
One of the most crucial elements in the design of a block cipher is the substitution box or S-box. Its cipher strength directly impacts the cipher algorithm's security, and the block cipher algorithm requires a good S-box. According to the cryptanalysis result of the S-box construction in AES: (1) the number of irreducible polynomials can be increased to 30; (2) the affinity transformation constant c can be chosen from all elements if the existence of fixed points and reverse fixed points in an S-box is ignored; and (3) the S-box in AES is fixed, which poses possible security risks to the AES algorithm. The study above led us to build a non-degenerate 2D enhanced quadratic map (2D-EQM) with unpredictability and ergodicity. From there, we generated affine transformation constants and affine transformation matrices, which were then applied to seed S-boxes to create a batch of strongly nonlinear S-boxes. Finally, we assessed the performance of suggested S-boxes using six criteria. Security and statistical research showed that the suggested S-box batch generation procedure was practical and effective.
Citation: Mohammad Mazyad Hazzazi, Farooq E Azam, Rashad Ali, Muhammad Kamran Jamil, Sameer Abdullah Nooh, Fahad Alblehai. Batch generated strongly nonlinear S-Boxes using enhanced quadratic maps[J]. AIMS Mathematics, 2025, 10(3): 5671-5695. doi: 10.3934/math.2025262
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One of the most crucial elements in the design of a block cipher is the substitution box or S-box. Its cipher strength directly impacts the cipher algorithm's security, and the block cipher algorithm requires a good S-box. According to the cryptanalysis result of the S-box construction in AES: (1) the number of irreducible polynomials can be increased to 30; (2) the affinity transformation constant c can be chosen from all elements if the existence of fixed points and reverse fixed points in an S-box is ignored; and (3) the S-box in AES is fixed, which poses possible security risks to the AES algorithm. The study above led us to build a non-degenerate 2D enhanced quadratic map (2D-EQM) with unpredictability and ergodicity. From there, we generated affine transformation constants and affine transformation matrices, which were then applied to seed S-boxes to create a batch of strongly nonlinear S-boxes. Finally, we assessed the performance of suggested S-boxes using six criteria. Security and statistical research showed that the suggested S-box batch generation procedure was practical and effective.
In terms of cybersecurity, protecting sensitive data and utilizing secure communication techniques are essential to preventing unauthorized access, data breaches, and cyber-attacks. Data security is a significant challenge for cryptographers given the rapid advancement of communication technologies. The main objective of cryptography is to develop methods that ensure secure network communication. The name "cryptography" comes from two Greek words: "graphein," which denotes the act of learning or writing, and "kryptos," which means something hidden or unrevealing. Various useful encryption methods and procedures have been established in engaging literary works to ensure the security of data transmission. Often, maintaining information security is thought to be the main goal of cryptography. Major contributions to the creation of modern cryptography have been made in fields including electrical engineering, physics, computer science, mathematics, and communication science. The nonlinear part of block cipher cryptosystems is called an S-box. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), and the Data Encryption Standard (DES) are examples of cryptographic techniques that use the S-box. The S-box's security affects the security of the entire cryptosystem. Thus, It is well known that the S-box, a nonlinear component, is crucial to maintaining the security of cryptographic systems. The DES was introduced in 1977 by a well-known computer manufacturer, and further research resulted in major improvements to the cryptographic method.
Eventually, a group of college students broke through DES's protection. The most used encryption scheme is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), created by Daemen and Rijmen in 2002. The reliability of encryption is significantly influenced by the S-box. Using a subpar S-box when encrypting data is similar to exploiting the security of the encryption. Consequently, it is essential to evaluate an S-box's robustness before using it in a cryptosystem. The severe avalanche requirement, bit independence criteria, nonlinearity, linear approximation probability, and the probability of differential approximation are among the methods of strength measurement used for the S-box examination. An essential component of contemporary cryptographic approaches, symmetric key cryptography ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and validity of digital data. S-boxes, often called substitution boxes, are crucial elements in many symmetric key cryptography techniques since they add confusing things, and, being nonlinear there is an increase in security. In cryptography, chaotic maps are used to create difficult-to-predict pseudo-random sequences. Complex systems, even deterministic ones, can be studied and modeled using chaotic maps because of their irregularity and unpredictability. Bifurcation is used in chaos theory and dynamical systems to characterize a qualitative shift in a system's behavior when a parameter changes. The word "bifurcation" in S-boxes refers to cryptography, specifically the creation and examination of cryptographic methods. An S-box is an essential part of many symmetric key algorithms, including block ciphers. Its purpose is to create confusion by performing substitution operations, which obscures the connection between the ciphertext and the key. When examining an S-box's resistance to different types of assaults, bifurcation can be linked to how minor adjustments to the input or key impact the encryption procedure as a whole.
Performance and security level of the encryption system are directly determined by the quality of the S-box, which is the main nonlinear component in many block cipher algorithms. Consequently, the development of the S-box with superior performance has emerged as a significant area of study that has drawn interest from many academics. To increase the nonlinearity of the original S-boxes, [1] employed a Josephus circle problem. A nonlinearity of 110.75 is achieved by the suggested S-box. Ali et al. [2] proposed a new design that uses a direct product of cyclic groups and the Galois field to produce a robust S-box. Instead of a fractional transformation, they employed a highly nonlinear inversion map of the Galois field. [3] used Arnold's Cat map to generate dynamic S-boxes. The technique generated nonlinear and efficient S-boxes, however it does not ensure bijectivity for each S-box. On average, the proposed scheme's nonlinearity was 107. The authors in [4] created S-boxes using a novel chaotic system. A very nonlinear S-box was created in [5] using a newly constructed chaotic sine map. The S-box's nonlinearity was increased by the authors using an optimization model, however, the scheme's average nonlinearity remained at 110.25. A novel method for creating a sturdy S-box using a multi-layer perceptron architecture and linear fractional transformation was presented in [6]. S-boxes created using a combination of algebraic and chaotic processes outperform S-boxes constructed solely using algebraic operations or chaos in terms of cryptographic performance. Furthermore, combining algebraic and chaotic models yields a better trade-off between S-box execution and generating efficiency, and this strategy is starting to show promise for creating S-boxes. A growing number of study disciplines have recently focused on creating hyperchaotic maps with intricate dynamics. The authors designed a new two-dimensional exponential chaotic system (ECS) [7]. Because the 2D-ECS cascades exponential nonlinearity with bounded functions, it can produce a huge number of hyperchaotic maps. By using trigonometric functions to cascade the exponential nonlinearity, three hyperchaotic maps were produced to demonstrate the efficacy of the 2D-ECS. Using a variety of numerical measurements, the authors first constructed state-mapping networks with varying fixed-point arithmetic precisions in order to examine the dynamic features of the hyperchaotic maps in the digital realm. The developed hyperchaotic maps outperformed the current chaotic maps in terms of performance indicators, according to experimental data. As a universal system that may produce numerous 2-D chaotic maps with various exponent coefficient settings, [8] suggested a two-dimensional (2-D) parametric polynomial chaotic system (2D-PPCS). The 2D-PPCS first initialized two parametric polynomials before subjecting them to modular chaotification. By varying the control parameters, the 2D-PPCS was able to tailor its Lyapunov exponents to achieve the necessary complexity and robust chaos. The resilient chaotic behavior of the 2D-PPCS was shown via theoretical research. Two illustrated cases were presented and evaluated using numerical experiments to confirm the 2D-PPCS's efficacy. Additionally, a pseudorandom number generator based on chaos was created to demonstrate the uses of the 2D-PPCS. Based on the homogenized disturbed spatiotemporal chaotic system [9], the dynamic S-box generation method was developed. Various techniques are also used to create S-boxes, including heuristic, genetic, and genuine random methods. Researchers have created keyed S-boxes in response to the shortcomings of static S-boxes. Kazlauskas et al. [10] suggested ways to produce a substantial quantity of S-boxes based on keys.
The combination of chaos theory and algebraic techniques in the literature has led to innovative S-box designs that offer enhanced security against cryptanalytic attacks while maintaining efficiency for encryption applications. Using the dynamic irreducible polynomial and the affine constant, a dynamic S-box was developed in [11]. The authors in [12] created and executed a novel AES block cipher variant that relies on an S-box cube that depends on the key. [13] developed a new computationally effective technique that uses key-dependent permutations over finite elliptic curves to create dynamic S-boxes. An extremely nonlinear S-box was constructed in [14] using a logistic chaotic map, symmetric group of permutation, and projective general linear group action. A genetic method was used in [15] to generate extremely nonlinear bijective S-boxes. S-boxes with an average nonlinearity of 110.75 were produced in [16] by putting forth a novel mixed chaotic system with favorable pseudo-random characteristics. A new approach to building an S-box using the chaotic system and the full Latin square was presented in [17]. A chaotic system first generates chaotic sequences that are used to create a complete Latin square. The full Latin square is then used to create an S-box. Performance analyses reveal that the S-box formed by the suggested method has a good performance and can withstand a wide range of security attacks, including the linear attack and differential attack. To demonstrate the efficacy of the S-box, this study used it to an image encryption application. [18] provided a crucial concept for creating symmetric rotating surfaces, and a generalized hybrid trigonometric Bézier curve is used to describe curves in engineering. The authors of [19] created a powerful S-box creation method based on EQM that combines and merges all rings with short periods into one maximum ring. The nonlinear confusion component was constructed in [20] using a straightforward and effective technique. The derived confusion component has a low nonlinearity of 105.5, making it resistant to differential and cryptographic attacks. The authors in [21] employed a watermarking-based method with chaotic fractional transformation properties to build the S-box. While the technique is intriguing and effective, the resulting S-box has a relatively low nonlinearity of 102.3. The quantum logistic map [22] was utilized to generate numerous nonlinear confusion components. However, by maximizing the parameters with the highest nonlinearity, choose just two confusion components. Although the produced S-boxes have extremely little non-linearity, this technique [23] is quite good. Strong S-boxes were constructed using three finite fields of order 256, an affine map, and an inversion map. The method used is easy to use and incredibly effective for creating robust S-boxes, nonetheless, we can only produce a certain amount of S-boxes with this arrival.
The combination of the chaotic systems has led to the development of a novel S-box generating technique in [24]. The authors in [25] used a method of image encryption using two keys. A linear congruential generator and a 2D logistic sine map produce the first key, whereas the Tent, Bernoulli, and KAA maps produce the second. For image security in cloud storage, [26] proposed a simplified picture encryption algorithm (SIEA) based on the Feistel cipher structure that utilized key generation and permutation. To encrypt digital images, [27] proposed ARHM (AES and Rossler hyperchaotic modelling), which combines the Rossler hyperchaotic system with AES with phantom transformation. The key space, key sensitivity, histogram, pixel correlation, entropy, and resistance to differential assaults are all simulated and examined using this model. It uses AES encryption speed and chaotic system randomization. Liu et al. [28] created an image encryption technique based on a non-degeneracy 3D chaotic map and a keyed strong S-box that can encrypt color images of all sizes. First, they created a non-degeneracy 3D discrete hyperchaotic map (3D-DHCM), which is then used to create a keyed strong S-box with no fixed point, reverse fixed point, or short period rings. The map is based on the discrete logarithm problem, which is the inverse function of the modular exponentiation procedure. Finally, the authors blurred the raw image before encryption, and then used permutation, confusion, and diffusion algorithms to shuffle all pixels. The authors in [29] developed a technique for improving the security of medical photographs, and produced robust S-boxes via Mobius transformation on a Galois field. Quantum theory has been increasingly applied to image encryption in recent years. The DNA coding-based image encryption algorithm and quantum chaotic pap (QCMDC-IEA) has inherent security flaws; its DNA domain encryption is susceptible to attacks, such as the presence of an equivalent key generated by different chaos-based sequences. A proposed attack method exploits these shortcomings to provide complete decipherment and low complexity.
A powerful S-box meets three conditions: no fixed points, no reverse fixed points, and no short iterating cycles. Nevertheless, the majority of S-boxes built with the previously discussed methods either lack many short cycles or have fixed or reverse fixed points, which means they do not meet these three requirements. These problems have a direct effect on the S-boxes' strength, opening up possible openings for attackers. A lot of these S-boxes also have low nonlinearity. In cryptography, nonlinearity is one of the most significant features of S-boxes since it is vital for increasing resistance to linear cryptanalysis [30]. However, it is important to consider the shortcomings of the popular 1D chaotic maps, like the Tent, Henon, sine, and logistic maps. One example is the short iteration periods, restricted chaotic range, weak randomness, and lack of ergodicity in 1D chaotic maps. The generated sequences could be attacked because of these flaws. The security of constructed S-boxes must therefore be guaranteed by building a multi-dimensional chaotic map.
Our motivations are as follows:
1. Creating novel chaotic mappings for the creation of pseudo-random numbers.
2. Investigating how algebraic structures and transformations are affected by chaotic mappings.
3. Development of numerous S-boxes with robust cryptographic characteristics.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. S-box weakness analysis: The S-box structure has two flaws: short iteration cycles, which could be a cryptography exploit, and fixed point or reverse fixed point.
2. We created a 2D enhanced quadratic map (EQM) in order to get over the drawbacks of 1D chaotic maps, which include numerous bifurcations, narrow key space, dense periodic windows, and a brief iteration duration.
3. Security analyses show that the robust S-box construction approach works well for cryptography.
This article is organized as follows: Section 3 deals with the study of chaotic maps, their analysis, and construction of a new hybrid EQM. Section 4 consists of a construction algorithm for an S-box using affine matrices and Galois fields. The evaluation criteria are defined and discussed in Section 5 for dynamic S-boxes. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study.
There are several characteristics of chaotic maps that make them very good options for encryption systems. Chaotic maps possess space in their system parameters, are pseudorandom, ergodic, and sensitive to initial conditions. They are divided into maps with low and large dimensions. The number of variables and parameters in low-dimensional maps is modest. Therefore, they are straightforward and simple to use. Because of their small chaotic range and parameter values, they are nevertheless easily predictable. However, a high-dimensional map's quantity of parameters and variables has a greater range of chaotic space since their height is higher. Nevertheless, their drawbacks make them difficult to apply in real-time due to their complexity and high processing overhead.
A particular kind of chaotic map, known as a logistic chaotic map, is more widely used than the others and is mostly used in picture encryption methods. A two degree polynomial mapping includes the logistic map. It is a famous example of a chaotic, complicated system with basic nonlinear dynamics. Many of the characteristics of this straightforward system are common to pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) [3], and it can readily transition from order to chaos. Logistic map have the advantages of simplicity and ease of use due to their low variation, however they have several disadvantages, such as chaotic orbits and parameters and beginning values that may be used to define them being easily predictable. The logistic chaotic map may be computed mathematically. Figure 1 shows a logistic map Lyapunov exponent, and Figure 2 shows a logistic map bifurcation.
xn+1=λxn(1−xn) |
The number of iterations is denoted by n, while the chaotic parameter is represented by λ.
One of the fundamental ideas in chaos theory is the Lyapunov exponent, which quantifies the speed at which neighboring paths in a dynamical system diverge or converge over time. It measures how sensitive a system is to starting conditions, which is a sign of chaotic behavior. The Lyapunov exponent is used to quantify how sensitive a chaotic system is to initial circumstances. Because it guarantees that even a small alteration to an initial key or state produces a radically different sequence, this sensitivity is desired in cryptography and adds to the system's unpredictability and security. The Lyapunov exponent formula is
λ=limn→∞1nlog(‖δxn‖‖δx0‖) |
where: (1) the initial perturbation or difference in the input is denoted by δx0; (2) the perturbation that occurs after n repetitions of the cryptographic function is δxn and (3) an appropriate metric, such as the Euclidean norm, is shown by ‖⋅‖
A term commonly used in the field of cryptography to describe bifurcation is taken from chaos theory and dynamical systems. When parameters are changed, cryptographic systems or functions exhibit behavior that can alter dramatically. This term is used to characterize such changes in behavior.
We created a 2D-EQM with modular arithmetic based on the standard quadratic map 3.1 in order to address its shortcomings, including its limited key space that may communicate equations, lack of ergodicity, and poor unpredictability.
xi+1=mod(aπ+xi⋅r(1−y2i+exp(xi)+sinh(xi)),1)yi+1=mod(bπ+yi⋅r(1−x2i+exp(yi)+sinh(yi)),1) | (3.1) |
where the state variables x,y∈(0,1) and the control parameter r∈(0,1800] are double precision floating point numbers in Eq 3.1, and a∈(1,10],b∈(1,20]. The phase diagram and bifurcation diagrams are shown in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5. The two positive Lyapunov exponents shown in Figure 6 demonstrate that, over a larger range of control settings, the 2D-EQM exhibits hyperchaotic behavior and is non-degenerate.
The Lyapunov exponent of proposed map is shown in Figure 6. The values of the Lyapunov exponents for mapping (3.1) are 14.74813 and 18.235113 using the parameters x0=0.762853479752345,y0=0.575685981383182,a=5,b=12 and r=1000.
The construction of the affine transformation constant and matrix using 2D-EQM is described in this section. The number of S-boxes built was then determined by using them to create a keyed strong S-box based on a seed S-box with high nonlinearity. Thirty irreducible polynomials in the order listed in the table make up this collection.
Input: The initial condition
(x0,y0,r0) |
in Eq (1) is the key of KEY. Output: An 8×8, S-box with high nonlinearity and a strong key. To construct a keyed strong S-box, follow these steps.
Step 1: Affine transformation through the construction of matrix B.
200 iterations of Eq 3.1 with (x0,y0,r0) to eliminate the impact of the transitory process. After that, 64 iterations are needed to produce the two sequences X and Y, and Eq 4.1 yields an invertible matrix B:
B=reshape(mod(⌊(x201:264+y201:264)⋅1015⌋,2),8,8) | (4.1) |
This equation contains the elements from index 201 to 264. In the given index range, the corresponding values of x and y are also added element-wise in the equation. The final values are multiplied by 1015 after the addition. To deal with tiny fractional portions, for example, if x and y are floats, this step greatly scales up the values and improves their precision. For every element, this operation applies modulo 2. Usually, this is done to change the values to binary. The rebuilt matrix will have eight rows and eight columns since the vector must have 64 elements in total. The matrix B, an 8×8 binary matrix, is the result. If |B|=0, we can use Eq 4.2 to produce a new B by altering the control parameter r and the state variable values (x,y) from the previous iteration:
x=x0+3√p108,y=y0+3√p107,r=r0+5√p106. | (4.2) |
here, p is a prime number in the interval (100,1000).
Step 2: Selecting an irreducible polynomial
After being scaled by 1015 and reduced modulo 30, the sum of x is converted into an index, which is then increased by 1 in Eq 4.3:
i=mod(floor(∑X⋅1015),30)+1 | (4.3) |
Step 3: An affine transformation vector C is created.
The sum of y, scaled by 1015, scaled and reduced modulo 256, is used to compute C. After being transformed into a binary string, C is saved as c, a column vector of binary values in Eq 4.4
C=mod(floor(∑y⋅1015),256) | (4.4) |
Step 4: Constructing a potential S-box Sc.
Choose an element z∈GF(28) generated by the irreducible polynomial. Convert z into binary form and consider the following transformation.
[a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8]=[b11b12b13b14b15b16b17b18b21b22b23b24b25b26b27b28b31b32b33b34b35b36b37b38b41b42b43b44b45b46b47b48b51b52b53b54b55b56b57b58b61b62b63b64b65b66b67b68b71b72b73b74b75b76b77b78b81b82b83b84b85b86b87b88]⋅([z1z2z3z4z5z6z7z8])2+[c1c2c3c4c5c6c7c8] |
After applying the transformation, convert
[a1,a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8] |
to decimal form.
Algorithm 1 Keyed Strong S-Box Construction |
1: Input: Initial condition (x0,y0,r0) |
2: Output: An 8×8 S-box |
3: Step 1: Affine transformation through the construction of matrix B |
4: Perform 200 iterations with (x0,y0,r0) to remove transient effects |
5: Perform 64 iterations to generate sequences X and Y |
6: Compute binary matrix B using Equation (3.2) |
7: Step 2: Selecting an irreducible polynomial |
8: Scale the sum of x by 1015, reduce modulo 30, and compute index i using Eq (3.4) |
9: Step 3: Creating affine transformation vector C |
10: Scale the sum of y by 1015, reduce modulo 256, and compute C using Eq (3.6) |
11: Step 4: Constructing potential S-box Sc |
12: Choose an element z∈GF(28) and apply the transformation |
13: Convert the resulting vector to decimal form to complete Sc |
14: Apply removal process to obtain strong keyed S-box |
Despite being widely utilized in several cryptosystems, S-box still has certain flaws that can make it vulnerable, like short cycles and fixed point or reverse fixed points. Invalid substitution may result from the fixed point or reverse fixed point. An attacker using an S-box can readily predict the fixed point or reverse fixed point of a different S-box, which can be a fingerprint. Repetitive iteration from any element cannot traverse all of the elements due to S-box's short cycles, which could result in a strong attack that is unusual. There are only 1108 S-boxes that can be built using 30 irreducible polynomials in AES, thus there are not many of them. They also do not depend on the key, and the majority of them have short cycles. The fixed point and reverse fixed-point detection are absent from the S-box in RC4. For the block cipher SM 4.0, there is still one fixed point and eight short periodic rings even if its S-box is built via nonlinear transformation. The elimination process was used by authors in [31] and can be understood by Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. This method achieved 99.072 percent results for elimination.
Algorithm 2 Elimination of Fixed and Reverse Fixed Points in S-box with Cycle Detection |
Input: Initial S-box |
Output: Final S-box after elimination of fixed points, reverse fixed points, and cycle corrections. |
Divide the S-box into 16 smaller 4×4 matrices Si,j, where i,j∈{0,1,2,3} |
for each Si,j in the S-box do |
Detect if there exists a fixed point Pi,j(r,c) or a reverse fixed point Pi,j(r,c), where r∈[0,3],c∈[0,3] |
if a fixed point or reverse fixed point is found then |
Apply Eq (6): Pi,j(r,c)↔Pi,j(r,[c+1]mod4) (swap with right neighbor) |
Apply Eq (7): Pi,j(r,c)↔Pi,j([r+1]mod4,c) (swap with bottom neighbor) |
end if |
end for |
Call: Func_Cycles(S) |
Output: Final S-box after removing short iterating cycles |
Algorithm 3 Func_Cycles Function to Handle Cycles in S-box |
1: Input: S-box S |
2: Output: Updated S-box S after cycle elimination. |
3: cycles = findCycles(S) (Find all cycles in the S-box) |
4: for each cycle in cycles do |
5: if length of the cycle equals the length of S then |
6: fprintf('No short cycles found.') |
7: return (Exit function if no short cycles found) |
8: end if |
9: end for |
10: fprintf('Found d cycles: ') |
11: for i = 1 to length(cycles) do |
12: fprintf('Cycle i (length d): ', i, length(cyclesi)) |
13: disp(cyclesi) |
14: end for |
15: while length(cycles) ≥ 2 do |
16: Get the last element of the first cycle: lastElem = cycles1(end) |
17: Get the first element of the second cycle: firstElem = cycles2(1) |
18: Find positions of these elements in S: |
19: posLastElem = find(S = = lastElem) |
20: posFirstElem = find(S = = firstElem) |
21: Swap these elements: |
22: S([posLastElem, posFirstElem]) = S([posFirstElem, posLastElem]) |
23: Recompute the cycles: cycles = findCycles(S) |
24: end while |
25: fprintf('S box after removing short iterating cycles: ') |
26: disp(S) |
Note: We can change the state variable values x,y of the previous iteration if there are still issues.
The final S-box will be available after all flaws have been fixed. It will be safe and robust for use in cryptography. A sample S-box is displayed in Table 1 with x0=0.830136384779407,y0=0.207884140559460,a=2,b=3 and r=59.
128 | 106 | 149 | 197 | 48 | 157 | 208 | 15 | 53 | 252 | 205 | 20 | 96 | 91 | 35 | 49 |
230 | 89 | 147 | 109 | 27 | 83 | 32 | 73 | 249 | 8 | 80 | 30 | 165 | 134 | 166 | 39 |
194 | 22 | 90 | 68 | 169 | 104 | 69 | 70 | 218 | 234 | 26 | 226 | 232 | 61 | 135 | 214 |
99 | 52 | 237 | 222 | 60 | 121 | 191 | 162 | 172 | 59 | 133 | 5 | 127 | 228 | 37 | 54 |
0 | 119 | 74 | 146 | 174 | 187 | 23 | 167 | 210 | 245 | 40 | 223 | 94 | 141 | 170 | 71 |
247 | 215 | 45 | 6 | 95 | 67 | 88 | 179 | 124 | 173 | 28 | 34 | 231 | 110 | 213 | 250 |
33 | 239 | 17 | 43 | 203 | 111 | 4 | 57 | 236 | 102 | 188 | 202 | 150 | 64 | 219 | 204 |
183 | 93 | 238 | 97 | 243 | 117 | 50 | 241 | 56 | 152 | 255 | 153 | 25 | 55 | 11 | 193 |
14 | 47 | 216 | 185 | 115 | 145 | 224 | 44 | 2 | 29 | 178 | 12 | 3 | 18 | 182 | 143 |
253 | 212 | 98 | 184 | 76 | 254 | 130 | 181 | 100 | 58 | 105 | 144 | 51 | 92 | 196 | 125 |
86 | 163 | 176 | 81 | 120 | 190 | 151 | 1 | 195 | 82 | 199 | 140 | 19 | 240 | 79 | 112 |
233 | 189 | 171 | 158 | 160 | 84 | 200 | 36 | 244 | 148 | 7 | 137 | 229 | 142 | 103 | 242 |
161 | 220 | 118 | 116 | 154 | 108 | 225 | 251 | 180 | 24 | 248 | 87 | 42 | 132 | 129 | 122 |
77 | 62 | 21 | 123 | 235 | 46 | 221 | 159 | 227 | 72 | 38 | 201 | 16 | 164 | 138 | 168 |
107 | 131 | 126 | 186 | 63 | 78 | 156 | 65 | 114 | 31 | 101 | 217 | 136 | 41 | 207 | 75 |
85 | 9 | 10 | 113 | 246 | 206 | 209 | 175 | 198 | 155 | 13 | 192 | 177 | 66 | 139 | 211 |
This section presents the results of security assessments that were carried out on the suggested S-boxes to ascertain their level of resistance to cryptographic assaults. The probability of linear approximation (LAP), bit independence criteria (BIC), nonlinearity, strict avalanche criteria (SAC), and differencing approximation (DAP) in action were the five tests used to evaluate the S-box (See Table 2).
Mathematical Structure | S-boxes | Nonlinearity | SAC | BIC Nonlinearity | BIC SAC | LAP | DAP |
Hyper Chaotic map | Proposed | 112 | 0.5066 | 112 | 0.5027 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Optimization | [1] | 110.5 | 0.5100 | 103 | 0.4998 | - | 0.0391 |
Cyclic groups | [2] | 112 | 0.5034 | 112 | 0.5066 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Chaos | [5] | 110.25 | 0.5027 | 102.71 | 0.4936 | 0.1250 | 0.0469 |
ECC | [13] | 107.75 | 0.5010 | 103.93 | 0.5038 | 0.1250 | 0.0391 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [24] | 112 | 0.5017 | 111.64 | 0.5006 | 0.0156 | 0.0703 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [26] | 103.75 | 0.501 | 103 | - | 0.141 | 0.039 |
GF(28) | [29] | 112 | 0.4988 | 112 | 0.5008 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [31] | 110.75 | 0.4976 | 110.07 | 0.5034 | 0.0859 | 0.0234 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [32] | 107.25 | 0.4981 | 104.42 | 0.5008 | - | - |
Hyper chaotic map | [33] | 112 | 0.4971 | 112 | 0.4997 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Optimization | [34] | 112.0 | 0.5031 | 112.00 | 0.51120 | 0.092610 | 0.0291800 |
Chaos | [35] | 112.00 | 0.5061 | 111.28 | 0.5016 | 0.0703 | 1.5625 |
GF(28) | [36] | 112 | 0.5032 | 112 | 0.5059 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
GF(28) | AES | 112 | 0.5040 | 112 | 0.5046 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
GF(28) | [37] | 112 | 0.4980 | 112 | 0.5017 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
transfer-function | [38] | 105.4039 | 0.5024 | 105.3571 | 0.5063 | 0.1171 | 0.0390 |
Lu-Chen | [39] | 105.75 | 0.4939 | 103.43 | 0.5032 | 0.1171 | 0.0390 |
random selection | [40] | 102.75 | 0.4978 | 103.35 | 0.5007 | 0.1328 | 0.0468 |
Block Ciphers | [41] | 106 | 0.5051 | 98 | - | 0.148 | 0.039 |
Block cipher | [42] | 107.00 | 0.4970 | - | 0.5070 | 0.0148 | 0.0470 |
chaotic system | [43] | 105.88 | 0.5084 | 103.18 | 0.5087 | 0.1288 | 0.0391 |
SEC | [44] | 112 | 0.5010 | 112 | 0.5000 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Chaos | [45] | 109 | 0.5 | - | - | - | - |
GF(28) | [46] | 112 | 0.5002 | 112 | 0.5054 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Our goal is to have the nonlinearity value as high as feasible because it directly affects password security. By increasing nonlinearity, nonlinear attacks can be resisted. Our top S-boxes in Table 1 achieve the ideal nonlinearity value for 8-bit S-boxes, which is 112. In Figure 7, the nonlinearity for 1000 S-boxes is shown. Nonlinearity persists in the 109–112 range even after removing all fixed points, reverse fixed points, and short-period rings. Our function gives an average nonlinearity of 111.51051. There are 466 finest S-boxes with nonlinearity 112 out of the 1000 S-boxes produced by the function, and there are 778 S-boxes with nonlinearity greater than 111 overall. These findings are astounding and far superior to the current techniques without any weaknesses [31] and the nonlinearity of 1950 S-boxes is higher than the mean score of [31]. The scores of the other current methods that are flawless are significantly lower. The schemes [2,4,15,29,36] contain short cycles, fixed, and reverse fixed points, and its S-boxes of nonlinearity fall between 105 and 112. Figure 7 show that our proposed S-box has nonlinearity values in between 111.5 to 112.
A property of substitution boxes (S-boxes) called strict avalanche criteria (SAC) is used to assess the cryptographic strength of S-boxes in symmetric key algorithms. Using SAC quantifies the output such that a small change in the input results in significant changes in the production, such as how much an S-box's output bits change when a single bit in its input is changed. When each of the S-box's input bits is reversed, each output bit should change with a probability of 0.5. By doing this, it is ensured that the S-box does not favor any certain output value. At least (k/2) output bits should ideally change if k input bits are altered. This feature makes sure that a slight change in the input results in a significant change in the output. If the function f(x)⊕f(x⊕a) is balanced for each vector of hamming weight 1, then the boolean function f satisfies the SAC. Figure 8 shows the average values of the dependence matrices. We calculated for 1000 S-boxes to assess the strict avalanche requirements of S-boxes. The sample S-box average score was 0.5050, which is good when compared to sample S-boxes [1,6,31]. Our average score of SAC is 0.5050 for 1000 dynamic S-boxes. Our scores are better than compared to some other papers [4,27,35]. Figure 8 shows the score of strict avalanche criteria (SAC) of our proposed S-box.
Let fa and fb be the S-box's two-bit outputs. When
fa⊕fb(a≠b, 1≤a,b≤n) |
an S-box that meets the rigorous avalanche conditions and is extremely nonlinear is said to satisfy the bit independence criterion (BIC). The term bit independence criterion describes a collection of characteristics that define the statistical independence of an S-box's input and output bits. The criteria that outline the conditions that must be fulfilled by the S-box in order to ensure that its output bits are statistically independent of its input bits. For an S-box's bit outputs fi and fj (1<i,j≤n,i≠j), if fi⊕fj is extremely nonlinear and meets the rigorous avalanche criterion, the S-box satisfies the BIC. The ideal BIC-SAC value is 0.5, and the assault resistance is increased by greater BIC nonlinearity values. The BIC The sample S-boxes in Figure 9 have a nonlinearity of 112, which is equivalent to the score of AES and sample S-boxes in [2,4,31,35,36]. The average BIC nonlinearity scores in [31] are 109.67 and 111.34 [35]. Thus, our average score is 111.49. The BIC nonlinearity scores of our suggested strategy are higher than [31,35]. The BIC SAC scores of our sample S-boxes and 1000 randomly generated S-boxes are displayed in Figure 10. For the sample S-boxes, the mean scores are 0.5025.
The probability of linear approximation is the likelihood that, given a given number of input-output pairs, the inputs of an S-box will approach its outputs linearly. Due to its increased vulnerability to linear attacks, a weaker S-box would have a greater linear approximation probability. Conversely, a smaller linear approximation probability suggests a stronger S-box. The S-box shows improved resistance to linear attacks as a result. The linear approximation probability can be determined using the formula below. Linear Approximation probability (LAP) of dynamically generated 1000 S-boxes is displayed in Figure 11.
LPS=maxα,β≠0|{u∈GF(2m)∣α⋅S(u)=β⋅S(v)}|−2m−12m |
assuming that the input and output masks are represented by u and v, respectively.
When considering a given number of rounds, the probability that a given input difference will result in a given output difference is estimated by the differential approximation probability for an S-box. The chance of a specific differential characteristic happening within the S-box is quantified. To calculate the differential approximation probability, a comprehensive search over all possible input and output differences across a predetermined number of rounds is often carried out. The occurrences of each difference are counted, and the total is then calculated. The ratio of input/output pairs examined to the number of occurrences of the desired difference is used to compute the likelihood. The S-box's resistance to differential cryptanalysis increases with decreasing differential approximation probability. A decreased likelihood suggests the lack of strong differentials displayed by the S-box makes, it is more difficult for an attacker to exploit the cipher's differential features. The attacker uses unique qualities to their advantage and cracks the cipher. Differential Approximation probability(DAP) of 1000 S-boxes can be observed in Figure 12.
DP(Δu,Δv)=|{u∈GF(2m)∣S(u)⊕S(u⊕Δu)=Δv}|2m |
The differential between the input and output are denoted by Δu and Δv, respectively.
EQM was used to suggest a keyed strong S-box construction technique. In certain S-boxes, exploitable vulnerabilities related to fixed point, reverse fixed point, and short cycles were first revealed. In order to create a keyed S-box without any weaknesses, an EQM with ergodicity was suggested; this significantly increased the average cycle length and randomness when compared to the quadratic map. After EQM was used to develop a keyed strong S-box construction algorithm, all of the short periodic rings were combined into a maximized ring, and the fixed point or reverse fixed point was removed using a swapping technique. The efficacy and viability of the suggested S-box construction algorithm were confirmed by experimental data.
Mohammad Mazyad Hazzazi: Methodology, Software, Data curation. Farooq E Azam: Conceptualization, Validation, Writing-original draft. Rashad Ali: Conceptualization, Methodology, Software, Writing, reviewing & editing. Muhammad Kamran Jamil: Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Supervision. Sameer Nooh: Methodology, Visualization, Writing- review & editing. Fahad Alblehai: Conceptualization, Formal Analysis, Software.
All authors have read and approved the final version of the manuscript for publication.
The authors declare they have not used Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools in the creation of this article.
All authors declare no conflicts of interest in this paper
The authors extend their gratitude to the deanship of scientific research of King Khalid University, for funding this work through a research project under grant R.G.P.2/34/45.
131 | 181 | 101 | 92 | 232 | 154 | 196 | 29 | 189 | 238 | 139 | 57 | 145 | 155 | 237 | 91 |
239 | 140 | 78 | 108 | 203 | 22 | 109 | 63 | 157 | 193 | 241 | 126 | 18 | 177 | 148 | 160 |
75 | 251 | 178 | 3 | 146 | 69 | 74 | 161 | 245 | 235 | 47 | 255 | 23 | 66 | 249 | 34 |
102 | 202 | 141 | 243 | 122 | 7 | 82 | 229 | 107 | 83 | 39 | 72 | 168 | 169 | 96 | 59 |
191 | 247 | 110 | 6 | 46 | 121 | 220 | 40 | 246 | 137 | 0 | 199 | 221 | 213 | 187 | 129 |
64 | 10 | 50 | 186 | 125 | 123 | 62 | 174 | 19 | 226 | 120 | 180 | 207 | 112 | 182 | 79 |
99 | 170 | 103 | 219 | 73 | 15 | 84 | 49 | 77 | 228 | 252 | 61 | 106 | 133 | 135 | 42 |
70 | 43 | 204 | 206 | 195 | 89 | 51 | 162 | 24 | 116 | 212 | 44 | 217 | 8 | 134 | 222 |
93 | 197 | 211 | 94 | 20 | 223 | 183 | 231 | 32 | 190 | 60 | 254 | 163 | 172 | 26 | 25 |
236 | 52 | 38 | 55 | 143 | 208 | 201 | 152 | 27 | 130 | 9 | 167 | 179 | 218 | 244 | 158 |
166 | 35 | 2 | 188 | 150 | 159 | 117 | 136 | 124 | 250 | 115 | 185 | 118 | 85 | 30 | 48 |
227 | 53 | 98 | 144 | 119 | 147 | 111 | 233 | 242 | 114 | 33 | 86 | 175 | 132 | 192 | 176 |
81 | 234 | 142 | 80 | 215 | 200 | 205 | 253 | 105 | 198 | 71 | 4 | 184 | 90 | 113 | 13 |
1 | 37 | 230 | 104 | 95 | 214 | 156 | 16 | 128 | 28 | 12 | 164 | 31 | 224 | 67 | 225 |
68 | 209 | 65 | 88 | 36 | 5 | 127 | 138 | 240 | 216 | 87 | 151 | 21 | 248 | 76 | 153 |
11 | 14 | 149 | 45 | 194 | 17 | 54 | 173 | 97 | 210 | 165 | 56 | 171 | 100 | 41 | 58 |
14 | 247 | 30 | 96 | 23 | 103 | 68 | 202 | 4 | 56 | 8 | 92 | 222 | 191 | 83 | 158 |
153 | 85 | 16 | 167 | 42 | 93 | 238 | 98 | 63 | 215 | 198 | 239 | 10 | 112 | 17 | 55 |
162 | 62 | 164 | 64 | 208 | 232 | 227 | 229 | 175 | 89 | 13 | 217 | 203 | 165 | 145 | 54 |
111 | 144 | 32 | 246 | 91 | 90 | 197 | 143 | 230 | 71 | 60 | 242 | 219 | 37 | 226 | 99 |
113 | 194 | 1 | 94 | 193 | 157 | 69 | 223 | 70 | 166 | 59 | 46 | 40 | 210 | 244 | 81 |
204 | 3 | 149 | 77 | 163 | 0 | 31 | 114 | 116 | 58 | 20 | 38 | 201 | 173 | 225 | 174 |
104 | 48 | 79 | 109 | 88 | 50 | 65 | 249 | 184 | 152 | 138 | 44 | 172 | 180 | 5 | 2 |
19 | 235 | 72 | 26 | 236 | 66 | 178 | 41 | 253 | 241 | 25 | 127 | 231 | 190 | 47 | 155 |
139 | 132 | 240 | 101 | 218 | 53 | 176 | 134 | 185 | 205 | 142 | 187 | 148 | 170 | 73 | 168 |
122 | 228 | 18 | 51 | 117 | 220 | 15 | 125 | 121 | 188 | 214 | 146 | 108 | 254 | 156 | 179 |
33 | 147 | 255 | 154 | 76 | 140 | 43 | 123 | 177 | 110 | 206 | 181 | 35 | 207 | 237 | 233 |
130 | 52 | 97 | 221 | 67 | 150 | 119 | 250 | 159 | 141 | 161 | 82 | 120 | 211 | 39 | 107 |
80 | 128 | 78 | 186 | 86 | 21 | 124 | 129 | 61 | 24 | 131 | 7 | 245 | 248 | 29 | 6 |
189 | 102 | 34 | 74 | 135 | 251 | 84 | 234 | 196 | 126 | 192 | 75 | 137 | 252 | 209 | 160 |
195 | 224 | 183 | 12 | 49 | 57 | 171 | 27 | 87 | 100 | 106 | 45 | 212 | 28 | 199 | 133 |
151 | 213 | 182 | 169 | 9 | 118 | 136 | 95 | 216 | 36 | 105 | 115 | 22 | 11 | 243 | 200 |
105 | 125 | 24 | 0 | 109 | 103 | 228 | 236 | 84 | 163 | 104 | 12 | 233 | 234 | 247 | 139 |
239 | 162 | 22 | 112 | 27 | 208 | 191 | 160 | 13 | 72 | 179 | 166 | 20 | 205 | 81 | 165 |
159 | 198 | 58 | 223 | 248 | 135 | 193 | 146 | 227 | 25 | 38 | 45 | 251 | 184 | 232 | 42 |
111 | 201 | 241 | 177 | 242 | 73 | 120 | 224 | 64 | 114 | 218 | 240 | 185 | 209 | 183 | 142 |
207 | 32 | 128 | 213 | 152 | 249 | 65 | 203 | 95 | 138 | 43 | 5 | 202 | 52 | 87 | 10 |
28 | 61 | 19 | 26 | 74 | 99 | 144 | 140 | 169 | 204 | 196 | 47 | 235 | 63 | 214 | 231 |
197 | 219 | 222 | 119 | 118 | 172 | 82 | 40 | 221 | 23 | 53 | 245 | 98 | 35 | 55 | 89 |
34 | 167 | 238 | 123 | 76 | 171 | 136 | 220 | 36 | 149 | 217 | 101 | 145 | 129 | 187 | 117 |
200 | 122 | 216 | 31 | 253 | 11 | 173 | 107 | 254 | 96 | 97 | 206 | 181 | 93 | 77 | 106 |
79 | 194 | 69 | 155 | 255 | 126 | 243 | 147 | 66 | 116 | 71 | 15 | 137 | 68 | 141 | 39 |
1 | 59 | 91 | 237 | 246 | 67 | 188 | 29 | 211 | 49 | 54 | 57 | 51 | 75 | 16 | 44 |
174 | 158 | 6 | 86 | 199 | 60 | 244 | 83 | 151 | 192 | 124 | 14 | 175 | 56 | 46 | 8 |
3 | 186 | 190 | 94 | 178 | 115 | 180 | 100 | 130 | 229 | 150 | 154 | 210 | 250 | 170 | 90 |
156 | 108 | 62 | 113 | 30 | 7 | 226 | 92 | 50 | 80 | 131 | 132 | 182 | 127 | 17 | 161 |
215 | 153 | 230 | 37 | 189 | 102 | 48 | 157 | 78 | 110 | 164 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 121 | 148 |
21 | 176 | 70 | 168 | 41 | 212 | 9 | 252 | 85 | 225 | 134 | 18 | 143 | 88 | 195 | 133 |
171 | 212 | 113 | 1 | 133 | 144 | 176 | 67 | 9 | 61 | 99 | 75 | 155 | 140 | 80 | 190 |
134 | 29 | 159 | 169 | 243 | 214 | 64 | 225 | 203 | 78 | 207 | 95 | 152 | 197 | 45 | 91 |
158 | 6 | 216 | 73 | 96 | 151 | 56 | 187 | 94 | 210 | 191 | 15 | 195 | 28 | 228 | 170 |
199 | 156 | 154 | 53 | 120 | 250 | 3 | 248 | 52 | 157 | 104 | 2 | 109 | 185 | 84 | 223 |
90 | 21 | 150 | 146 | 88 | 123 | 16 | 220 | 253 | 167 | 93 | 119 | 41 | 180 | 18 | 24 |
69 | 48 | 206 | 160 | 227 | 193 | 232 | 201 | 186 | 124 | 81 | 40 | 51 | 100 | 50 | 192 |
59 | 130 | 33 | 166 | 14 | 72 | 26 | 11 | 114 | 217 | 247 | 13 | 153 | 231 | 238 | 241 |
31 | 34 | 224 | 240 | 135 | 47 | 183 | 226 | 55 | 182 | 142 | 149 | 179 | 188 | 194 | 58 |
36 | 118 | 234 | 127 | 246 | 251 | 117 | 139 | 102 | 46 | 239 | 105 | 208 | 101 | 172 | 128 |
222 | 242 | 200 | 49 | 213 | 112 | 39 | 107 | 85 | 70 | 137 | 218 | 44 | 145 | 10 | 79 |
136 | 42 | 83 | 77 | 68 | 74 | 57 | 8 | 115 | 237 | 76 | 20 | 198 | 97 | 71 | 54 |
163 | 106 | 138 | 219 | 196 | 7 | 0 | 63 | 202 | 125 | 66 | 249 | 5 | 233 | 122 | 30 |
236 | 86 | 143 | 121 | 23 | 175 | 165 | 215 | 38 | 103 | 131 | 174 | 168 | 161 | 209 | 89 |
110 | 92 | 132 | 255 | 244 | 252 | 82 | 37 | 211 | 141 | 60 | 204 | 177 | 62 | 32 | 205 |
65 | 162 | 108 | 12 | 17 | 126 | 4 | 230 | 43 | 229 | 235 | 111 | 184 | 87 | 189 | 19 |
245 | 254 | 164 | 178 | 22 | 221 | 25 | 27 | 147 | 129 | 148 | 116 | 35 | 173 | 181 | 98 |
6 | 137 | 69 | 85 | 190 | 62 | 75 | 11 | 123 | 98 | 155 | 113 | 170 | 226 | 239 | 108 |
198 | 1 | 0 | 107 | 232 | 192 | 60 | 50 | 125 | 143 | 183 | 188 | 205 | 174 | 157 | 71 |
118 | 23 | 130 | 132 | 166 | 194 | 103 | 252 | 221 | 89 | 120 | 91 | 212 | 144 | 223 | 105 |
119 | 220 | 140 | 254 | 230 | 46 | 136 | 117 | 80 | 54 | 187 | 116 | 227 | 55 | 81 | 168 |
197 | 146 | 150 | 128 | 44 | 217 | 251 | 100 | 104 | 67 | 15 | 66 | 122 | 78 | 28 | 45 |
30 | 195 | 246 | 124 | 191 | 57 | 163 | 84 | 176 | 93 | 25 | 36 | 240 | 202 | 167 | 65 |
152 | 173 | 83 | 225 | 147 | 24 | 19 | 14 | 76 | 182 | 216 | 96 | 106 | 16 | 51 | 121 |
43 | 229 | 13 | 193 | 4 | 162 | 222 | 109 | 184 | 165 | 153 | 39 | 206 | 34 | 97 | 87 |
244 | 2 | 224 | 158 | 141 | 129 | 138 | 82 | 26 | 88 | 247 | 180 | 47 | 99 | 148 | 61 |
64 | 133 | 79 | 243 | 20 | 49 | 145 | 42 | 7 | 72 | 102 | 200 | 196 | 9 | 110 | 86 |
139 | 90 | 203 | 92 | 31 | 189 | 63 | 209 | 94 | 149 | 151 | 238 | 48 | 219 | 56 | 228 |
201 | 156 | 255 | 161 | 37 | 38 | 112 | 3 | 70 | 207 | 18 | 178 | 53 | 164 | 77 | 248 |
131 | 135 | 231 | 8 | 32 | 27 | 208 | 172 | 250 | 218 | 33 | 126 | 235 | 74 | 210 | 101 |
215 | 241 | 237 | 236 | 159 | 58 | 35 | 73 | 142 | 52 | 211 | 204 | 242 | 134 | 115 | 22 |
245 | 68 | 199 | 21 | 234 | 114 | 41 | 5 | 17 | 185 | 175 | 95 | 214 | 186 | 213 | 127 |
177 | 179 | 111 | 169 | 40 | 12 | 253 | 154 | 249 | 59 | 233 | 160 | 171 | 181 | 10 | 29 |
S-boxes | Nonlinearity | SAC | BIC Nonlinearity | BIC SAC | LAP | DAP |
A1 | 112 | 0.5034 | 112 | 0.4986 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A2 | 112 | 0.5042 | 112 | 0.5008 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A3 | 112 | 0.4980 | 112 | 0.4995 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A4 | 112 | 0.4978 | 112 | 0.4990 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A5 | 112 | 0.5037 | 112 | 0.4983 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
AES | 112 | 0.5040 | 112 | 0.5046 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
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A. Kadeer, Y. Tuersun, H. Liu, Constructing keyed strong S-Box with optimized nonlinearity using nondegenerate 2D hyper chaotic map, Phys. Scripta, 99 (2024), 125281. 10.1088/1402-4896/ad91ed doi: 10.1088/1402-4896/ad91ed
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R. Liu, H. Liu, M. Zhao, Cryptanalysis and construction of keyed strong S-Box based on random affine transformation matrix and 2D hyper chaotic map, Expert Syst. Appl., 252 (2024), 124238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2024.124238 doi: 10.1016/j.eswa.2024.124238
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Y. Ma, Y. Tian, L. Zhang, P. Zuo, Two-dimensional hyperchaotic effect coupled mapping lattice and its application in dynamic S-box generation, Nonlinear Dynam., 112 (2024), 17445–17476. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-024-09907-y doi: 10.1007/s11071-024-09907-y
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M. M. Hazzazi, Gulraiz, R. Ali, M. K. Jamil, S. A. Nooh, F. Alblehai, Cryptanalysis of hyperchaotic S-box generation and image encryption, AIMS Math., 9 (2024), 36116–36139. 10.3934/math.20241714 doi: 10.3934/math.20241714
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N. Abughazalah, L. Said, M. Khan, Construction of optimum multivalued cryptographic Boolean function using artificial bee colony optimization and multi-criterion decision-making, Soft Comput., 28 (2024), 5213–5223. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-023-09267-6 doi: 10.1007/s00500-023-09267-6
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C. Luo, Y. Wang, Y. Fu, P. Zhou, M. Wang, Constructing dynamic S-boxes based on chaos and irreducible polynomials for image encryption, Nonlinear Dynam., 112 (2024), 6695–6713. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-024-09353-w doi: 10.1007/s11071-024-09353-w
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A. S. Alali, R. Ali, M. K. Jamil, J. Ali, Gulraiz, Dynamic S-Box construction using Mordell Elliptic Curves over Galois Field and its applications in image encryption, Mathematics, 12 (2024), 587. https://doi.org/10.3390/math12040587 doi: 10.3390/math12040587
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M. A. Tootkaboni, M. B. Savadkouhi, S-Boxes design based on the Lu-Chen system and their application in image encryption, Soft Comput., 28 (2024), 12119–12140. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00500-024-09912-8 doi: 10.1007/s00500-024-09912-8
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F. Artuğer, F. Özkaynak, A method for generation of substitution box based on random selection, Egypt. Inform. J., 23 (2022), 127–135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eij.2021.08.002 doi: 10.1016/j.eij.2021.08.002
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R. Ali, J. Ali, P. Ping, M. K. Jamil, A novel S-box generator using Frobenius automorphism and its applications in image encryption, Nonlinear Dynam., 112 (2024), 19463–19486. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11071-024-10003-4 doi: 10.1007/s11071-024-10003-4
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128 | 106 | 149 | 197 | 48 | 157 | 208 | 15 | 53 | 252 | 205 | 20 | 96 | 91 | 35 | 49 |
230 | 89 | 147 | 109 | 27 | 83 | 32 | 73 | 249 | 8 | 80 | 30 | 165 | 134 | 166 | 39 |
194 | 22 | 90 | 68 | 169 | 104 | 69 | 70 | 218 | 234 | 26 | 226 | 232 | 61 | 135 | 214 |
99 | 52 | 237 | 222 | 60 | 121 | 191 | 162 | 172 | 59 | 133 | 5 | 127 | 228 | 37 | 54 |
0 | 119 | 74 | 146 | 174 | 187 | 23 | 167 | 210 | 245 | 40 | 223 | 94 | 141 | 170 | 71 |
247 | 215 | 45 | 6 | 95 | 67 | 88 | 179 | 124 | 173 | 28 | 34 | 231 | 110 | 213 | 250 |
33 | 239 | 17 | 43 | 203 | 111 | 4 | 57 | 236 | 102 | 188 | 202 | 150 | 64 | 219 | 204 |
183 | 93 | 238 | 97 | 243 | 117 | 50 | 241 | 56 | 152 | 255 | 153 | 25 | 55 | 11 | 193 |
14 | 47 | 216 | 185 | 115 | 145 | 224 | 44 | 2 | 29 | 178 | 12 | 3 | 18 | 182 | 143 |
253 | 212 | 98 | 184 | 76 | 254 | 130 | 181 | 100 | 58 | 105 | 144 | 51 | 92 | 196 | 125 |
86 | 163 | 176 | 81 | 120 | 190 | 151 | 1 | 195 | 82 | 199 | 140 | 19 | 240 | 79 | 112 |
233 | 189 | 171 | 158 | 160 | 84 | 200 | 36 | 244 | 148 | 7 | 137 | 229 | 142 | 103 | 242 |
161 | 220 | 118 | 116 | 154 | 108 | 225 | 251 | 180 | 24 | 248 | 87 | 42 | 132 | 129 | 122 |
77 | 62 | 21 | 123 | 235 | 46 | 221 | 159 | 227 | 72 | 38 | 201 | 16 | 164 | 138 | 168 |
107 | 131 | 126 | 186 | 63 | 78 | 156 | 65 | 114 | 31 | 101 | 217 | 136 | 41 | 207 | 75 |
85 | 9 | 10 | 113 | 246 | 206 | 209 | 175 | 198 | 155 | 13 | 192 | 177 | 66 | 139 | 211 |
Mathematical Structure | S-boxes | Nonlinearity | SAC | BIC Nonlinearity | BIC SAC | LAP | DAP |
Hyper Chaotic map | Proposed | 112 | 0.5066 | 112 | 0.5027 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Optimization | [1] | 110.5 | 0.5100 | 103 | 0.4998 | - | 0.0391 |
Cyclic groups | [2] | 112 | 0.5034 | 112 | 0.5066 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Chaos | [5] | 110.25 | 0.5027 | 102.71 | 0.4936 | 0.1250 | 0.0469 |
ECC | [13] | 107.75 | 0.5010 | 103.93 | 0.5038 | 0.1250 | 0.0391 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [24] | 112 | 0.5017 | 111.64 | 0.5006 | 0.0156 | 0.0703 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [26] | 103.75 | 0.501 | 103 | - | 0.141 | 0.039 |
GF(28) | [29] | 112 | 0.4988 | 112 | 0.5008 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [31] | 110.75 | 0.4976 | 110.07 | 0.5034 | 0.0859 | 0.0234 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [32] | 107.25 | 0.4981 | 104.42 | 0.5008 | - | - |
Hyper chaotic map | [33] | 112 | 0.4971 | 112 | 0.4997 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Optimization | [34] | 112.0 | 0.5031 | 112.00 | 0.51120 | 0.092610 | 0.0291800 |
Chaos | [35] | 112.00 | 0.5061 | 111.28 | 0.5016 | 0.0703 | 1.5625 |
GF(28) | [36] | 112 | 0.5032 | 112 | 0.5059 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
GF(28) | AES | 112 | 0.5040 | 112 | 0.5046 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
GF(28) | [37] | 112 | 0.4980 | 112 | 0.5017 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
transfer-function | [38] | 105.4039 | 0.5024 | 105.3571 | 0.5063 | 0.1171 | 0.0390 |
Lu-Chen | [39] | 105.75 | 0.4939 | 103.43 | 0.5032 | 0.1171 | 0.0390 |
random selection | [40] | 102.75 | 0.4978 | 103.35 | 0.5007 | 0.1328 | 0.0468 |
Block Ciphers | [41] | 106 | 0.5051 | 98 | - | 0.148 | 0.039 |
Block cipher | [42] | 107.00 | 0.4970 | - | 0.5070 | 0.0148 | 0.0470 |
chaotic system | [43] | 105.88 | 0.5084 | 103.18 | 0.5087 | 0.1288 | 0.0391 |
SEC | [44] | 112 | 0.5010 | 112 | 0.5000 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Chaos | [45] | 109 | 0.5 | - | - | - | - |
GF(28) | [46] | 112 | 0.5002 | 112 | 0.5054 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
131 | 181 | 101 | 92 | 232 | 154 | 196 | 29 | 189 | 238 | 139 | 57 | 145 | 155 | 237 | 91 |
239 | 140 | 78 | 108 | 203 | 22 | 109 | 63 | 157 | 193 | 241 | 126 | 18 | 177 | 148 | 160 |
75 | 251 | 178 | 3 | 146 | 69 | 74 | 161 | 245 | 235 | 47 | 255 | 23 | 66 | 249 | 34 |
102 | 202 | 141 | 243 | 122 | 7 | 82 | 229 | 107 | 83 | 39 | 72 | 168 | 169 | 96 | 59 |
191 | 247 | 110 | 6 | 46 | 121 | 220 | 40 | 246 | 137 | 0 | 199 | 221 | 213 | 187 | 129 |
64 | 10 | 50 | 186 | 125 | 123 | 62 | 174 | 19 | 226 | 120 | 180 | 207 | 112 | 182 | 79 |
99 | 170 | 103 | 219 | 73 | 15 | 84 | 49 | 77 | 228 | 252 | 61 | 106 | 133 | 135 | 42 |
70 | 43 | 204 | 206 | 195 | 89 | 51 | 162 | 24 | 116 | 212 | 44 | 217 | 8 | 134 | 222 |
93 | 197 | 211 | 94 | 20 | 223 | 183 | 231 | 32 | 190 | 60 | 254 | 163 | 172 | 26 | 25 |
236 | 52 | 38 | 55 | 143 | 208 | 201 | 152 | 27 | 130 | 9 | 167 | 179 | 218 | 244 | 158 |
166 | 35 | 2 | 188 | 150 | 159 | 117 | 136 | 124 | 250 | 115 | 185 | 118 | 85 | 30 | 48 |
227 | 53 | 98 | 144 | 119 | 147 | 111 | 233 | 242 | 114 | 33 | 86 | 175 | 132 | 192 | 176 |
81 | 234 | 142 | 80 | 215 | 200 | 205 | 253 | 105 | 198 | 71 | 4 | 184 | 90 | 113 | 13 |
1 | 37 | 230 | 104 | 95 | 214 | 156 | 16 | 128 | 28 | 12 | 164 | 31 | 224 | 67 | 225 |
68 | 209 | 65 | 88 | 36 | 5 | 127 | 138 | 240 | 216 | 87 | 151 | 21 | 248 | 76 | 153 |
11 | 14 | 149 | 45 | 194 | 17 | 54 | 173 | 97 | 210 | 165 | 56 | 171 | 100 | 41 | 58 |
14 | 247 | 30 | 96 | 23 | 103 | 68 | 202 | 4 | 56 | 8 | 92 | 222 | 191 | 83 | 158 |
153 | 85 | 16 | 167 | 42 | 93 | 238 | 98 | 63 | 215 | 198 | 239 | 10 | 112 | 17 | 55 |
162 | 62 | 164 | 64 | 208 | 232 | 227 | 229 | 175 | 89 | 13 | 217 | 203 | 165 | 145 | 54 |
111 | 144 | 32 | 246 | 91 | 90 | 197 | 143 | 230 | 71 | 60 | 242 | 219 | 37 | 226 | 99 |
113 | 194 | 1 | 94 | 193 | 157 | 69 | 223 | 70 | 166 | 59 | 46 | 40 | 210 | 244 | 81 |
204 | 3 | 149 | 77 | 163 | 0 | 31 | 114 | 116 | 58 | 20 | 38 | 201 | 173 | 225 | 174 |
104 | 48 | 79 | 109 | 88 | 50 | 65 | 249 | 184 | 152 | 138 | 44 | 172 | 180 | 5 | 2 |
19 | 235 | 72 | 26 | 236 | 66 | 178 | 41 | 253 | 241 | 25 | 127 | 231 | 190 | 47 | 155 |
139 | 132 | 240 | 101 | 218 | 53 | 176 | 134 | 185 | 205 | 142 | 187 | 148 | 170 | 73 | 168 |
122 | 228 | 18 | 51 | 117 | 220 | 15 | 125 | 121 | 188 | 214 | 146 | 108 | 254 | 156 | 179 |
33 | 147 | 255 | 154 | 76 | 140 | 43 | 123 | 177 | 110 | 206 | 181 | 35 | 207 | 237 | 233 |
130 | 52 | 97 | 221 | 67 | 150 | 119 | 250 | 159 | 141 | 161 | 82 | 120 | 211 | 39 | 107 |
80 | 128 | 78 | 186 | 86 | 21 | 124 | 129 | 61 | 24 | 131 | 7 | 245 | 248 | 29 | 6 |
189 | 102 | 34 | 74 | 135 | 251 | 84 | 234 | 196 | 126 | 192 | 75 | 137 | 252 | 209 | 160 |
195 | 224 | 183 | 12 | 49 | 57 | 171 | 27 | 87 | 100 | 106 | 45 | 212 | 28 | 199 | 133 |
151 | 213 | 182 | 169 | 9 | 118 | 136 | 95 | 216 | 36 | 105 | 115 | 22 | 11 | 243 | 200 |
105 | 125 | 24 | 0 | 109 | 103 | 228 | 236 | 84 | 163 | 104 | 12 | 233 | 234 | 247 | 139 |
239 | 162 | 22 | 112 | 27 | 208 | 191 | 160 | 13 | 72 | 179 | 166 | 20 | 205 | 81 | 165 |
159 | 198 | 58 | 223 | 248 | 135 | 193 | 146 | 227 | 25 | 38 | 45 | 251 | 184 | 232 | 42 |
111 | 201 | 241 | 177 | 242 | 73 | 120 | 224 | 64 | 114 | 218 | 240 | 185 | 209 | 183 | 142 |
207 | 32 | 128 | 213 | 152 | 249 | 65 | 203 | 95 | 138 | 43 | 5 | 202 | 52 | 87 | 10 |
28 | 61 | 19 | 26 | 74 | 99 | 144 | 140 | 169 | 204 | 196 | 47 | 235 | 63 | 214 | 231 |
197 | 219 | 222 | 119 | 118 | 172 | 82 | 40 | 221 | 23 | 53 | 245 | 98 | 35 | 55 | 89 |
34 | 167 | 238 | 123 | 76 | 171 | 136 | 220 | 36 | 149 | 217 | 101 | 145 | 129 | 187 | 117 |
200 | 122 | 216 | 31 | 253 | 11 | 173 | 107 | 254 | 96 | 97 | 206 | 181 | 93 | 77 | 106 |
79 | 194 | 69 | 155 | 255 | 126 | 243 | 147 | 66 | 116 | 71 | 15 | 137 | 68 | 141 | 39 |
1 | 59 | 91 | 237 | 246 | 67 | 188 | 29 | 211 | 49 | 54 | 57 | 51 | 75 | 16 | 44 |
174 | 158 | 6 | 86 | 199 | 60 | 244 | 83 | 151 | 192 | 124 | 14 | 175 | 56 | 46 | 8 |
3 | 186 | 190 | 94 | 178 | 115 | 180 | 100 | 130 | 229 | 150 | 154 | 210 | 250 | 170 | 90 |
156 | 108 | 62 | 113 | 30 | 7 | 226 | 92 | 50 | 80 | 131 | 132 | 182 | 127 | 17 | 161 |
215 | 153 | 230 | 37 | 189 | 102 | 48 | 157 | 78 | 110 | 164 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 121 | 148 |
21 | 176 | 70 | 168 | 41 | 212 | 9 | 252 | 85 | 225 | 134 | 18 | 143 | 88 | 195 | 133 |
171 | 212 | 113 | 1 | 133 | 144 | 176 | 67 | 9 | 61 | 99 | 75 | 155 | 140 | 80 | 190 |
134 | 29 | 159 | 169 | 243 | 214 | 64 | 225 | 203 | 78 | 207 | 95 | 152 | 197 | 45 | 91 |
158 | 6 | 216 | 73 | 96 | 151 | 56 | 187 | 94 | 210 | 191 | 15 | 195 | 28 | 228 | 170 |
199 | 156 | 154 | 53 | 120 | 250 | 3 | 248 | 52 | 157 | 104 | 2 | 109 | 185 | 84 | 223 |
90 | 21 | 150 | 146 | 88 | 123 | 16 | 220 | 253 | 167 | 93 | 119 | 41 | 180 | 18 | 24 |
69 | 48 | 206 | 160 | 227 | 193 | 232 | 201 | 186 | 124 | 81 | 40 | 51 | 100 | 50 | 192 |
59 | 130 | 33 | 166 | 14 | 72 | 26 | 11 | 114 | 217 | 247 | 13 | 153 | 231 | 238 | 241 |
31 | 34 | 224 | 240 | 135 | 47 | 183 | 226 | 55 | 182 | 142 | 149 | 179 | 188 | 194 | 58 |
36 | 118 | 234 | 127 | 246 | 251 | 117 | 139 | 102 | 46 | 239 | 105 | 208 | 101 | 172 | 128 |
222 | 242 | 200 | 49 | 213 | 112 | 39 | 107 | 85 | 70 | 137 | 218 | 44 | 145 | 10 | 79 |
136 | 42 | 83 | 77 | 68 | 74 | 57 | 8 | 115 | 237 | 76 | 20 | 198 | 97 | 71 | 54 |
163 | 106 | 138 | 219 | 196 | 7 | 0 | 63 | 202 | 125 | 66 | 249 | 5 | 233 | 122 | 30 |
236 | 86 | 143 | 121 | 23 | 175 | 165 | 215 | 38 | 103 | 131 | 174 | 168 | 161 | 209 | 89 |
110 | 92 | 132 | 255 | 244 | 252 | 82 | 37 | 211 | 141 | 60 | 204 | 177 | 62 | 32 | 205 |
65 | 162 | 108 | 12 | 17 | 126 | 4 | 230 | 43 | 229 | 235 | 111 | 184 | 87 | 189 | 19 |
245 | 254 | 164 | 178 | 22 | 221 | 25 | 27 | 147 | 129 | 148 | 116 | 35 | 173 | 181 | 98 |
6 | 137 | 69 | 85 | 190 | 62 | 75 | 11 | 123 | 98 | 155 | 113 | 170 | 226 | 239 | 108 |
198 | 1 | 0 | 107 | 232 | 192 | 60 | 50 | 125 | 143 | 183 | 188 | 205 | 174 | 157 | 71 |
118 | 23 | 130 | 132 | 166 | 194 | 103 | 252 | 221 | 89 | 120 | 91 | 212 | 144 | 223 | 105 |
119 | 220 | 140 | 254 | 230 | 46 | 136 | 117 | 80 | 54 | 187 | 116 | 227 | 55 | 81 | 168 |
197 | 146 | 150 | 128 | 44 | 217 | 251 | 100 | 104 | 67 | 15 | 66 | 122 | 78 | 28 | 45 |
30 | 195 | 246 | 124 | 191 | 57 | 163 | 84 | 176 | 93 | 25 | 36 | 240 | 202 | 167 | 65 |
152 | 173 | 83 | 225 | 147 | 24 | 19 | 14 | 76 | 182 | 216 | 96 | 106 | 16 | 51 | 121 |
43 | 229 | 13 | 193 | 4 | 162 | 222 | 109 | 184 | 165 | 153 | 39 | 206 | 34 | 97 | 87 |
244 | 2 | 224 | 158 | 141 | 129 | 138 | 82 | 26 | 88 | 247 | 180 | 47 | 99 | 148 | 61 |
64 | 133 | 79 | 243 | 20 | 49 | 145 | 42 | 7 | 72 | 102 | 200 | 196 | 9 | 110 | 86 |
139 | 90 | 203 | 92 | 31 | 189 | 63 | 209 | 94 | 149 | 151 | 238 | 48 | 219 | 56 | 228 |
201 | 156 | 255 | 161 | 37 | 38 | 112 | 3 | 70 | 207 | 18 | 178 | 53 | 164 | 77 | 248 |
131 | 135 | 231 | 8 | 32 | 27 | 208 | 172 | 250 | 218 | 33 | 126 | 235 | 74 | 210 | 101 |
215 | 241 | 237 | 236 | 159 | 58 | 35 | 73 | 142 | 52 | 211 | 204 | 242 | 134 | 115 | 22 |
245 | 68 | 199 | 21 | 234 | 114 | 41 | 5 | 17 | 185 | 175 | 95 | 214 | 186 | 213 | 127 |
177 | 179 | 111 | 169 | 40 | 12 | 253 | 154 | 249 | 59 | 233 | 160 | 171 | 181 | 10 | 29 |
S-boxes | Nonlinearity | SAC | BIC Nonlinearity | BIC SAC | LAP | DAP |
A1 | 112 | 0.5034 | 112 | 0.4986 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A2 | 112 | 0.5042 | 112 | 0.5008 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A3 | 112 | 0.4980 | 112 | 0.4995 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A4 | 112 | 0.4978 | 112 | 0.4990 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A5 | 112 | 0.5037 | 112 | 0.4983 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
AES | 112 | 0.5040 | 112 | 0.5046 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
128 | 106 | 149 | 197 | 48 | 157 | 208 | 15 | 53 | 252 | 205 | 20 | 96 | 91 | 35 | 49 |
230 | 89 | 147 | 109 | 27 | 83 | 32 | 73 | 249 | 8 | 80 | 30 | 165 | 134 | 166 | 39 |
194 | 22 | 90 | 68 | 169 | 104 | 69 | 70 | 218 | 234 | 26 | 226 | 232 | 61 | 135 | 214 |
99 | 52 | 237 | 222 | 60 | 121 | 191 | 162 | 172 | 59 | 133 | 5 | 127 | 228 | 37 | 54 |
0 | 119 | 74 | 146 | 174 | 187 | 23 | 167 | 210 | 245 | 40 | 223 | 94 | 141 | 170 | 71 |
247 | 215 | 45 | 6 | 95 | 67 | 88 | 179 | 124 | 173 | 28 | 34 | 231 | 110 | 213 | 250 |
33 | 239 | 17 | 43 | 203 | 111 | 4 | 57 | 236 | 102 | 188 | 202 | 150 | 64 | 219 | 204 |
183 | 93 | 238 | 97 | 243 | 117 | 50 | 241 | 56 | 152 | 255 | 153 | 25 | 55 | 11 | 193 |
14 | 47 | 216 | 185 | 115 | 145 | 224 | 44 | 2 | 29 | 178 | 12 | 3 | 18 | 182 | 143 |
253 | 212 | 98 | 184 | 76 | 254 | 130 | 181 | 100 | 58 | 105 | 144 | 51 | 92 | 196 | 125 |
86 | 163 | 176 | 81 | 120 | 190 | 151 | 1 | 195 | 82 | 199 | 140 | 19 | 240 | 79 | 112 |
233 | 189 | 171 | 158 | 160 | 84 | 200 | 36 | 244 | 148 | 7 | 137 | 229 | 142 | 103 | 242 |
161 | 220 | 118 | 116 | 154 | 108 | 225 | 251 | 180 | 24 | 248 | 87 | 42 | 132 | 129 | 122 |
77 | 62 | 21 | 123 | 235 | 46 | 221 | 159 | 227 | 72 | 38 | 201 | 16 | 164 | 138 | 168 |
107 | 131 | 126 | 186 | 63 | 78 | 156 | 65 | 114 | 31 | 101 | 217 | 136 | 41 | 207 | 75 |
85 | 9 | 10 | 113 | 246 | 206 | 209 | 175 | 198 | 155 | 13 | 192 | 177 | 66 | 139 | 211 |
Mathematical Structure | S-boxes | Nonlinearity | SAC | BIC Nonlinearity | BIC SAC | LAP | DAP |
Hyper Chaotic map | Proposed | 112 | 0.5066 | 112 | 0.5027 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Optimization | [1] | 110.5 | 0.5100 | 103 | 0.4998 | - | 0.0391 |
Cyclic groups | [2] | 112 | 0.5034 | 112 | 0.5066 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Chaos | [5] | 110.25 | 0.5027 | 102.71 | 0.4936 | 0.1250 | 0.0469 |
ECC | [13] | 107.75 | 0.5010 | 103.93 | 0.5038 | 0.1250 | 0.0391 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [24] | 112 | 0.5017 | 111.64 | 0.5006 | 0.0156 | 0.0703 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [26] | 103.75 | 0.501 | 103 | - | 0.141 | 0.039 |
GF(28) | [29] | 112 | 0.4988 | 112 | 0.5008 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [31] | 110.75 | 0.4976 | 110.07 | 0.5034 | 0.0859 | 0.0234 |
Hyper Chaotic map | [32] | 107.25 | 0.4981 | 104.42 | 0.5008 | - | - |
Hyper chaotic map | [33] | 112 | 0.4971 | 112 | 0.4997 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Optimization | [34] | 112.0 | 0.5031 | 112.00 | 0.51120 | 0.092610 | 0.0291800 |
Chaos | [35] | 112.00 | 0.5061 | 111.28 | 0.5016 | 0.0703 | 1.5625 |
GF(28) | [36] | 112 | 0.5032 | 112 | 0.5059 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
GF(28) | AES | 112 | 0.5040 | 112 | 0.5046 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
GF(28) | [37] | 112 | 0.4980 | 112 | 0.5017 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
transfer-function | [38] | 105.4039 | 0.5024 | 105.3571 | 0.5063 | 0.1171 | 0.0390 |
Lu-Chen | [39] | 105.75 | 0.4939 | 103.43 | 0.5032 | 0.1171 | 0.0390 |
random selection | [40] | 102.75 | 0.4978 | 103.35 | 0.5007 | 0.1328 | 0.0468 |
Block Ciphers | [41] | 106 | 0.5051 | 98 | - | 0.148 | 0.039 |
Block cipher | [42] | 107.00 | 0.4970 | - | 0.5070 | 0.0148 | 0.0470 |
chaotic system | [43] | 105.88 | 0.5084 | 103.18 | 0.5087 | 0.1288 | 0.0391 |
SEC | [44] | 112 | 0.5010 | 112 | 0.5000 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
Chaos | [45] | 109 | 0.5 | - | - | - | - |
GF(28) | [46] | 112 | 0.5002 | 112 | 0.5054 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
131 | 181 | 101 | 92 | 232 | 154 | 196 | 29 | 189 | 238 | 139 | 57 | 145 | 155 | 237 | 91 |
239 | 140 | 78 | 108 | 203 | 22 | 109 | 63 | 157 | 193 | 241 | 126 | 18 | 177 | 148 | 160 |
75 | 251 | 178 | 3 | 146 | 69 | 74 | 161 | 245 | 235 | 47 | 255 | 23 | 66 | 249 | 34 |
102 | 202 | 141 | 243 | 122 | 7 | 82 | 229 | 107 | 83 | 39 | 72 | 168 | 169 | 96 | 59 |
191 | 247 | 110 | 6 | 46 | 121 | 220 | 40 | 246 | 137 | 0 | 199 | 221 | 213 | 187 | 129 |
64 | 10 | 50 | 186 | 125 | 123 | 62 | 174 | 19 | 226 | 120 | 180 | 207 | 112 | 182 | 79 |
99 | 170 | 103 | 219 | 73 | 15 | 84 | 49 | 77 | 228 | 252 | 61 | 106 | 133 | 135 | 42 |
70 | 43 | 204 | 206 | 195 | 89 | 51 | 162 | 24 | 116 | 212 | 44 | 217 | 8 | 134 | 222 |
93 | 197 | 211 | 94 | 20 | 223 | 183 | 231 | 32 | 190 | 60 | 254 | 163 | 172 | 26 | 25 |
236 | 52 | 38 | 55 | 143 | 208 | 201 | 152 | 27 | 130 | 9 | 167 | 179 | 218 | 244 | 158 |
166 | 35 | 2 | 188 | 150 | 159 | 117 | 136 | 124 | 250 | 115 | 185 | 118 | 85 | 30 | 48 |
227 | 53 | 98 | 144 | 119 | 147 | 111 | 233 | 242 | 114 | 33 | 86 | 175 | 132 | 192 | 176 |
81 | 234 | 142 | 80 | 215 | 200 | 205 | 253 | 105 | 198 | 71 | 4 | 184 | 90 | 113 | 13 |
1 | 37 | 230 | 104 | 95 | 214 | 156 | 16 | 128 | 28 | 12 | 164 | 31 | 224 | 67 | 225 |
68 | 209 | 65 | 88 | 36 | 5 | 127 | 138 | 240 | 216 | 87 | 151 | 21 | 248 | 76 | 153 |
11 | 14 | 149 | 45 | 194 | 17 | 54 | 173 | 97 | 210 | 165 | 56 | 171 | 100 | 41 | 58 |
14 | 247 | 30 | 96 | 23 | 103 | 68 | 202 | 4 | 56 | 8 | 92 | 222 | 191 | 83 | 158 |
153 | 85 | 16 | 167 | 42 | 93 | 238 | 98 | 63 | 215 | 198 | 239 | 10 | 112 | 17 | 55 |
162 | 62 | 164 | 64 | 208 | 232 | 227 | 229 | 175 | 89 | 13 | 217 | 203 | 165 | 145 | 54 |
111 | 144 | 32 | 246 | 91 | 90 | 197 | 143 | 230 | 71 | 60 | 242 | 219 | 37 | 226 | 99 |
113 | 194 | 1 | 94 | 193 | 157 | 69 | 223 | 70 | 166 | 59 | 46 | 40 | 210 | 244 | 81 |
204 | 3 | 149 | 77 | 163 | 0 | 31 | 114 | 116 | 58 | 20 | 38 | 201 | 173 | 225 | 174 |
104 | 48 | 79 | 109 | 88 | 50 | 65 | 249 | 184 | 152 | 138 | 44 | 172 | 180 | 5 | 2 |
19 | 235 | 72 | 26 | 236 | 66 | 178 | 41 | 253 | 241 | 25 | 127 | 231 | 190 | 47 | 155 |
139 | 132 | 240 | 101 | 218 | 53 | 176 | 134 | 185 | 205 | 142 | 187 | 148 | 170 | 73 | 168 |
122 | 228 | 18 | 51 | 117 | 220 | 15 | 125 | 121 | 188 | 214 | 146 | 108 | 254 | 156 | 179 |
33 | 147 | 255 | 154 | 76 | 140 | 43 | 123 | 177 | 110 | 206 | 181 | 35 | 207 | 237 | 233 |
130 | 52 | 97 | 221 | 67 | 150 | 119 | 250 | 159 | 141 | 161 | 82 | 120 | 211 | 39 | 107 |
80 | 128 | 78 | 186 | 86 | 21 | 124 | 129 | 61 | 24 | 131 | 7 | 245 | 248 | 29 | 6 |
189 | 102 | 34 | 74 | 135 | 251 | 84 | 234 | 196 | 126 | 192 | 75 | 137 | 252 | 209 | 160 |
195 | 224 | 183 | 12 | 49 | 57 | 171 | 27 | 87 | 100 | 106 | 45 | 212 | 28 | 199 | 133 |
151 | 213 | 182 | 169 | 9 | 118 | 136 | 95 | 216 | 36 | 105 | 115 | 22 | 11 | 243 | 200 |
105 | 125 | 24 | 0 | 109 | 103 | 228 | 236 | 84 | 163 | 104 | 12 | 233 | 234 | 247 | 139 |
239 | 162 | 22 | 112 | 27 | 208 | 191 | 160 | 13 | 72 | 179 | 166 | 20 | 205 | 81 | 165 |
159 | 198 | 58 | 223 | 248 | 135 | 193 | 146 | 227 | 25 | 38 | 45 | 251 | 184 | 232 | 42 |
111 | 201 | 241 | 177 | 242 | 73 | 120 | 224 | 64 | 114 | 218 | 240 | 185 | 209 | 183 | 142 |
207 | 32 | 128 | 213 | 152 | 249 | 65 | 203 | 95 | 138 | 43 | 5 | 202 | 52 | 87 | 10 |
28 | 61 | 19 | 26 | 74 | 99 | 144 | 140 | 169 | 204 | 196 | 47 | 235 | 63 | 214 | 231 |
197 | 219 | 222 | 119 | 118 | 172 | 82 | 40 | 221 | 23 | 53 | 245 | 98 | 35 | 55 | 89 |
34 | 167 | 238 | 123 | 76 | 171 | 136 | 220 | 36 | 149 | 217 | 101 | 145 | 129 | 187 | 117 |
200 | 122 | 216 | 31 | 253 | 11 | 173 | 107 | 254 | 96 | 97 | 206 | 181 | 93 | 77 | 106 |
79 | 194 | 69 | 155 | 255 | 126 | 243 | 147 | 66 | 116 | 71 | 15 | 137 | 68 | 141 | 39 |
1 | 59 | 91 | 237 | 246 | 67 | 188 | 29 | 211 | 49 | 54 | 57 | 51 | 75 | 16 | 44 |
174 | 158 | 6 | 86 | 199 | 60 | 244 | 83 | 151 | 192 | 124 | 14 | 175 | 56 | 46 | 8 |
3 | 186 | 190 | 94 | 178 | 115 | 180 | 100 | 130 | 229 | 150 | 154 | 210 | 250 | 170 | 90 |
156 | 108 | 62 | 113 | 30 | 7 | 226 | 92 | 50 | 80 | 131 | 132 | 182 | 127 | 17 | 161 |
215 | 153 | 230 | 37 | 189 | 102 | 48 | 157 | 78 | 110 | 164 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 121 | 148 |
21 | 176 | 70 | 168 | 41 | 212 | 9 | 252 | 85 | 225 | 134 | 18 | 143 | 88 | 195 | 133 |
171 | 212 | 113 | 1 | 133 | 144 | 176 | 67 | 9 | 61 | 99 | 75 | 155 | 140 | 80 | 190 |
134 | 29 | 159 | 169 | 243 | 214 | 64 | 225 | 203 | 78 | 207 | 95 | 152 | 197 | 45 | 91 |
158 | 6 | 216 | 73 | 96 | 151 | 56 | 187 | 94 | 210 | 191 | 15 | 195 | 28 | 228 | 170 |
199 | 156 | 154 | 53 | 120 | 250 | 3 | 248 | 52 | 157 | 104 | 2 | 109 | 185 | 84 | 223 |
90 | 21 | 150 | 146 | 88 | 123 | 16 | 220 | 253 | 167 | 93 | 119 | 41 | 180 | 18 | 24 |
69 | 48 | 206 | 160 | 227 | 193 | 232 | 201 | 186 | 124 | 81 | 40 | 51 | 100 | 50 | 192 |
59 | 130 | 33 | 166 | 14 | 72 | 26 | 11 | 114 | 217 | 247 | 13 | 153 | 231 | 238 | 241 |
31 | 34 | 224 | 240 | 135 | 47 | 183 | 226 | 55 | 182 | 142 | 149 | 179 | 188 | 194 | 58 |
36 | 118 | 234 | 127 | 246 | 251 | 117 | 139 | 102 | 46 | 239 | 105 | 208 | 101 | 172 | 128 |
222 | 242 | 200 | 49 | 213 | 112 | 39 | 107 | 85 | 70 | 137 | 218 | 44 | 145 | 10 | 79 |
136 | 42 | 83 | 77 | 68 | 74 | 57 | 8 | 115 | 237 | 76 | 20 | 198 | 97 | 71 | 54 |
163 | 106 | 138 | 219 | 196 | 7 | 0 | 63 | 202 | 125 | 66 | 249 | 5 | 233 | 122 | 30 |
236 | 86 | 143 | 121 | 23 | 175 | 165 | 215 | 38 | 103 | 131 | 174 | 168 | 161 | 209 | 89 |
110 | 92 | 132 | 255 | 244 | 252 | 82 | 37 | 211 | 141 | 60 | 204 | 177 | 62 | 32 | 205 |
65 | 162 | 108 | 12 | 17 | 126 | 4 | 230 | 43 | 229 | 235 | 111 | 184 | 87 | 189 | 19 |
245 | 254 | 164 | 178 | 22 | 221 | 25 | 27 | 147 | 129 | 148 | 116 | 35 | 173 | 181 | 98 |
6 | 137 | 69 | 85 | 190 | 62 | 75 | 11 | 123 | 98 | 155 | 113 | 170 | 226 | 239 | 108 |
198 | 1 | 0 | 107 | 232 | 192 | 60 | 50 | 125 | 143 | 183 | 188 | 205 | 174 | 157 | 71 |
118 | 23 | 130 | 132 | 166 | 194 | 103 | 252 | 221 | 89 | 120 | 91 | 212 | 144 | 223 | 105 |
119 | 220 | 140 | 254 | 230 | 46 | 136 | 117 | 80 | 54 | 187 | 116 | 227 | 55 | 81 | 168 |
197 | 146 | 150 | 128 | 44 | 217 | 251 | 100 | 104 | 67 | 15 | 66 | 122 | 78 | 28 | 45 |
30 | 195 | 246 | 124 | 191 | 57 | 163 | 84 | 176 | 93 | 25 | 36 | 240 | 202 | 167 | 65 |
152 | 173 | 83 | 225 | 147 | 24 | 19 | 14 | 76 | 182 | 216 | 96 | 106 | 16 | 51 | 121 |
43 | 229 | 13 | 193 | 4 | 162 | 222 | 109 | 184 | 165 | 153 | 39 | 206 | 34 | 97 | 87 |
244 | 2 | 224 | 158 | 141 | 129 | 138 | 82 | 26 | 88 | 247 | 180 | 47 | 99 | 148 | 61 |
64 | 133 | 79 | 243 | 20 | 49 | 145 | 42 | 7 | 72 | 102 | 200 | 196 | 9 | 110 | 86 |
139 | 90 | 203 | 92 | 31 | 189 | 63 | 209 | 94 | 149 | 151 | 238 | 48 | 219 | 56 | 228 |
201 | 156 | 255 | 161 | 37 | 38 | 112 | 3 | 70 | 207 | 18 | 178 | 53 | 164 | 77 | 248 |
131 | 135 | 231 | 8 | 32 | 27 | 208 | 172 | 250 | 218 | 33 | 126 | 235 | 74 | 210 | 101 |
215 | 241 | 237 | 236 | 159 | 58 | 35 | 73 | 142 | 52 | 211 | 204 | 242 | 134 | 115 | 22 |
245 | 68 | 199 | 21 | 234 | 114 | 41 | 5 | 17 | 185 | 175 | 95 | 214 | 186 | 213 | 127 |
177 | 179 | 111 | 169 | 40 | 12 | 253 | 154 | 249 | 59 | 233 | 160 | 171 | 181 | 10 | 29 |
S-boxes | Nonlinearity | SAC | BIC Nonlinearity | BIC SAC | LAP | DAP |
A1 | 112 | 0.5034 | 112 | 0.4986 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A2 | 112 | 0.5042 | 112 | 0.5008 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A3 | 112 | 0.4980 | 112 | 0.4995 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A4 | 112 | 0.4978 | 112 | 0.4990 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
A5 | 112 | 0.5037 | 112 | 0.4983 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |
AES | 112 | 0.5040 | 112 | 0.5046 | 0.0625 | 0.0156 |