citation: Jianli Jiang, Shucui He, Huan Zhang, Xiaoyu Ju. Stackelberg game analysis of carbon reduction label standards in agricultural supply chains: Impacts of consumer low-carbon preference and label recognition[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(9): 4284-4314. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026150
In response to growing concerns over agricultural carbon emissions, carbon reduction label standards (CES) have emerged as a market-oriented policy tool to promote low-carbon transitions in supply chains. This study investigates the effects of consumers' low-carbon preference (CLP) and consumers' recognition of carbon reduction labels (CLR) on the effectiveness of CES within agricultural supply chains, considering two emission reduction strategies that are independent reduction by processors (i.e. Non-cooperative Strategy, NS model) and two-tier reduction by suppliers and processors (i.e. Tandem Strategy, TS model). Using Stackelberg game theory, we derive optimal pricing, emission reduction levels, profits, and environmental and social benefits under each model. Our analytical and numerical results reveal that stringent CESs enhance carbon reduction, profitability, and social benefits when CLR is high, particularly under two-tier emission reduction. Moreover, the comparative advantage of two-tier over independent reduction widens with increasing CLR. While higher CLP incentivizes greater emission reductions, its effects on profits and social benefits depend on its interaction with CES's stringency and the choice of reduction strategy. Notably, under high CLP, relaxed CES can yield higher firm profits and social benefits than strict standards. This study provides theoretical and practical insights for policymakers, firms, and consumers in designing and responding to carbon labeling policies.
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Jianli Jiang, Shucui He, Huan Zhang, Xiaoyu Ju. Stackelberg game analysis of carbon reduction label standards in agricultural supply chains: Impacts of consumer low-carbon preference and label recognition[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(9): 4284-4314. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026150
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