Research article

Game-theoretic analysis of green investment decisions under service competition in shipping supply chains

  • Published: 17 November 2026
  • 91-10, 91A10

  • Under decarbonization pressure, green investment has become a strategic choice for ocean shipping companies amid service competition across shipping supply chains. However, it remains unclear how green investment decisions shape service investment strategies. This paper investigates green investment strategies adopted by ocean shipping companies under service competition between shipping supply chains. A Stackelberg game model is established within two competing shipping supply chains, where each chain contains one ocean shipping company and one freight forwarder. Three scenarios are examined: neither ocean shipping company makes green investment, only one ocean shipping company makes green investment, and both ocean shipping companies make green investment simultaneously. Our main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) green investment can improve the service quality of the green ocean shipping company, which further increases the transport demand for its affiliated freight forwarder and enhances the profitability of both firms within the corresponding shipping supply chain; (ⅱ) green investment effectively cuts overall carbon emissions when the carbon emission reduction coefficient stays at a moderate to high level; and (ⅲ) the equilibrium strategy for both competing ocean shipping companies is simultaneous green investment. Nevertheless, a prisoner's dilemma emerges when the service cost coefficient remains low or the green investment cost coefficient is low.

    Citation: Huawei Sun, Jing Xu, Yang Lu, Zhuanzhuan Ren. Game-theoretic analysis of green investment decisions under service competition in shipping supply chains[J]. Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization, 2026, 22(12): 6559-6592. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2026220

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  • Under decarbonization pressure, green investment has become a strategic choice for ocean shipping companies amid service competition across shipping supply chains. However, it remains unclear how green investment decisions shape service investment strategies. This paper investigates green investment strategies adopted by ocean shipping companies under service competition between shipping supply chains. A Stackelberg game model is established within two competing shipping supply chains, where each chain contains one ocean shipping company and one freight forwarder. Three scenarios are examined: neither ocean shipping company makes green investment, only one ocean shipping company makes green investment, and both ocean shipping companies make green investment simultaneously. Our main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) green investment can improve the service quality of the green ocean shipping company, which further increases the transport demand for its affiliated freight forwarder and enhances the profitability of both firms within the corresponding shipping supply chain; (ⅱ) green investment effectively cuts overall carbon emissions when the carbon emission reduction coefficient stays at a moderate to high level; and (ⅲ) the equilibrium strategy for both competing ocean shipping companies is simultaneous green investment. Nevertheless, a prisoner's dilemma emerges when the service cost coefficient remains low or the green investment cost coefficient is low.



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