Research article Special Issues

Strong cooperation or tragedy of the commons in the chemostat

  • In [11], a proof of principle was established for the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons, a center piece for many theories on the evolution of cooperation. A general chemostat model with two species, the cooperator and the cheater, was formulated where the cooperator allocates a portion of the nutrient uptake towards the production of a public good which is needed to digest an externally supplied resource. The cheater does not produce the public good, and instead allocates all nutrient uptake towards its own growth. It was proved that if the cheater is present, both the cooperator and the cheater will go extinct. A key assumption was that the cheater and cooperator share a common nutrient uptake rate and yield constant. Here, we relax that assumption and find that although the extinction of both types holds in many cases, it is possible for the cooperator to survive and exclude the cheater if it can evolve so as to have a lower break-even concentration for growth than the cheater. Coexistence of cooperator and cheater is generically impossible.

    Citation: Patrick De Leenheer, Martin Schuster, Hal Smith. Strong cooperation or tragedy of the commons in the chemostat[J]. Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering, 2019, 16(1): 139-149. doi: 10.3934/mbe.2019007

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  • In [11], a proof of principle was established for the phenomenon of the tragedy of the commons, a center piece for many theories on the evolution of cooperation. A general chemostat model with two species, the cooperator and the cheater, was formulated where the cooperator allocates a portion of the nutrient uptake towards the production of a public good which is needed to digest an externally supplied resource. The cheater does not produce the public good, and instead allocates all nutrient uptake towards its own growth. It was proved that if the cheater is present, both the cooperator and the cheater will go extinct. A key assumption was that the cheater and cooperator share a common nutrient uptake rate and yield constant. Here, we relax that assumption and find that although the extinction of both types holds in many cases, it is possible for the cooperator to survive and exclude the cheater if it can evolve so as to have a lower break-even concentration for growth than the cheater. Coexistence of cooperator and cheater is generically impossible.


    Many organisms exhibit cooperative behavior that benefits the whole group. Examples of such behavior in microbial populations are secreted products such as extracellular enzymes that digest nutrients, siderophores that acquire iron, or exopolysaccharides that support biofilm growth [16]. Such products are known as public goods. While common goods production is advantageous, and often critical to the growth of the population, it is also costly. Cheating individuals that choose not to cooperate could benefit from the fruits of labor of individuals that do, and would have a competitive advantage over the cooperators. One would expect that cheaters should be able to successfully invade a population of cooperators. This situation reflects a Prisoner's dilemma in evolutionary game theory, where cheating is the evolutionary stable strategy [12]. However, when cheaters start to dominate cooperators, the common good would become scarce, ultimately leading to the demise of cooperators and cheaters alike. This idea is known as the Tragedy of the Commons [8,6]. It has since then spurred a body of research that continues to grow up to this day, devoted to identifying mechanisms that explain the evolution of cooperation.

    Although there has been extensive experimental work on the topic of the Tragedy of the Commons, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there exist very few mathematical models based on first principles that express population growth, public good production and cheating behavior, for which the tragedy of the commons can be verified by means of a mathematical proof. In [11] we proposed a minimal chemostat model that incorporates cooperative and cheating behavior in microbial populations, and we established mathematically that the tragedy of the commons does indeed occur. The main goal of this paper is to generalize the chemostat model of [11] to investigate the fate of the population when the cooperator has the ability to evolve its ecological characteristics, specifically its per capita uptake rate function and yield constant. Although we find that the tragedy continues to hold in many cases, we also find scenarios where the cooperator not only survives, it even outcompetes the cheater by driving it to extinction. We will show that his happens when the break-even concentration for the growth nutrient of the cooperator evolves to become lower than that of the cheater. Interestingly, under no circumstances can the cooperator and cheater coexist in this generalized chemostat model: either the tragedy of the commons occurs, or the cooperator outcompetes the cheater, hereby favoring a very strong form of cooperation.

    We propose the generalized chemostat model and prove our main result in Section 2. Section 3 contains a discussion of our main result, and conclusions are found in Section 4.

    We consider a general chemostat model with positive dilution rate D and positive input nutrient concentration S0. Nutrient, cooperator and cheater concentration are denoted by S, X1 and X2 respectively. The cooperator produces an enzyme which has concentration E, and this enzyme is used to convert the nutrient into a processed nutrient with concentration P. Once processed, nutrient is available for growth of the cooperator and cheater, but the cooperator also diverts a fraction towards production of the enzyme; the cheater does not produce the enzyme. The enzymatic reaction converting nutrient into processed nutrient is given by:

    S+ES+P.

    The rate of this reaction is proportional to E and to a possibly nonlinear C2 function G(S) which is assumed to be zero at zero, strictly increasing (G(S)>0 for all S>0) and concave (G(S)0 for all S). The prototypical example is a mass action rate, corresponding to G(S)=kS for some positive rate constant k. The per capita uptake rates of cooperator and cheater are given by F1(P)/γ1 and F2(P)/γ2, where the γi are positive yield constants, and the functions Fi(P) are assumed to be C1, zero at P=0, and strictly increasing (Fi(P)>0 for all P>0). In applications, one often picks Michaelis-Menten functions for the Fi(P) which have the form mP/(a+P) where m and a are positive constants, but Hill functions of the form mPn/(an+Pn) where n is a positive integer, and m and a also are positive constants, are allowed here as well.

    As mentioned, the cooperator only uses a fraction of the available processed nutrient towards growth, and we denote this fraction by a positive constant q<1. The remaining fraction 1q is used to produce the enzyme. The conversion efficiency for the conversion of P into E by the cooperator, is a positive constant η.

    These considerations lead to the following model:

    dSdt(t)=D(S0S)EG(S) (2.1)
    dPdt(t)=EG(S)1γ1X1F1(P)1γ2X2F2(P)DP (2.2)
    dEdt(t)=η(1q)X1F1(P)DE (2.3)
    dX1dt(t)=X1(qF1(P)D) (2.4)
    dX2dt(t)=X2(F2(P)D) (2.5)

    defined on the forward invariant set R5+.

    By scaling s=S,p=P,e=E/(ηγ1),x1=X1/γ1,x2=X2/γ2 and defining g(s)=ηγ1G(S),fi(p)=Fi(P) for i=1,2, and d=D and s0=S0, we obtain the scaled model:

    dsdt(t)=d(s0s)eg(s) (2.6)
    dpdt(t)=eg(s)x1f1(p)x2f2(p)dp (2.7)
    dedt(t)=(1q)x1f1(p)de (2.8)
    dx1dt(t)=x1(qf1(p)d) (2.9)
    dx2dt(t)=x2(f2(p)d) (2.10)

    Defining two new variables

    m=s+p+e+x1+x2v=eQx1, where Q=1qq,

    which satisfy the following equations:

    dmdt(t)=d(s0m)dvdt(t)=dv,

    hence m(t)s0 and v(t)0 as t+. To understand the behavior of (2.6)(2.10), we therefore first investigate the following limiting system:

    dpdt(t)=Qx1g(s0px1/qx2)x1f1(p)x2f2(p)dpdx1dt(t)=x1(qf1(p)d)dx2dt(t)=x2(f2(p)d),

    which is defined on the forward invariant state space {x10,x20,p0,p+x1/q+x2s0}. It will be more convenient to analyze this system with one more change of variable:

    w=p+x1q+x2.

    instead of using the variable p:

    dwdt(t)=Qx1g(s0w)dw (2.11)
    dx1dt(t)=x1(qf1(wx1/qx2)d) (2.12)
    dx2dt(t)=x2(f2(wx1/qx2)d) (2.13)

    which is a system with forward invariant state space Ω={x10,x20,x1/q+x2ws0}. The Jacobian matrix of this system is:

    (Qx1gdQg0x1qf1qf1dx1f1x1qf1x2f2x2f2/qf2dx2f2),

    where we have suppressed the arguments of the functions g, fi and their derivatives to avoid a cumbersome notation. Our assumptions about these functions imply that the Jacobian matrix has the sign structure displayed below, where means that the sign is not fixed, but depends on the state where the Jacobian is evaluated, and where + and indicate a non-negative and non-positive value for every state in the state space Ω respectively:

    (+0++)

    The key observation is that this sign structure implies that system (2.11)(2.13) is a 3-dimensional competitive system, see [13] for more on this particular class of systems. This means that backward-time solutions of this system remain ordered with respect to the partial order generated by the cone K={(w,x1,x2)|w0,x10,x20}. The relevance of this fact is that a Poincaré-Bendixson theory is available for this class of systems which makes a global analysis feasible in ways comparable to planar systems. Note also that the sign structure of the Jacobian implies that the subsystem (2.11)(2.12) on the part of the boundary of Ω where x2=0 is a cooperative system in the usual sense.

    We begin our investigation of the dynamics of system (2.11)(2.13) by recalling from [11] the dynamics on the part of the boundary of Ω where x2=0, which is easily seen to be a forward invariant set. Let p1 denote the solution to the equation qf1(p)=d. Since f1(p) is increasing in p, this solution is unique whenever it exists. When it does not exist, which happens if and only if limpqf1(p)d, we define p1=+. For example, when f1(p)=m1p/(a1+p) (Monod function with a1 and m1 positive), and assuming that qm1>d, we can easily compute p1:

    p1=a1dqm1d. (2.14)

    The quantity p1 represents the break-even concentration of the processed nutrient for the cooperator. We introduce the assumption that:

    H:p1<s0,

    which says that the break-even concentration of the cooperator should be less than the input nutrient concentration. If H does not hold, then x1(t)0, implying the same for w(t) and x2(t); this trivial extinction case is not of interest. Next define the function h:[0,s0)R+, by

    h(w)=dQwg(s0w).

    We showed in [11] that h is zero at zero, that it is strictly increasing and strictly convex (i.e. h(w)>0) with a vertical asymptote at w=s0. Consider the following equation:

    h(w)=q(wp1),0w<s0. (2.15)

    Then strict convexity of the function on the left, and linearity of the function on the right, implies that this equation has at most 2 solutions in the interval (0,s0), and will have exactly 2 solutions for all sufficiently small values of p1. In fact, we showed in [11] that:

    Lemma 2.1. Let H hold. If equation (2.15) has two solutions w1<w2, then system (2.11)(2.13), restricted to the invariant set {x2=0} has 3 steady states, e0=(0,0), e1=(w1,h(w1)) and e2=(w2,h(w2)). The steady states e0 and e2 are locally asymptotically stable, and e1 is a saddle with one-dimensional stable manifold Ws, and one-dimensional unstable manifold Wu. The stable manifold Ws intersects the boundary of Ω{x2=0} in two points, one on the boundary x1=qw, the other on the boundary w=s0, forming a separatrix: Initial conditions below Ws give rise to solutions converging to e0, whereas initial conditions above Ws give rise to solutions converging to e2, yielding a bistable system.

    Figure 1 in the S3 Appendix in [11] illustrates the geometry of the nullclines. Using the fact that this planar system is cooperative and irreducible, one may conclude that Ws is an unordered set, meaning that no two of its points are related by the usual component-wise ordering while Wu is a totally ordered curve consisting of a heteroclinic orbit connecting e1 to e0 and a heteroclinic orbit connecting e1 to e2.

    Figure 1.  Time series for system (2.1)(2.5) illustrating the Tragedy (Left panel), or Strong cooperation (Right Panel). Initial Conditions and model parameters are given in the main text.

    The dynamics of system (2.11)(2.13) restricted to the part of the boundary of Ω where x1=0 (also a forward invariant set) is trivial: w(t)0 as t, and hence x2(t)0 as well, since the argument of the function f2 in the x2-equation becomes arbitrarily small for all sufficiently large times. The remaining parts of the boundary of Ω are not forward invariant. In fact, solutions starting there, enter int(Ω) instantaneously. This feature will be used later.

    We are now ready to investigate the global behavior of system (2.11)(2.13) in Ω. Before stating the precise result, we also define p2, the break even concentration of the processed nutrient for the cheater, as the unique solution p to the equation f2(p)=d (as before, we define p2=+ if there is no solution).

    Theorem 2.2. Assume that the conditions of Lemma 2.1 hold. Then system (2.11)-(2.13) has 3 steady states e0=(0,0,0), e1=(w1,h(w1),0) and e2=(w2,h(w2),0). Moreover,

    1. Strong cooperation or tragedy: If p1<p2, then e0 and e2 are locally asymptotically stable, and e1 is a saddle point with 2-dimensional stable, and 1-dimensional unstable manifold. All solutions converge to one of these 3 steady states. In particular, x2(t)0 for every solution.

    2. Tragedy: If p2<p1, then e0 is locally asymptotically stable, e1 is a saddle point with 1-dimensional stable and 2-dimensional unstable manifold, and e2 is a saddle point with 2-dimensional stable manifold contained in the boundary of Ω where x2=0, and 1-dimensional unstable manifold. All solutions with x2(0)>0 converge to e0.

    Proof. Using Lemma 2.1, it is easy to verify that there are exactly 3 steady states e0, e1 and e2 which are all contained in the part of the boundary of Ω where x2=0. In particular, there are no steady states where both cooperator and cheater coexist at positive levels, a feature that will reveal its importance later on.

    1. Suppose that p1<p2. Then the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at ei=(wi,xi1,0), i=0,1,2 are given by the eigenvalues of the matrix

    Jis=(Qx1g(s0w)dQg(s0w)x1qf1(wx1/q)qf1(wx1/q)dx1f1(wx1/q)),

    and the number

    λi3=f2(wx1/q)d.

    Evaluating these at e0, we obtain the eigenvalue d with multiplicity 3. It was shown in [11] that J1s has one positive and one negative eigenvalue; moreover, λ13=f2(p1)d<f2(p2)d=0 because p1<p2. Similarly, we showed in [11] that J2s has two eigenvalues with negative real part; moreover, λ23=f2(p1)d<f2(p2)d=0. These calculations prove the statements regarding the nature of the steady states and the dimension of the stable and unstable manifold of e1.

    We are left to show that all solutions converge to one of the 3 steady states. This follows from Lemma 2.1 for solutions on the boundary where x2=0, and the same is true for solutions on the boundary where x1=0, as explained earlier. So we consider a solution y(t)=(w(t),x1(t),x2(t)) with x1(0)>0 and x2(0)>0. Our goal is to show that the omega limit set of this solution, ω(y(0)), is a singleton consisting of one of the 3 steady states. If either e0 or e2 belong to ω(y(0)), then ω(y(0)) is indeed the singleton {e0} or {e2} respectively, because both are locally asymptotically stable. So we assume that ω(y(0)) does not contain e0, nor e2. Then either e1ω(y(0)) or e1ω(y(0)). If e1ω(y(0)), then there are two possibilities: y(0)Ws(e1), the stable manifold of e1, and then ω(y(0))={e1}; or y(0)Ws(e1), but then since e1ω(y(0)), the Butler-McGehee Lemma (p.12 in [14]) implies that ω(y(0)) must intersect the 1-dimensional unstable manifold Wu(e1) of e1 in the x2=0 face at a point distinct from e1. But as noted following Lemma 1, Wu(e1){e1} consists of two monotone orbits, one connecting to e0, the other to e2. It follows that ω(y(0)) contains either e0 or e1, a contradiction to earlier arguments. Thus, we are left to consider the case that e1ω(y(0)). Then ω(y(0)) does not contain any of the steady states, and it follows from Hirsch's Theorem (Theorem 4.1 in chapter 3 of [13]) that ω(y(0)) must be a periodic orbit O. Moreover, it is easy to see that any periodic orbit of system (2.11)(2.13) must belong to int(Ω): the invariant sets on the boundary where x1=0, and where x2=0 do not contain periodic orbits, see Lemma 2.1 and the discussion following it; the remaining parts of the boundary are instantaneous repellors. We aim to force a contradiction to the existence of a periodic orbit by using Proposition 4.3 in chapter 3 of [13] but first we must prepare its application by extending system (2.11)(2.13) to the extended state space

    Ωe={x10,x20,0ws0},

    by extending the functions fi, i=1,2 and their domains, to domains R and extended C1 functions such that fi,e(p)>0 for all p in R. This implies that the extended system on Ωe is still a 3-dimensional competitive system because the sign structure of the Jacobian matrix remains unchanged by construction. Moreover, it is not difficult to check that this extension does not introduce new steady states in int(Ωe) because the x1 and x2 steady state equations would imply that wx1/qx2 must equal both p1 and p2, contradicting our assumption that p1<p2.

    As noted earlier, the time-reversed extending system (2.11)(2.13) preserves the partial order generated by the cone K={(w,x1,x2)|w0,x10,x20}. We write yK0 for yK, yKy if yyK0, and yKy if yyint(K). The point A=(s0,0,0)Ω is easily seen to satisfy AKo for every oO so the same holds for point A=(s0ϵ,ϵ,ϵ)int(Ω) for small ϵ>0. Similarly, B=(ϵ,ϵ1,ϵ1) belongs to the interior of Ωe and satisfies oKB for all oO for all small ϵ>0. Fix suitably small ϵ>0. Let [A,B]K denote the box-set {y=(w,x1,x2)R3:AKyKB}=[ϵ,s0ϵ]×[ϵ,ϵ1]2.

    Consequently, we have

    O[A,B]Kint(Ωe).

    Then Proposition 4.3 in chapter 3 of [13] implies that [A,B]K contains a steady state. However, this contradicts the fact, established above, that the extended system has no steady states in int(Ωe). This completes the proof in case p1<p2.

    2. Suppose that p1>p2. Similar calculations of the Jacobian matrices as in the previous case show the nature of the 3 steady states and their stable and unstable manifold. The main difference is that here λi3=f2(p1)d>f2(p2)d=0 for i=1,2 because now p1>p2.

    We are left to show that all solutions with x2(0)>0, converge to e0. Pick such a solution y(t)=(w(t),x2(t),x2(t)). Then y(0) does not belong to the stable manifolds of e1 or e2 (as these are contained in the part of the boundary of Ω where x2=0). We claim that neither e1, nor e2 can belong to ω(y(0)). Indeed, if e1ω(y(0)) then the Butler-McGehee Lemma implies that ω(y(0)) intersects Ws(e1){e1}, but then backward time invariance of omega limit sets would imply that ω(y(0)) contains points outside of Ω which is impossible. A similar argument rules out that e2 belongs to ω(y(0)). Therefore, either e0ω(y(0)), in which case also ω(y(0))={e0} because e0 is asymptotically stable, establishing the desired result; or e0ω(y(0)), but then again by Hirsch's Theorem, ω(y(0)) must be a periodic orbit. We can now argue as in the proof of the previous case, by extending the system without introducing any steady states in the interior of its state sp ace, and showing that this leads to a contradiction as above.

    Having proved Theorem 2.2, we can now invoke standard results from the theory of asymptotically autonomous systems, see e.g. Appendix F in [14] (note that the reduced system has no cycle of steady states), to characterize the global dynamics of the scaled system (2.6)(2.10), and then also of the unscaled system (2.1)(2.5) in terms of the break-even concentrations P1 of the cooperator, and P2 of the cheater, which are defined as the unique solutions of the equations qF1(P)=D and F2(P)=D respectively (and defined as + if no solution exists). Of course, Pi=pi since Fi=fi. The Main Result of this paper is:

    Theorem 2.3. Assume that P1<S0, and that equation (2.15) has two distinct solutions w1 and w2 with P1<w1<w2<S0. Then system (2.1)-(2.5) has exactly 3 steady states SS0=(S0,0,0,0,0), SS1=(S0w1,P1,η(1q)γ1(w1P1),qγ1(w1P1),0) and SS2=(S0w2,P1,η(1q)γ2(w2P1),qγ2(w2P1),0). Moreover,

    1. Strong cooperation or tragedy: If P1<P2, then SS0 and SS2 are locally asymptotically stable, and SS1 is a saddle point with 4-dimensional stable, and 1-dimensional unstable manifold. All solutions converge to one of these 3 steady states. In particular, X2(t)0 as t+ for every solution. The system is bistable: With the exception of solutions starting on the stable manifold of SS1, all solutions converge to either SS2 (strong cooperation), or to SS0 (tragedy).

    2. Tragedy: If P2<P1, then SS0 is locally asymptotically stable, SS1 is a saddle point with 3-dimensional stable and 2-dimensional unstable manifold, and SS2 is a saddle point with 4-dimensional stable manifold contained in the boundary of R5+ where X2=0, and 1-dimensional unstable manifold. All solutions with X2(0)>0 converge to SS0 (tragedy).

    Figure 1 illustrates the case that P1<P2 with G(S)=kS and Monod uptake functions Fi(P)=miPai+P where m1=6,a1=0.025,m2=5,a2=0.05 and where q=0.8 and k=20,D=1,S0=1,γi=1,η=1. Initial conditions for the Tragedy outcome are S=0.3,P=0.0,E=0.01,X1=0.10,X2=0.55. Initial conditions for the Strong Cooperation outcome are S=0.48,P=0.0,E=0.08,X1=0.34,X2=0.1. Parameters and initial data are chosen merely for illustrating the two possible outcomes; they do not have biological significance.

    Theorem 2.3 represents a generalization of Theorem 1 in [11] in the following sense: In [11] we considered the case where γ1=γ2 and F1(P)=F2(P), which means that the cooperator and cheater are indistinguishable as far as their per capita uptake rates Fi(P)/γi, and their yield constants γi are concerned. In this special case P2<P1 always holds, and therefore the tragedy occurs (2nd case in Theorem 2.3), and thus we recover the result of Theorem 1 in [11] as a special case.

    The main purpose of this paper was to investigate whether a tragedy can be avoided if the cooperator evolves by either changing its yield constant γ1, and/or its growth function F1(P), relative to the cheater. Interestingly, only changing its yield γ1, but keeping F1(P)=F2(P), is insufficient: In this case, the inequality P2<P1, remains valid and a tragedy cannot be avoided. This is supported by experimental observations with different metabolic strategies. In direct competitions, low-yield but high-flux fermentation out-competes high-yield but low-flux respiration [9].

    Therefore, the cooperator must modify F1(P) to have a chance at survival. The key to cooperator survival lies in the reversal of the inequality P2<P1 into P1<P2. In other words, the cooperator must evolve in such a way that it has a lower break-even concentration than the cheater, thereby becoming better adapted to the environment of the chemostat. We can gain some insight into how the cooperator can achieve this by considering the case that F1(P) is a Monod function. Then formula (2.14) (and recalling that p1=P1) shows that P1 can be decreased by either increasing m1 or by decreasing a1; that is, by either increasing its maximal uptake rate through an increase in m1, or by decreasing its half-saturation constant a1, the cooperator can evolve to become the superior competitor that drives the cheater to extinction.

    This has been observed during experimental evolution of cooperating microbial populations, where adaptations that improve nutrient uptake stabilize cooperative behavior [15,1]. More broadly, any principle or mechanism that disproportionally increases the benefit of cooperation in cooperating individuals, including kin selection or spatial structuring, will favor its evolution and maintenance [17].

    Assuming that P1<P2 holds, then depending on the initial condition of the system, Theorem 2.3 shows that essentially there are two possible scenarios: Either the tragedy continues to hold, or, more strikingly, the cooperator outcompetes the cheater and drives the cheater to extinction. Under no circumstances can there be a coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. There is some experimental evidence that time and/or space heterogeneities promote cooperation [2,7,3]. In our model time heterogeneities can be introduced by letting the dilution rate and input nutrient concentration fluctuate explicitly with respect to time, by replacing D by D(t), and S0 by S0(t) in our model. However, as we have shown in [11], such fluctuations still give rise to a Tragedy of the Commons, when F1(P)=F2(P) and γ1=γ2, confirming that time heterogeneities cannot induce coexistence of cooperator and cheater. We have not investigated scenarios with spatial heterogeneities in the environment, but in principle one could extend our model to reflect the gradostat (when space is discrete), or the unstirred chemostat (when space is continuous), see [14] for more on models of this kind.

    Patrick De Leenheer is supported in part by NSF-DMS-1411853. Martin Schuster is supported by NSF-MCB-1158553. Hal Smith is supported by Simons Foundation Grant 355819.

    All authors declare no conflicts of interest in this paper.



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