Theory article

Pricing and green innovation for national and private brands on the e-retail platform

  • Published: 22 June 2026
  • 91A65, 91A10, 91A80

  • This study examines pricing and green innovation decisions in an e-retail platform supply chain where a national brand (NB) competes directly with a platform-owned private brand (PB). Using a Stackelberg game framework, we analyze four scenarios: No innovation, NB-only innovation, PB-only innovation, and bilateral innovation. The key findings are as follows. Network externalities consistently benefit all supply chain members and enhance green innovation levels across scenarios, but their impact on retail prices is scenario-dependent. The NB manufacturer achieves its highest profit under NB-only innovation, whereas the e-retail platform prefers bilateral innovation, which constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium. This misalignment creates a green innovation prisoner's dilemma: Although bilateral innovation maximizes the total supply chain profit, the manufacturer earns less than under NB-only innovation. Moreover, standalone green innovation by either party yields higher green levels than bilateral innovation. These findings suggest that coordinating bilateral green innovation may require profit-sharing mechanisms, and that innovation strategies should be tailored to the market conditions.

    Citation: Chuanxu Wang, Yingying Chen. Pricing and green innovation for national and private brands on the e-retail platform[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(7): 3310-3344. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026121

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  • This study examines pricing and green innovation decisions in an e-retail platform supply chain where a national brand (NB) competes directly with a platform-owned private brand (PB). Using a Stackelberg game framework, we analyze four scenarios: No innovation, NB-only innovation, PB-only innovation, and bilateral innovation. The key findings are as follows. Network externalities consistently benefit all supply chain members and enhance green innovation levels across scenarios, but their impact on retail prices is scenario-dependent. The NB manufacturer achieves its highest profit under NB-only innovation, whereas the e-retail platform prefers bilateral innovation, which constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium. This misalignment creates a green innovation prisoner's dilemma: Although bilateral innovation maximizes the total supply chain profit, the manufacturer earns less than under NB-only innovation. Moreover, standalone green innovation by either party yields higher green levels than bilateral innovation. These findings suggest that coordinating bilateral green innovation may require profit-sharing mechanisms, and that innovation strategies should be tailored to the market conditions.



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